St. Cloud State University

The Repository at St. Cloud State
Culminating Projects in History

Department of History

8-2007

Real Potemkin Villages : Pokazukha and Propaganda in the
Soviet-Cuban Connection
Michael Thomas Westrate

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.stcloudstate.edu/hist_etds
Part of the Other History Commons

REAL POTEMKIN VILLAGES: POKAZUKHA AND PROPAGANDA
IN THE SOVIET-CUBAN CONNECTION

by
Michael T. Westrate
B.A., Hillsdale College, 1995

A Thesis
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty
of
St. Cloud State University
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree
Master of Arts

St. Cloud, Minnesota
August, 2007

This thesis submitted by Michael T. Westrate in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts at St. Cloud State University is hereby
approved by the final evaluation committee.

Dean
School of Graduate Studies

REAL POTEMKIN VILLAGES: POKAZUKHA AND PROPAGANDA
IN THE SOVIET-CUBAN CONNECTION

Michael T. Westrate

In the middle of the twentieth century, a series of events occurred that brought
the world's largest country into an intimate connection with one of the world's smaller
nations. A globe apart, the Soviet superpower and powerless Cuba connected
themselves in a common goal-protecting a burgeoning Marxist-Leninist revolution
from what the leaders in both countries saw as historically preordained interference by
the United States. When the two solidified their close connections in the late 1950s
and early 1960s,.no one could have predicted that their relationship would bring the
world to the brink of nuclear war, or that the Revolution in Cuba would outlast
Communist rule in the Soviet Union by more than fifteen years.
The story of the Soviet-Cuban union is long and complex. Although only
providing minimal support until the latter 1950s, the Soviet Union began to offer
assistance to Castro's Cuba in 1958. In 1959, the leaders of the U.S.S.R. started both
open economic support and clandestine military support. In 1960, they intensified
their aid. In early 1962, the Soviets began a secret mission to deploy nuclear weapons
on Cuban soil-with results familiar to most people over the age of thirty-five.
In both Castro's Cuba and Khrushchev's U.S.S.R. , appearances were vital. For
both leaders, in different ways, foreign policy successes-particularly vis-a-vis the
United States-were essential in consolidating and holding power domestically. Both
men used fa9ades and propaganda to accomplish their political ends. Such political
use of fa9ades has a long history in Russia and an intense, if shorter, history in Cuba.
By the mid-l 950s, the leaders of these nations were both relying on fa9ade-building
and Soviet propaganda practices. Such strategies worked extraordinarily well for both
leaders until the early 1960s, when the U.S. finally exposed Khrushchev's bluff for
what it was-a Potemkin village. Even so, Khrushchev was able to ensure that Castro
was safe from intervention by the U.S.

111

By retelling the story of the Soviet-Cuban connection, this project seeks to
accomplish three main goals: First, it revises our understanding of Castro's success- and
why he chose Bolshevism as his modus operandi. Second, it details the historical
complexity of the Soviet-Cuban relationship and the impetus behind that association.
Third, it explores the migration of Leninist propaganda and its counterpart-Russian
pokazukha-from Russian Eurasia to the Cuban Caribbean.
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Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

You know what Lenin said, in order to bring any kind of idea to life,
you have to fling it to the masses. You suggest a slogan to the masses,
and the masses should become possessed of it.
-Fidel Castro 1
In the middle of the twentieth century, a series of events occurred that brought
the world's largest country into an intimate connection with one of the world's smaller
nations. A globe apart geographically, economically, culturally and politically, the
Soviet superpower and powerless Cuba connected themselves in a common goalprotecting a burgeoning Caribbean Marxist-Leninist revolution from what the leaders
in both countries saw as historically preordained interference by the United States.
When the two solidified their close connections in the late 1950s and early 1960s, no
one could have predicted that their relationship would bring the world to the brink or
nuclear war, or that the Revolution in Cuba would outlast Communist rule in the
Soviet Union by more than fifteen years.
The story of the Soviet-Cuban union is long and complex. The Communist
Party of Cuba participated in the Soviet-led Communist International (Comintem)

1

Fidel Castro, quoted in Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, "One Hell of a Gamble ":
Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, /958-1964 (New York: Norton, 1997), 29.

1

2

until that organization's collapse in 1943.2 Communists held important posts in
Fulgencio Batista's second government. 3 The writings of Marx, Lenin, Stalin and
others were printed and circulated in Cuba throughout the early part of the 1900s using
money sent from the U.S.S.R. 4 Raul Castro, Fidel's younger brother and heir-apparent
to the Castro regime, openly declared himself a Communist in the early 1950s, while
he was still in college. 5 On December 1, 1961, Castro declared, "I am a MarxistLeninist, and I will be one until the last days of my life. "6
The Soviet Union began to support Castro's movement in 1958. 7 In 1959, the
leaders of the U.S.S.R. started both open economic support and clandestine military
support. In 1960, they intensified their aid. In early 1962, the Soviets began a secret
mission to deploy nuclear weapons on Cuban soil-with results familiar to every
Cuban, North American, and former Soviet citizen over the age ofthirty-five. 8

2

Manuel Caballero, Latin America and the Comintern 1919-/943 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1986), 48-9.
3
4

Ibid., 127-9.
Ibid., 24-6.

5

Lionel Martin, The Early Fidel: The Roots of Castro's Communism (Secaucus, NJ : Lyle
Stuart, 1978), 79.
6

F. Castro, quoted in Nestor T. Carbonell, And the Russians Stayed: The Sovietization of
Cuba, A Personal Portrait by Nestor T Carbonell (New York: William Morrow, 1989), 202-3 . See
also Robert E. Quirk, Fidel Castro (New York: Norton , 1993), 395.
7

Jacques Levesque, The USSR and the Cuban Revolution: Soviet Ideological and Strategical
Perspectives, 1959-77 (New York: Praeger, 1978), 8-20.
8

Fursenko and Naftali, One Hell ofa Gamble, 11-19, 170-200.

3

In both Cuba and the U.S.S.R., appearances were vital to their leaders. For
both Castro and Khrushchev, in different ways, foreign policy successes-particularly
vis-a-vis the United States- were essential in consolidating and holding power

domestically. Both men used fa;:ades and propaganda to accomplish their political
ends. Such political use of fac;:ades has a long history in Russia and an intense, if
shorter, history in Cuba. By the mid-1950s, the leaders of both nations were heavily
affected by the Soviet version of fac;:ade buj)ding-called pokazukha by the
Russians-as well as the propagandist ideology and practices of the Russian
Revolution. 9
What could motivate a superpower to support a shaky revolution on the other
side of the world? What could cause the independent-minded leaders of the Cuban
Revolution to ask for such support? How did Fidel Castro come to power in Cuba,
despite the presence of an interventionist superpower just off his country's coast?
Why did he then put on the mantle of Bolshevik Communism? Why was Nikita
Khrnshchev willing to risk so much by supporting an erratic Latin revolutionary?
Through a study of specific events, this thesis project offers possible answers to these
questions. It reexan1ines the complex relationship between Cuba and the Soviet
Union, focusing on how and why the building of 'Potemkin villages' was such an
important aspect of policy in both countries.

9

Pokazukha, roughly translated , means "showing off to achieve a desired effect" or "putting
on with a goal in mind." This term is used in contemporary Russia to succinctly describe Russian-style
deceptive fa9ade-buildin g in the tradition of Prince Potemkin of "Potemkin village" fame . Both
pokazukha and its companion propaganda will be di scussed further in Chapter Ill.

4

By retelling the story of the Soviet-Cuban connection in this way, this thesis
project attempts to accomplish three main goals: First, it will revise our understanding
of the Castro's resounding initial popularity-and why he chose Bolshevik
Communism as his modus operandi. Second, it will detail the historical complexity
behind the Soviet-Cuban relationship and the impetus behind their mid-twentiethcentury union. Third, it will explore the migration of Leninist propaganda and its
counterpart-Russian pokazukha-from Russian Eurasia to the Cuban Caribbean.

Historiography
There is no shortage of studies on the Cuban missile crisis. 10 Several
biographers have written about Castro's life, including one that focuses entirely on
discovering the origins of Fidel's socialism. 11 Khrushchev's life has enjoyed almost as
much scrutiny. 12 Several experts have put out treatments of the Cold War since its

IO See, for example, James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn, and David A. Welch, Cuba on the Brink:
Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse (New York: Pantheon, 1993 ); Aleksandr Fursenko
and Timothy Naftali, "One Hell ofa Gamble": Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, /958-1964 (New
York: Norton, 1997); David Detzer, The Brink: Cuban Missie Crisis, 1962 (New York: Thomas
Crowell, 1970); and Max Frankel, High Noon in the Cold War: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Cuban
Missile Crisis (New York: Ballantine Books, 2004).
11

For general biographies, see Robert E. Quirk, Fidel Castro (New York: Norton, 1993); Peter
G. Bourne, Fidel: A Biography of Fidel Castro (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1986); Georgie
Anne Geyer, Guerrilla Prince: The Untold Story of Fidel Castro (Boston: Little, Brown and Company,
1991); and John J. Vail , Fidel Castro (New York: Chelsea House, 1986). For Fidel's communism, see
Lionel Martin, The Early Fidel: The Roots of Castro's Communism (Senacus, NJ : Lyle Stewart, 1978).
12

For an excellent biography of Khrushchev, see William Taubman, Khrushchev: The Man
and His Era (New York: Norton, 2003).

...

5
end.

13

Various accounts of the Soviet connection with Latin America grace the library

shelves. 14 One book even discusses the 'deception' perpetrated by a 'Red' Castro upon
the 'innocent' people of Cuba and the United States. 15 Why, then, did this thesis need
to be written?
The answer lies in the flaws of each of the above categories of works. The
studies of the Cuban missile crisis are overwhelmingly concerned with U.S. interests
and the role of its leaders; when they do treat the motivations of the Cubans and
Soviets, it is with a broad brush and very few pages. Fidel's biographers are either so
sympathetic with his life and politics as to be unacceptably biased, or they side-step
the issue of his ideological convictions altogether by simply labeling him a
'revolutionary'. Khrushchev's biographers spend much less time examining the Cuba
co1mection than it deserves. Books about the Soviet-Cuban relationship tend to either
vilify or glorify the actors-and do so from two well-defined camps which are clearly
in conscious opposition to each other. The general treatments of the Cold War include

13

See, for example, John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin
Press, 2005); and Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From
Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996).
14

See, for example, Nicola Miller, Soviet Relations with Latin America: 1959-1987
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, l 989); Manuel Caballero, Latin America and the Com intern
I 9 I 9-1943 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). For Soviet-Cuban connection, see W.
Raymond Duncan, The Soviet Union and Cuba: Interests and Influence (New York : Praeger, 1985);
Jacques Levesque, The USSR and the Cuban Revolution: Soviet Ideological and Strategical
Perspectives, 1959-77 (New York: Praeger, 1978); and D. Bruce Jackson, Castro, the Kremlin, and
Communism in Latin America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1969).
15

James Monahan and Kenneth 0 . Gilmore, The Great Deception: The Inside Story of How
the Kremlin Took Over Cuba (New York: Farrar, Straus and Co. , 1963).

6

the Soviet-Cuban connection only as it pertains to the missile crisis, the non-aligned
movement, or the war in Angola.
The vast majority of all of these works were written during or shortly after the
Cold War, and many are therefore affected both by the obvious ideological and
political biases of their authors as well as a severe lack of Soviet source material.
Those authors that published after the end of the Cold War-and were therefore able
to use the archives of the former Soviet Union-have focused primarily on the Soviet
role and thus left the issues of Castro's involvement to the books that came before. 16
In the areas of pokazukha and propaganda, this project draws from many works
in Russian and Soviet history. It utilizes much of the research done on imposture; it
pulls ideas from the vast literature on Russian and Soviet identity. 17 Several Cold War
era studies of propaganda have also been useful. 18 However, this project recasts the
work that came before, using the corpus of Russian and Soviet historiography to deal
precisely with the operation of pokazukha in the Soviet-Cuban connection.
Other disciplines also have much to tell us about pokazukha-at least
tangentially. Numerous articles and books from professors of Russian language and
literature refer to the Russian and Soviet predilection for illusion, and are helpful in

16

See Gaddis, Cold War and Zubok and Pleshakov, Kremlin's Cold War.

17

On identity, see for example Geoffrey A. Hosking, Rulers and Victims: the Russians in the
Soviet Union (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2006).
18

For a good example of this type of examination, see Frederick C. Barghoorn, Soviet Foreign
Propaganda (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964).

7

fully exploring the prevalence of pokazukha and propaganda.

19

Cold War studies in

the political science literature hold a mine of examples, and a group of works on
deception produced by psychiatrists and psychologists helped to clarify the 'slippery'
nature of a concept like pokazukha. 20 This thesis incorporates pertinent aspects from
all of these categories of secondary sources, juxtaposing arguments and analyses to
accomplish its key goals in such a way that the primary source materials-and their
authors-speak in a clearer voice.

Framework
Chapter II of this project, entitled, "The Long Shadow of the United States",
surveys the history of Cuba with particular emphasis on the role of its North American
neighbor. It shows how, beyond U.S. intervention in Guatemala, the contemporary
actions of the Eisenhower administration in the 1950s had little to do with the initial
forging of the Soviet-Cuban bond. Much more important was what the leaders in both
socialist countries perceived as historically preordained interference by the United
States. Rather than diplomatic actions of the moment, the geographic and historical
shadow of the United States played the primary North American role in the SovietCuban relationship prior to 1960.

19

In particular, see Thomas Seifrid, "Illusion and Its Workings in Modern Russian Culture,"
The Slavic and East European Journal 45, no. 2 (200 I).

°

2

For an example of the literature in psychology, see Daniel Goleman, Vital lies, Simple
Truths: The Psychology o/Self-Deception (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1985).

8
Scholars are unsure of the degree of Communist and Soviet influence, both in
Cuban history generally and with Fidel Castro in particular. Chapter III, entitled
"Communist Cuba: Communist Castro", explores the background behind that
influence, and suggests that Fidel was drawn to Marxist-Leninism because of a

combination of his understanding of Cuba's history as well as his personal
revolutionary tendencies. Most works written on the subject to date have suggested
that one or the other motivated Castro to become a Bolshevik-either his
interpretation of the historical exploitation of his country, or his dreams of becoming a
dictator. In reality, his motivations were complex, and changed over time.
Chapter IV, entitled "Potemkin Villages, " investigates Russianpokazukha and
Soviet propaganda, and suggests some reasons why the seeds of these practices,
planted by the Bolsheviks in the early twentieth century, found such fertile ground in
Castro's Cuba. The chapter will briefly tell the story of Catherine the Great's Tauride
Tour, out of which originated the term "Potemkin village," then will define Russianstyle pokazukha. The chapter will conclude by exploring how such practices were
incorporated into Bolshevik ideology to be exported to the rest of the globeincluding Cuba.
Mid-twentieth-century Cuba was a nation struggling to reinvent itself, to break
free from the historical and colonial place it had occupied. The Cuban people were
used to deception in politics; the regimes following the 1940 constitution were all
corrupt and fraudulent governments. Dishonesty was regularly covered by deception,
including some amateurish propaganda-however, the Cuban dictators that came

9

before Castro did not successfully apply propaganda and fayades, and the people of
Cuba were therefore quite aware of their corruption. Castro had but to offer a wellpackaged alternative. Once he did, the Cuban-and North American-people were
happy to give him a chance at changing Cuba. Chapter V, "Pokazukha in Cuba," tells
the story of how Castro used the lessons of Russian-style fayade-building and Soviet
propaganda to offer a well-packaged alternative to the corrupt Batista regime, thereby
destroying his enemy and conquering his country without having to fight on any major
battlefields. By manipulating Herbert Matthews and the U.S. press corps, and using
them to help portray his movement as a powerful and unaligned (non-Communist)
alternative to Fulgencio Batista's regime, Castro was able to take and consolidate
power in Havana.
Chapter VI, "The U.S.S.R. and Khrushchev," explores the role of the Soviet
Union in Latin America prior to 1960, and how Nikita Khrushchev's Potemkin-like
foreign policy caused the Communist superpower to be so easily bound up with a
revolutionary movement half a world away. Prior to Castro's revolution, Latin
America was very much on the periphery of Moscow's vision; Castro's socialism
focused the Kremlin's attention squarely on that part of the world. Geopolitically and
ideologically, unaligned Cuba offered a potential propaganda tool and a promising
disruption of U.S. primacy in the Western hemisphere.
Chapter VII, entitled "Up to the Brink," explores the preliminary steps the
Cubans and Soviets took toward alliance. Initially, The Soviet-Cuban connection was
tentative, driven by a mutual need for the appearance of success against a common

10
enemy, the 'imperialist' United States. Verifiable success against the U.S. was
important to neither Castro nor Khrushchev-rather, the fa9ade, which was much
easier to construct, took the place of real success in both of their countries. This
chapter first details how, through fits and starts, the bond between the Soviets and
Cubans solidified. This is followed by a discussion of how Castro and Khrushchev's
Potemkin-like policies converged in 1960, with Castro using the U.S.S.R. to thwart
United States intervention and Khrushchev using Castro's Cuba as the poster-child of
global socialist revolution. Both men were happy to fill the role the other asked of
them.
With Soviet support assured, Castro no longer needed to hide his Communist
sympathies from Washington. Castro's Cuba fully embraced its job as poster-child of
the anti-imperialist Third World, while simultaneously capitalizing on both
Khrushchev's public commitment and his desire to retain leadership of the socialist
camp. The Bay of Pigs failure, executed as it was in a lackadaisical manner, served
only to fuel the propagandistic fires burning in the Potemkin villages of Moscow and
Havana. Simultaneously, however, the U.S. was finishing a successful effort to
dismantle the Soviet fa9ade of missile superiority. Once that Potemkin village was
pulled down, the primacy of Soviet propaganda was irrevocably lost. In a brash bid to
retain that position, Khrushchev sent nuclear missiles to Cuba, but it was already too
late. Chapter VIII, entitled "Pigs and Hedgehogs", investigates these topics .
Throughout, the paper explores how both Castro and Khrushchev used tactics
drawn from the traditions of Russian pokazukha and Soviet propaganda. Castro used

11

them to overcome Batista's censorship, to gull the people of the United States into
thinking he was no threat to North American interests, and to convince his own people
that he was the man who would deliver them into a bright new future. Khrushchev
used them to sustain his mantle of leadership in the global revolution, and maintaining
Castro's fa9ades became an important part of the Kremlin's overall foreign policy
strategy. Using that fabricated status to his advantage, Castro made sure that the
Soviet-Cuban connection was on equal terms, regardless of the economic and
geopolitical inequality between the two countries. Eventually, the maintenance of the
Cuban fa9ade helped the ones built in Khrushchev's Soviet Union to crumble.
However, those erected in Castro's Cuba still stand as a testament to the legacy of
Potemkin, Lenin, Stalin, and Khrushchev.

Chapter II

THE LONG SHADOW OF THE UNITED STATES

Look, the only way to prevent a direct U.S. aggression is for the United
States to realize that an invasion against Cuba would be tantamount to a
war against the Soviet Union.
-Fidel Castro, to Soviet Emissaries, March 196221
I was haunted by the knowledge that the Americans could not stomach
having Castro's Cuba right next to them. They would do something.
They have the strength, and they have the means ... Our aim was to
strengthen and to reinforce Cuba.
-Nikita Khrushchev22
Understanding Cuban history is essential to understanding both the support for
Castro in Cuba and Fidel's motivations in engaging the help of the U.S.S.R. History
influenced the decisions Castro and his deputies were to make throughout the early
years of the Revolution. The history of Cuba is a history of colonial rule from abroad
and turbulent attempts at independence-punctuated by interference from the United
States. Spain ruled Cuba for the four hundred years leading up to 1898. However,
Spanish governance was disrupted both by intrusion from outside and by revolt from
within. From 1739-1763, the British navy deliberately caused trouble for the Spanish
Empire using Cuban territory. Occupying Guantanamo Bay and Havana at different
21

F. Castro, interview by unknown correspondent, CNN, March 1998, http://www.cnn.com/
SPECIALS/cold. war/episodes/ I 0/interviews/castro
22

N. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes, trans. and ed. by Jerrold L.
Schecter and Vyacheslav V. Luchkov (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1990), 170.
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13

points during this period, and spurring both the sugarcane monoculture and the mass
importation of African slaves, the British left their mark on Cuba, both militarily and
economically. 23
The history of North American interference in Cuban affairs is as long as the
history of the United States itself. North American colonials were among the British
soldiers that took Guantanamo and Havana in the mid-l 700s. Although they were
unable to do so, during the Revolutionary War members of the colonial army
leadership wished to take Cuba as a strategic military post in the Caribbean. However,
it was not until 1898, when economic interests combined with strategic interests, that
the United States would officially begin to meddle in Cuban affairs. When those
interests became evident, the leaders in Washington quickly established official,
interventionist policies. Over time, both the policies and their use increased until
many of the people of Cuba deeply resented their North American neighbor.

Cuba Coveted
We must have the Floridas and Cuba.
-Thomas Jefferson, J80rJ2 4
In the years following the independence of the United States, there was a great
migration westward. The newly formed settlements of the American West had no
outlet for their goods to compare with that of the trade route down the Mississippi

23
24

Richard Gott, Cuba: A New History (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004), 40-4.

Thomas Jefferson, quoted in Charles E. Chapman, A History of the Cuban Republic: A
Study in Hispanic American Politics (New York: Macmillan, 1927), 48.

14

River to New Orleans and the Gulf of Mexico. The acquisition of New Orleans in the
Louisiana Purchase of 1803 improved matters for the United States, but the route was
still at the mercy of any power that held Florida or Cuba. The French invasion of
Spain in 1808 caused anxiety in the young United States that Napoleon would cause
complications in Spanish America. 25 Governor Claiborne of Louisiana presented the
Western attitude about Cuba in a letter to the Secretary of State in 1810:
There is nothing I so much desire as to see the flag of my Country
reared on the Moro Castle. Cuba is the real mouth of the Mississippi,
and the nation possessing it, can at any time command the trade of the
Western States. Give us Cuba and the American Union is placed
beyond the reach of change. 26
Over the next century, numerous leaders of the United States expressed the
same wish. "It was not so much that they desired Cuba for itself, as they were afraid
some European power, as [James] Madison put it, 'might make a fulcrum of that
position against the commerce and security of the United States. "' 27 This fear was one
of the primary motivating factors leading to the adoption of the Monroe Doctrine, a
policy that the United States has followed-in one form or another-right up to the
present day.
Written by John Quincy Adams and presented by President James Monroe
during a "State of the Union" address in 1823, the policy originally had three main
components: First, it stated that the United States would no longer allow European
25

Chapman, Cuban Republic, 47-8.

26

Governor Claiborne, quoted in Chapman, Cuban Republic, 48 .

27

Chapman, Cuban Republic, 49.

15
countries to colonize in the Western hemisphere. Second, it reinforced President
George Washington's isolationist rule of foreign policy, in which the U.S. would only
get involved in European affairs if American interests were disturbed. Third, it stated,
in no uncertain terms, that the U.S. would consider any attempt at colonization in the
Western hemisphere a threat to its national security. 28 Just a few months prior to
writing the Monroe Doctrine, John Quincy Adams wrote a letter to the minister of the
United States in Spain in which he claimed: "Cuba, almost in sight of our shores,
from a multitude of considerations, has become an object of transcendent importance
to the commercial and political interests of our Union." 29 The opinion of the
succeeding leaders in the United States capital did not stray from this conviction-nor
did they fail to act upon it.
The Cuban struggle for independence from Spain spanned thirty years and
involved three main wars and a number of smaller revolts. Beginning in 1868, the
struggle waxed and waned until 1895, when several important Cuban freedom
fighters, including the famous revolutionary Jose Marti, landed on Cuba. Marti was
soon killed, but others fought on, defeating the Spanish Governor. As the war wore
on, the major limitation to Cuban success was the lack of arms and ammunition.
Although the majority of weapons and funding came from Cuban patriots inside the

28
29

Paul Boyer, American Nation (Austin, TX : Holt, 2000), 229-30.
John Quincy Adams, quoted in Chapman, Cuban Republic, 55.

16

United States, the supply operation violated American laws enforced by the U.S. Coast
Guard. Few supply ships slipped through their net. 30
In late 1897 and early 1898, riots in Havana by rowdy pro-Spanish
"Voluntarios" gave the United States an excuse to interfere further in Cuban affairs.
The McKinley administration sent in the U.S.S. Maine to "protect American interests"
in January 1898. With American attention focused on Cuba, Spanish atrocities began
to inspire sympathy among the people of the United States. Pushed by popular
opinion, President McKinley demanded reforms for Cuba. When the U.S.S. Maine
exploded, killing 274 Americans in February 1898, tensions escalated and the U.S.
would no longer accept Spanish promises of eventual reform. 3 1
Thus, in April 1898, as Cuban freedom fighters began to win major victories
and were on their way to defeating the Spanish, the U.S. 'hijacked' the Caribbean war
for independence by declaring war on Spain. 32 Up against a modem, well-equipped
army and navy, the Spanish mustered only a nominal defense and U.S. military forces
were quickly successful. The Spanish surrendered in July. In December 1898,
Spanish leaders signed the Treaty of Paris, recognizing Cuban independence. The
U.S. Army, led by Minnesota judge Charles Magoon, took over the island on a
temporary basis and began several major programs, including a massive public health
initiative and a complex modernization program of infrastructural improvements. In
30
31

32

Gott, Cuba: A New History, 93-7 .
Keen and Haynes, History of Latin America, 428-30.
Ibid.

17
1902, the United States handed control over to a Cuban government, but only after
insuring that the new Cuban constitution, written late the previous year, included
provisions implementing the requirements of the Platt Amendment. 33
Those requirements were a serious infringement of Cuban sovereignty, and
included the following: ceding to the United States the naval base in Cuba
(Guantanamo Bay); stipulating that Cuba would not transfer Cuban land to any power
other than the United States; mandating that Cuba would contract no foreign debt
without guarantees that the interest could be paid from ordinary revenues; and
prohibiting Cuba from negotiating treaties with any country other than the United
States "which will impair or tend to impair the independence of Cuba." Cuba would
not be allowed to "permit any foreign power or powers to obtain .. .lodgement in or
control over any portion" of Cuba. The new Cuban government was forced to agree to
a formal treaty detailing all the foregoing provisions. Most importantly, the United
States declared the right to intervene militarily any time its leaders suspected that any
34

of the above requirements was violated.

In the words of one revolutionary Cuban

leader: "The Platt Amendment has reduced the independence and sovereignty of the
Cuban republic to a myth. 1135
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Over the next few years, American investors acquired much of the land
destroyed by the war, enabling the United States by 1920 to control roughly threequarters of Cuban sugar production, the foundation of the Cuban economy. From
1902 to 1905, the Cuban population recovered political power and formed a republic
under President Tomas Palma. Under his administration, Cuba enacted civil rights
and anti-discrimination legislation, years ahead of the North Americans. Most
historians agree that the Cuban Republic under Palma was peaceful and progressive.36
However, during the same period, the United States declared further rights for itself in
Latin America. Articulated in 1904, the "Roosevelt Corollary" was a substantial
alteration of the Monroe Doctrine by President Theodore Roosevelt. Essentially, he
extended the doctrine to include the 'right' of the United States to intervene to stabilize
the economic affairs of small nations in Latin America if they were unable to pay their
international debts. The Monroe Doctrine (as modified by Roosevelt) and the Platt
Amendment would lend themselves well to America's new policy of 'containment'
during the Cold War.
In 1906, the United States interfered once more in the Caribbean when
negotiations led by Undersecretary of War William Taft ended a successful Cuban
revolt. 37 The United States again sent in Magoon, who assumed temporary control
until 1909. Yet again, in 1920, the United States intervened in Cuba to settle disputes
among ruling elites, with President Woodrow Wilson sending in Sumner Welles to
36
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negotiate a settlement. 38 Cuba also became a major tourist destination in the 1920s,
and by the end of the decade, it was festooned with casinos and nightclubs catering to
foreign clientele.39
Then, in September 1933, the lower ranks of the Cuban Army revolted,
together with student revolutionaries, successfully taking power on the island. A key
figure in the process was Fulgencio Batista, originally an army sergeant, who
gradually assumed total control of the country. To consolidate power, Batista brutally
suppressed a series of revolts. With encouragement from U.S. Ambassador Welles, he
separated the Cuban military from the student-labor component of the new
revolutionary government. This was necessary in order to cut the anti-American
students off from the power of the military. As Army Chief of Staff, Batista became
the country's de facto leader behind a series of puppet presidents. 40
In 1940, Batista was elected President in his own right, while the Cuban
leadership passed a remarkable new constitution. The Cuban Constitution of 1940 is
widely considered one of the most progressive constitutions in existence at the time.
A significant achievement in statecraft, this constitution provided for land reform,
public education, a minimum wage, and other liberal ideas. Sadly, the provisions of
the document were not well implemented or enforced, either by Batista or by the
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dishonest leaders who followed him. Batista lost the election in 1944, left office, and
was succeeded by two liberal, but horribly corrupt, presidents. 41
As Cuba began this period of dishonest governance, the United States and the
Soviet Union emerged from WWII to find themselves locked in a new kind of war-a
Cold War. In Washington, D.C., 'containment' became the operating foreign policy.
Articulated by George F. Kennan in 1946 and first put into force by President Harry S.
Truman, the policy of containment fully incorporated many of the same assumptions
that were held by the leaders of the Soviet Union during the same period, particularly
that the world was divided into two 'camps', one capitalist, the other Communist. The
leaders of the U.S. decided that the spread of Communism from the Soviet center must
be contained at all costs. The leadership in Washington adopted a policy of
intervention in the Third World, one major element of which was "long-term, patient
but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies." 42 By 1950,
events in Europe and Asia spurred U.S. decision makers to use the containment policy
as a guiding principle in foreign policy worldwide.

CIA Incursion
Up to that point [U.S. intervention in Guatemala] he used to say, he
was merely a sniper, criticizing from a theoretical point of view the
political panorama of our America. From here on he was convinced
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that the struggle against the oligarchic system and the main enemy,
Yankee imperialism, must be an armed one, supported by the people.
-Hilda Gadea, Ernesto 'Che' Guevara'sfirst wife43
In the wake of WWII, the Soviets saw the nations emerging from imperial rule
as potential allies while the United States saw them as potential threats. As those in
Moscow hoped that anti-imperialist feelings would tum these countries toward
socialism, those in Washington knew that "the United States could not detach itself
from its British, French, Dutch, and Portuguese allies ... the risk that 'third world'
nationalists would associate the Americans with imperialism was therefore high. "44
Although formal U.S. foreign policy of the time was in fact anti-imperialist, its
leadership in NATO and its affiliation and support of that organization's empires
caused it to be easily lumped in with the empires railed against by mid-twentieth
century Marxist-Leninists. Even the Latin American policies articulated in the Platt
Amendment and the Monroe Doctrine were perceived by the leaders of the United
States as anti-imperialist, rather than imperialist. Those policies were written to keep
European imperialism from interfering with American interests. However, in practice,
the United States was rampantly interventionist in the Western hemisphere,
particularly in Cuba. Using the stigma of the empires the U.S. was now sworn to
protect, as well as the history of U.S. intervention, Soviet and other Marxist-Leninist
propagandists pushed an image of the United States as an imperial power, and many
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people in the emerging states were swayed by this image. The propaganda component
of the early Cold War was vital for both superpowers, as the leaders in both suspected
that the choices newly independent states made could yet tip the balance of power in
the Cold War.
In the Soviet Union of the mid-l 950s, this possibility was greeted with
ebullient optimism; in the United States, it was met with caution. Under these
circumstances, allowing even an undeveloped country to fall under Communist control
could shake the confidence of the non-Communist world. This was what Eisenhower
had in mind when, in April, 1954, he invoked the famous Cold War metaphor: "You
have a row of dominos set up, you knock over the first one, and ...the last one ... will
go over very quickly. So you could have ...a disintegration that would have the most
profound influences. "45
Just one month later, in May 1954, the United States did something that would
seriously retard the early growth of the Soviet-Cuban connection five years laterthey intervened in Guatemala. There, the Monroe Doctrine combined with the policy
of containment to produce an extraordinary intervention in Latin American affairs.
Although the United States intruded in numerous countries around the world during
this period, usually through the auspices of the CIA, the case of Guatemala was
particularly important for the future of Cuba.
After his election in 1951 , President Jacobo Arbenz of Guatemala instituted a
number of new policies, including an agrarian reform law that expropriated and
45
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redistributed land. His labor and industrialization policies seemed to threaten U.S.
interests in his country, particularly those of the United Fruit Company (UFCO). The
UFCO had large stakes in Guatemala's old order (in addition to their huge Cuban
holdings), and lobbied various levels of the U.S. government for action against
Arbenz. Concurrently, the U.S. intelligence community deemed Arbenz's reforms to
be Communist in nature, fueling fear that Guatemala would become what CIA
Director Allen Dulles called a "Soviet beachhead in the western hemisphere. "46
Allen Dulles and his brother, John Foster Dulles (then U.S. Secretary of State)
had both been partners in the UFCO's law firm prior to acquiring their government
posts. Historians have accused both men of deep involvement in a U.S. conspiracy
against Arbenz, along with Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America John Moors
Cabot and his brother Henry Cabot Lodge, U.S . Ambassador to the U.N. The second
set of brothers were stockholders in the UFCO at the time of the Guatemala
intrusion. 47
The CIA operation, codenamed PBSUCCESS (Presidential Board Success),
ran from 1952 to 1954. The CIA armed and trained a "Liberation Army" of about 400
fighters under the command of a then exiled Guatemalan army officer, Colonel Carlos
Castillo Armas. In 1954, the arrival in Guatemala of a Czech arms shipment (the U.S.
had previously imposed an arms embargo on Guatemala) gave the CIA the pretext to
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invade. Armas' 'army' advanced six miles into Guatemala from the Honduran border,
and waited for his U.S . allies to do the rest. A phony "Liberation Air Force",
consisting of U.S . pilots flying CIA airplanes, commenced dropping propaganda
leaflets and incendiary bombs on the capital. Guatemalan army officers refused either
to fight or to arm people willing to do so. They also pressured Arbenz to resign,
turning the government over to a three-manjunta. 48
However, the United States insisted on the installation of Armas as
"President." In July, Armas was flown to the capital on a U.S. embassy plane. He
promptly launched a campaign of terror against his opponents. According to one
estimate, eight thousand people were executed. Arbenz's land reform was revoked,
the UFCO and other landholders regained their holdings, and Armas surrounded
himself with a gang of "grafters and cut-throats."49 During the coup, the CIA carried
out a complex and largely experimental diplomatic, economic, and propaganda
campaign. PBSUCCESS employed ideas and methods that were relatively new to
U.S. practice at the time. The success of the operation led to PBSUCCESS becoming
the model for the overthrow or destabilization of any potential "domino" country,
including the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion in Cuba. 50

It was with this recent U.S. exploit very much in mind that both the Cuban
leaders of the Cuban revolution and the Russian leaders of the Soviet Union embarked
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upon tentative relations in 1959. Ernesto 'Che' Guevara, one of Fidel's closest allies
until his death, had actually been in Guatemala City at the time of the coup, and he
would never forget the experience. 51 In the Soviet Union, the leaders of global
Communism had learned an important lesson. According to the official history
textbook of the KGB (used in intelligence training academies): "American
imperialism is the most dangerous enemy. It requires constant alertness on the part of
the government and its services. "52 The policy of Containment and the Domino
Theory, combined with the Monroe Doctrine and the Roosevelt Corollary, meant that
aiding left-leaning governments in the Western hemisphere was no easy task.53
Besides the political importance of the United States in Cuban affairs, by 1959
Cuba was profoundly connected to the U.S. in the economic realm. With pressure
from North American investors, sugar had become the country's principal crop, and
Cuba's growers sold between 2.5 and 3 million metric tons (50-60 percent of total
production) to the U.S. every year at a subsidized price. Subsidiaries of North
American companies employed 10 percent of all Cuban workers, and U.S. interests
owned the island's utilities and most of its oil refineries. Along with other U.S.
corporations, the United Fruit Company (with its political connections in Washington)
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still owned most of Cuba's major sugar plantations. 54 The invasion of Guatemala had
proven that economic interests such as these, along with ideological interests and
security issues, were primary motivators in American foreign policy.
Taken together, the political and economic preeminence of the U.S. in Cuban
affairs stood as a major obstacle for the rise of any openly Communist leader in Cuba,
and made a strong connection between the Soviet Union and any Latin American
country seem an impossibility.
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Chapter III

COMMUNIST CUBA; COMMUNIST CASTRO

We were indeed socialists, we had had indeed the opportunity of
studying the fundamental works of Marx, Engels, and Lenin.
Actually, it can be said that the revolutionary process of Cuba is the
confirmation of the extraordinary force of the ideas of Marx, Engels,
and Lenin. I wish to assert here that the Cuban revolution-an event
that appeared difficult, an event that for many was impossible-would
have been impossible to conceive and apply had it not been for the
essential ideas and principles of Marxism.
-Fidel Castro 55
Scholars disagree about the importance of Communist influence, both in
Cuban history generally and with Castro in particular. However, most scholars agree
upon the basic factual outline of Communism's history in Cuba. In the case of Fidel
Castro, opinions vary widely, but,. as this chapter will show, the historical record
seems to support Castro's own dating of his conversion to Marxist-Leninism while he
was at the University of Havana in the early 1950s.
From the early twentieth century on, Bolshevik Communism offered an
alternative to the policies and ideology that the European and North American rulers
had historically forced upon the Cuban people. Communist sympathizers in Western
academe are correct in this analysis. 56 Marxist-Leninism also offered a successful
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revolutionary template for any would-be dictator that might decide to utilize it. 'Cold
Warrior' scholars are just as correct when they claim this as Castro's motivation. 57 In
reality, both motivations combined to inspire the use of Bolshevik tactics and ideology
in Castro's movement.

Cuba's Communism
The advantages of socialism are truly tremendous if one wants to take
advantage of them [pounds on table].
-Fidel Castro 58
Communism's history in Cuba began with George Weeth, a friend and student
of Karl Marx. Expelled from his native Germany, Weeth immigrated to Cuba and
lived there until his death in 1854. One of Weeth's Cuban disciples, Pablo Lafargue,
studied in Paris, married Marx's daughter and became an important member of the
Socialist Internationals. Lafargue's close friend Carlos Balino joined the charismatic
student leaders Blas Roca and Julio Antonio Mella to found the Communist Party of
Cuba in 1925. 59 Under the tutelage of Polish immigrant Fabio Grobart, the Cuban
national party quickly joined the Comintem, the organization of world Communism
directed from Moscow.
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Most historical accounts agree that Grobart (aliases Abraham Sinovich,
Antonio Blanco, and Fabio Grovat, real name Yunger Semjovich) came to Cuba as an
agent of the Comintern in 1922 or 1923, and assisted the Party's formation in Cuba.
Grobart helped lead the Cuban Communist Party, in one capacity or another, until his
death in 1994. In 1943, a FBI "Survey of Communist Activities in Cuba" called him
"the real chief and dictator of the Cuban Communist Party." 60 Although Grobart
worked primarily behind the scenes, he and his followers formed local "soviets,"
penetrated and converted labor unions, and worked diligently to foment Communist
revolution in Cuba. Under Grobart's leadership, the Communists became an important
force in Cuban politics. Although they won few elections themselves, Communists
did compose important elements of several Cuban administrations, including those led
by Machado and Batista. 61
However, until 1959, the Cuban Communists, Grobart included, were only on
the periphery of Moscow's vision. The leaders of the U.S.S.R. believed, following
Marx and Lenin, that revolution would occur in Europe first, then in Asia, followed by
the rest of the globe. The countries of Latin America, including Cuba, were not far
enough along the predetermined path to global socialism for them to be any kind of
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focus of the international movement. 62 Therefore, beyond the role of men such as
Grobart and monetary support for the printing of ideological and propaganda texts,
Moscow allowed the Cuban Communist Party to control its own domestic affairs. As
for major positions on international policy, Cuban Communists toed the line drawn by
Moscow.
For example, from the beginning of their organizations, both the Comintern
and the Cuban Communist Party declared the United States an imperialist power.
However, after the U.S. allied with the Soviets against the Nazis, Communists
everywhere, including those in Cuba, suddenly considered the United States an ally. 63
The exigencies of World War II required a "United Front" against Nazism, and
capitalist and socialist alike found themselves on the same side of what the
Communist Third International called, "a deep dividing line between those countries
which fell under the Hitlerite tyranny and those freedom-loving peoples who have
united in a powerful anti-Hitlerite coalition." 64 Thus were the particular interests of
the Cuban Communists regularly sublimated to the will of Moscow.
In late 1920s and early 1930s Cuba, the Party's membership was made up
mostly of university students who saw themselves as the representatives of national
will and heirs to Jose Marti's legacy. Among others in the younger generation, they
62
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believed it was their duty to carry on the revolution that the United States had
frustrated in 1898. They opposed the United State's supervision of the island, and saw
the Platt Amendment's provisions as humiliating. This student Communist Party
instigated the general strike that brought down the Gerardo Machado dictatorship in
August 1933, even though the Party reversed itself and began to support Machado just
prior to his fall, fearing another intervention by the North Americans. Despite late
Communist support of Machado, that intervention occurred when Sumner Welles
appointed a new U.S.-friendly president, Carlos Manuel de Cespedes, in September.
In response, the students (led by the Communist Party leadership) joined forces with
the lower echelons of the military and deposed the North-American appointee. 65 As
the story of this event illustrates, the Communists were quite powerful in Cuba, even if
they won few elections themselves.
At first, Batista and the military representatives of the new government
allowed the students to choose the provisional president, and they decided upon Dr.
Ramon Grau San Martin, a popular professor at the University of Havana. The United
States refused to recognize the Grau presidency, and the military component of the
new government conspired to take power. Led by Batista and encouraged by the
United States, the army contingent purged members of the Communist Party, the
National Confederation of Labor, and the Anti-Imperialist League from government
positions. In January, 1934, Batista forced Grau to resign. After a two-day rule by
engineer Carlos Hevia, Batista appointed Carlos Mendieta as provisional President.
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Five days later, the United States recognized Cuba's new government. Under pressure
from the United States, Batista's organization had swept the student Communists from
power. 66
The next six years were chaotic times for Cuba, and the Communist Party
vacillated between advocating strikes and supporting the current regime. However,
after Batista became the first president elected under the new 1940 constitution, he
gave the Communists complete freedom of operation. He also promoted several
Communists into key posts in his government, and Communists in Cuba enjoyed a
period of peace and influence.
Following the end of WWII, Cuba was again plunged into a period of upheaval
and revolt, leading to Batista's second period of rule. In 1952, Edwardo Chibas, the
leader of the liberal Orthodox Party, was widely expected to win the Presidential
election by running on a platform of anticorruption. Chibas committed suicide before
he could win the presidency, and the party was left without its primary leader. Taking
advantage of this vacuum, Batista, who was again running for President but was only
expected to get a fraction of the necessary votes, seized power three months before the
election was to take place. Almost immediately, Batista suspended the 1940
Constitution. Due in part to the corruption of the previous two administrations, the
general public's reaction to the coup was slow. In 1954, Batista was again elected
President, though the elections were almost certainly fraudulent. His democratic title
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was only for show, since Batista ruled as a dictator until Castro's movement caused
him to flee the country in 1959. 67
Although Batista had again purged the Communists from his government in
1947, the Communist response to the dictator's 1952 coup was ambiguous. The
Communist Party was increasingly disconnected from other revolutionary groups.
Eusebio Mujal, former Communist and high-profile labor leader, made this situation
worse by collaborating with the Batista regime. By 1957, the Party publicly opposed
Batista's dictatorship, but refused to support armed insurrection, including that led by
Fidel Castro. By then, their complacency had so far distanced them from mainstream
public opinion in Cuba that their proclamations had little impact domestically.
However, Communism had already made its impact on Castro's
revolutionaries. Fidel's younger brother Raul, along with their longtime friend and
ally Che Guevara, were open Marxist-Leninists from the 1950s on. The leaders of the
Castro revolution used Communist ideology and Leninist strategies from the very
beginnings of their revolt. In 1958, during their time in the Sierra Maestra Mountains,
the leaders of Castro's band made "a pact" with Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, propaganda
chief of the Cuban Communist Party. This was later confirmed by Nino Diaz, a highranking officer in Castro's movement:
[Rodriguez's] Communist 'recruits' began to come in droves. They
were not good soldiers, but it soon became obvious that they weren't
supposed to fight. Their job was to spread out among the troops and
work as political indoctrinators. With Raul Castro's permission, they
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even went out and organized Marxist study groups among the local
peasants who were loyal supporters of the revolution. 68
Although Fidel and the official Cuban Communist Party publicly distanced
themselves from each other from 1957 to 1961, this internal conversion of Castro's
peasant revolutionaries continued apace. In 1961 , before his public declaration of
Marxist-Leninism, Fidel reversed the official Communist Party's status. In July of that
year, the Integrated Revolutionary Organizations Party (ORI) was formed by the
merger of the People's Socialist Party (the original Cuban Communist Party) led by
Blas Roca, the 26 th of July Movement (discussed in detail below), led by Castro, and
the Revolutionary Directory of March 13 1\ led by Faure Chamon. Blas Roca and
Fabio Grobart were the only members of the old Communist leadership to survive the
purges, ordered by Fidel, which surrounded the formation of the new organization. In
March 1962, the ORI became the United Party of the Cuban Socialist Revolution
(PURSC). PURSC then officially became "The Communist Party of Cuba" in October
1965. 69 Since 1965, the Communist Party has been the only recognized political party
in Cuba. Other parties, though not technically illegal, are unable to campaign or
conduct any activities in the country that could be deemed "counter-revolutionary." 70
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Castro's Communism
If Ulysses was captivated by the songs of the siren; I was captivated by
the incontestable verities of the Marxist literature.

-Fidel Castro 71
Entire books have been written about when, and why, Fidel Castro became a
Communist. 72 Although scholars are still unsure of Fidel Castro's earliest exposure to
Marxist-Leninist ideology, some have suggested that he read many of the ideology's
seminal works during his adolescent years. 73 Whether or not that is true, many
historians now agree with Fidel's own post-1961 stance on his ideological
conversion-that by the time he left the University of Havana in 1950, he was already
a convicted Marxist-Leninist. Thus, despite his revolutionary-era statements to the
contrary, Castro was likely a Communist at least nine years before the victory of the
Revolution and twelve years before he publicly announced that Cuba would become a
Communist country. 74
There are several reasons for this conclusion. First, since 1961, Castro himself
has consistently used the 1950 dating. Second, several witnesses have disclosed that it
was Fidel who gave his brother Raul his first Communist literature-and Raul
publicly declared himself a Communist in 1950. Third, Castro played a role in the
riots in Bogota, Columbia in 1948-riots probably instigated by Communists. Fourth,
71
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as we have seen, Communist indoctrination was begun among the soldiers of Castro's
army while it was still little more than a small guerilla band huddled in the Sierra
Maestra Mountains. Sixth, an examination of Castro's pre-Revolution speeches,
letters, manifestos, and articles has illuminated a Marxist-Leninist conviction dating
from at least as far back as his university days. 75 However, the timing of Castro's full
conversion will probably never be determined precisely. Regardless of the exact date
of his 'conviction' to Communist principles, Fidel's early life was full of both
encounters with Communist ideology and exposures to the power of public opinion.
Castro was born on April 13, 1926, on his father's sugar plantation near the
coast of Cuba's Oriente province. His father, Angel Castro, had been born in
Northwest Spain and had come to Cuba with the Spanish army during the SpanishAmerican War. After the U.S. victory, Angel had acquired a large sugarcane
plantation. Angel's first marriage to a Cuban schoolteacher ended with her death. He
then married his cook, with whom he had an affair during his first marriage. She had
already given birth to three children by him prior to their marriage, including Fidel. 76
Castro led an easy early existence as the son of a wealthy landowner; at age
six, he went to La Salle boarding school. As an adult, Castro has said repeatedly that
his idea of social consciousness first sprouted at this school. While at La Salle, Castro
once barricaded himself in a classroom with other student supporters to resist
75
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punishment for not having memorized a poem. When he was only thirteen, he
attempted to organize a strike of his own father's plantation workers. 77
In 1942, at age sixteen, Castro began high school in Havana at the Jesuit-run
Belen Preparatory School. At this school, Castro played baseball, soccer, basketball
and jai alai. He was a good student and an excellent debater. He was voted Cuba's
best high school athlete in 1944. He was also a good student of history, especially of
the life and writings of the revolutionaries Jose Marti and Vladimir Lenin. 78 The note
under his senior yearbook photo read. "We do not doubt that he will fill the book of
his life with brilliant pages." 79
In 1945, Castro entered the University of Havana Law School, where he began
to involve himself in school and national politics. Despite inattention to his studies,
Castro was a good student. In 194 7, however, a combination of national political
groups and university students were organizing an expedition, called the Cayo
Confites expedition, to invade the Dominican Republic and overthrow its hated-and
U.S.-supported-<lictator. Castro left school to join up. He was well aware of the
strategic and economic importance of the Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, and Cuba
to the United States. Like many other Cubans, he was disaffected with North
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American influence in the Caribbean-here was a chance for him to make a name for
himself and strike back against the 'aggressors'. Cuban police stopped the expedition
before it began, arresting those involved; Castro escaped arrest by jumping ship and
swimming to shore. 80
Castro went back to school, periodically organizing political demonstrations.
During this time, Castro began to understand how important propaganda is to any
cause, and how he could use it. Dr. Richard Martinez Ferrer, a doctor in residency at
the hospital of the University of Havana, later recalled:
One night there was a knock on my door, ancl suddenly Fidel appeared
with a huge bandage on his head ... He said he needed help. I told him
to come in, and he responded immediately: 'About two hours ago, I
went to the newspaper office and the police attacked me, and I had to
go to the emergency room and a doctor bandaged me.' 81
The next morning, Castro asked Martinez to bring him a copy of the Prensa
Libre newspaper. On the front page, a banner headline read: "Student Leader

Assaulted by Police". In the upper right-hand corner was a picture of Castro with the
bandage on his head. Martinez continued:
I returned to the room with the paper .. .I opened the door. Fidel was
supposed to be there, waiting for me ... He was there, but without the
bandage. I was amazed. 'What happened to you?' I asked him. And he
replied that nothing had happened, that he had had to do this to get
front page on the paper. 82

80
81

82

Vail, Fidel Castro, 20.
Doctor Richard Martinez Ferrer, quoted in Geyer, Guerrilla Prince, 65 .
Ibid.

39
In 1949, another incident occurred that serves as a good example of Castro's
intelligence and talents in utilizing propaganda. A small group of drunken and rowdy
U.S. Marines clambered discourteously atop the statue of Jose Marti in Havana's
central park. One of them urinated on it, defaming the sacred memory of Marti. It
was as if Fidel had been waiting for an event like this. Immediately, he formed an
honor guard, which flanked the statue all night. The next day, he led an angry protest
demonstration at the U.S. embassy. Fidel's group moved on the building, equipped
with rocks in their pockets. When they were about half a block away, they began
throwing them at the windows, creating an uproar. They then ran to a restaurant down
the street, where they watched the police cars rushing to the embassy, their sirens
blaring. This was the first time that Castro's name appeared in the Cuban press in an
important way. "It was also proof, if any more were needed, that the young leader
knew not only how to use events to his advantage but also how to create events of his
own."83
In 1951 , one of Fidel's political mentors, Senator Eduardo Chibas, shot himself
in the abdomen during his weekly radio program, thereby committing public suicide.
His last words, which sadly for him did not go out over the airwaves (he had run past
the hour and his microphone had been cut) were: "This is my last gunshot to awaken
the civic consciousness of the Cuban people." 84 It has been suggested that Chibas did
not intend a fatal wound-that instead of martyrdom, he was seeking a propaganda
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coup for his cause, as a shot to the head or heart is the usual method of suicide-byfirearm. 85 Whether or not that suggestion is true, this episode is a good example of the
poorly executed propaganda-type political maneuvering that existed in Cuba prior to
the late 1950s.
Chibas had founded and lead the Orthodox Party, of which Castro was a
member. A charismatic man committed to the legal route to power, Chibas believed
that the Orthodoxos were the true heirs to the revolutionary heritage of Marti.
Recognizing the power of Chi bas' revolutionary message, Castro joined the Orthodox
Party in 1947. Fidel campaigned with Chibas across the country when he ran for
senator, and again during his Presidential campaign. After Chibas' death, Castro
played up his mentor's martyrdom.
Fidel spoke longer than anyone else, from prepared statements, to the
microphones that radio stations had set up in Havana to record words of condolence
from Chibas' mourners. Castro also lobbied the man in charge of Chibas' funeral
arrangements to move his body to the Presidential palace, "to take advantage of the
gigantic outpouring of public grief. .. so we can seize power. 1186 Although he did not
succeed in capitalizing on the funeral, Castro did take on the mantle of Chibas and use
his dead mentor's political following to get elected to the House of Representatives.
Castro's campaign progressed well, and by March of 1952, he had little doubt that he
would win-but he did not. The elections were never held, for Batista staged his coup
85
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just prior to the elections. Batista's illegal coup had a profound effect on Fidel, who
realized that legal political avenues were much less powerful than public opinion or
military might. 87
,-J

This realization about the power of public opinion was one of the reasons why
Castro publicly denied his Marxist-Leninist ideological sympathies from 1952 until
1961. Fidel is an incredibly shrewd politician with a good grasp of his country's
history, and he knew that declaring himself a Communist would evaporate the good
will he had garnered in the United States (discussed in detail below) and seriously
erode the popularity he had in his own country. He was extremely sensitive to the
anti-Communist atmosphere that surrounded him, and was content to work under other
guises until he could take and consolidate his rule. 88 Not until he had taken power in
Havana through the support of the Cuban people could he allow them to know he was
a Communist; not until he had the support of the world's only other superpower could
he afford to resist the one ninety miles off his country's coast.
It is clear that Fidel was heavily affected by his reading of Soviet Communist
literature, particularly relating to practical methods of establishing and consolidating
rule. According to several classmates, even during high school Castro read avidly and
recited excerpts from the political manifestos and speeches of famous Marxist
revolutionaries, including Lenin. 89 When he arrived at college, from the very
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beginning Fidel had many Com1mmist friends. Castro does not attribute his
conversion to his friends, however. He has said that Marx and Engel's Communist
Manifesto had "an almost apocalyptic influence" on his thinking.90 "For me it was a
revelation .. .It was so persuasive that I was absolutely amazed. I was converted to
those ideas." 9 1 Castro also read Lenin's Selected Works during this time, which
included "What is to be Done?", the essay that laid out the principles of official Soviet
propaganda (discussed in detail below). 92
One episode is particularly illuminating of both Castro's adherence to
Communist ideology and his exposure to Soviet principles of propaganda. In July
1953, shortly before the Moncada incident (for which Fidel and Raul would both earn
a prison sentence, discussed below), Castro made one of many trips to the Communist
bookshop in Havana, which was the storefront to the Communist Party offices.
Among the books he purchased that day were several dealing with the Russian
Revolution and Soviet activities against the Nazis.93 While at the bookstore, Castro
met with Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, then propaganda chief of the Cuban Communist
Party and an expert on Bolshevik agitation and propaganda. "While [at the bookshop],
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Castro came up to the propaganda department," Rodriguez later recalled, "We had a
long conversation about the national situation . .. The conversation was that of two
leaders, two revolutionaries, speaking about the struggle. "94 As has already been
mentioned, Rodriguez would later head up the indoctrination of Castro's soldiers
during their time in the Sierra Maestras.
What did Castro take away from reading Soviet materials on 'the dictatorship
of the proletariat'? What did he learn from meetings with men like Rodriguez? Since
Fidel is an inveterate liar, and since historians cannot read minds, we are only able to
speculate. However, the next two chapters will investigate first what Castro could

have learned from the Soviets (by examining Russian political culture and Soviet
ideology), then will move on to how Castro put those principles into action in his own
country.

94

Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, interview by Lionel Martin, September 27, 1972, quoted in
Martin, Early Fidel, 122.

Chapter IV

POTEMKIN VILLAGES

Russians fear the truth, that is, we do not fear it, if you wish, but
constantly regard the truth as something far too tedious and prosaic,
insufficiently poetic, too commonplace, and in this way, by constantly
avoiding it, we finally made it one of the most unusual and rare things
in the Russian world.
-Fyodor Mikhailovich Dostoevsky95
Russian-style deception allowed Castro to destroy his enemies and conquer his
country without having to fight on any major battlefields. Cuba was a nation
struggling to reinvent itself, to break free from the historical and colonial place it had
occupied. The Cuban people were used to deception; the regimes following the 1940
constitution were all corrupt governments, using deceit to clumsily cover their
shortcomings. Castro had but to offer a well-packaged alternative to those regimes.
Russian-style pokazukha, in the form of Potemkin villages like his "Guerilla-theater"
and supported by Soviet-style propaganda distributed through North American
journalists (discussed below), became keys to Castro's success.
What exactly is a "Potemkin village"? What is pokazukha? How has the
practice of building Potemkin-like fai;:ades, and legitimating them with propaganda,
become a recurrent practice in Russian political history? How did Lenin adapt such
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concepts, fusing them with Marxist principles to create Bolshevik ideology and
practice? Section one of this chapter will briefly tell the story of Catherine the Great's
Tauride Tour, out of which originated the term "Potemkin village". Section two will
define Russian-style pokazukha; section three will explore how such practices were
incorporated into Bolshevik ideology and technologies of power to be exported to the
rest of the globe-including Cuba.

Potemkin's Posturing
One was under the impression of seeing villages in the distance, but
these were only houses and church steeples painted on boards. Villages
close to the river, just built, seemed to be inhabited. But the villagers
had been forced to come from as far as forty miles away. They had to
leave their houses each evening and rush to other villages, which they
then inhabited for a few hours, as long as the Empress was passing by.
-Georg Helbig, 179896
Prince Grigory Aleksandrovich Potemkin was a Russian general, leader, and
favorite of Catherine II, Tsarina of Russia (Catherine the Great). History remembers
him primarily for his leadership in the Russian colonization of southern Ukraine and
the Crimea-and, of course, for his famous villages. In 1783, he initiated and carried
out the project of annexing the Crimea to the Russian Empire. Four years later, as
both the regional ruler of Ukraine and a primary shaper of the Empire's foreign policy,
he organized Catherine's 'Tauride Tour' of the southern provinces. 97 The grandest
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spectacle of her reign, the trip was carefully planned by Potemkin to legitimate
Catherine's Russia in the minds of Western rulers and provoke a response from her
Ottoman enemies. 98
A year before, accounts had been deliberately published that the Tsarina would
be crowned "sovereign of her new possessions" in the most magnificent style. The
trip was to cost seven million rubles at a time when a loaf of bread was only a few
kopeks [pennies]. In eight months of travel, Catherine covered more than 6,000

kilometers over both land and water. Her journey was a theatrical procession
purposefully designed both to acquaint the Tsarina with her new dominions and to
highlight Russia's presence on the Black Sea to "l'Europe etonnee." 99 Additionally,
during the voyage both Potemkin and Catherine wished to intimidate Russia's
Ottoman enemies by a grandiose show of power and wealth. 100
Potemkin's preparations, which he started more than three years before, were
lavish in the extreme. The party set out across the Russian snow of January in one
hundred and seventy-eight gilt carriages mounted on runners, several of which were
98
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the size of houses and pulled by thirty horses each. The Tsarina's personal sledge had
a drawing-room, study, library and bedroom on board. At each rural stop, five
hundred and sixty replacement horses waited. The retinue traveling with Catherine
included a large portion of the Russian court, as well as all of the foreign dignitaries
stationed in Petersburg.
Upon arriving in Kiev, the first major urban stop for the party, each of the
foreign diplomats was provided with a separate palace with its own servants, private
coaches, and grooms wearing the livery of that diplomat's sovereign. 101 The city was
festooned with decorations, and for the next ten weeks, city-wide festivities
entertained Catherine and her guests. While at Kiev, Catherine met with numerous
dignitaries, including the German-French Prince Charles de Nassau-Siegen. Catherine
also met the Spaniard Francisco de Miranda, who sought to enlist Catherine's aid in
the liberation of Cuba and the rest of Latin America. From Kiev, Catherine ordered
the minting of a special medal commemorating her Tauride Tour. It depicted her
portrait on one side and her itinerary on the other, encircled by the motto "The Way to
Benefit." 102 It was clear that she did not want anyone to forget the opulent nature of
her journey-or of its importance.
Although her itinerary included extended stopovers in Kiev and Moscow,
Catherine's ultimate destination was Russia's recently acquired territories in southern
Ukraine and the Crimea. Therefore, in Kiev, the procession switched to travel on the
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Dnieper River, in a style even more extravagant than the participants had enjoyed
while traveling on land. Seven huge Roman-style galleys, painted red and gold,
headed the convoy, followed by seventy-three others of varying sizes. In all, a flotilla
of eighty boats accompanied the sovereign, with more than 3,000 flamboyantly
uniformed sailors attending (and protecting) the Tsarina and her retinue. Each of the
seven galleys was equipped like a palace, even down to its own small orchestra that
struck up a tune every time a guest embarked or debarked. The famous maestro
Giuseppe Sarti conducted the orchestra on Catherine's galley. 103
All along the river, the shores were crowded with peasants cheering and taking
in the spectacle. At each stop, special temporary buildings, triumphal arches, and
floral and other decorations met the Tsarina and her retinue. Every village and city
was prepared beforehand, with new coats of paint on the houses and buildings. The
streets were clean and illuminated, the beggars run out of town, and the poorer areas
hidden behind brightly painted, temporary fences. 104 At the major stops, grand
fireworks displays delighted peasants and ambassadors alike. When Catherine
reached the new city of Kherson, Potemkin launched two fresh ships of the line,
adding to the Black Sea fleet he had recently created. One of those ships was
christened Joseph II, which gratified Catherine's important Austrian ally and travel
compamon.
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In Sevastopol, Potemkin's entertainments reached their apex, with a fireworks
display that involved over 20,000 rockets-delighting Catherine, Joseph, and the
entourage while simultaneously terrifying the local Tatar spectators. 105 Also in
Sevastopol, Potemkin surprised the Tsarina with a battalion of 'Amazons.' This group
was made up of one hundred musket-bearing Greek women dressed in crimson skirts
and gold-trimmed jackets, topped by gold-spangled turbans complete with ostrich
feathers . Joseph II greeted the female commander with a kiss. 106
Although Potemkin's extravagances drew large audiences of the local Russian,
Ukrainian, and Tatar peoples to view these demonstrations of Russian power, his goals
for the procession could not have been accomplished without Western witnesses to
report back to their countries on the greatness of Catherine's power and holdings.
Therefore, her entourage included numerous foreign diplomats. Catherine's foreign
guests provided an important propaganda connection to various groups and leaders
abroad. While traveling, she spoke with them regularly about their impressions of the
trip and about foreign perceptions of herself and her government. Since these
courtiers and correspondents strove to articulate and repeat what the Tsarina wanted to
hear, their versions of the trip were thoroughly intertwined with her own. 107 This too
was by design-Potemkin and Catherine wanted their tour to be remembered their
way.
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Catherine's most prominent companion was Joseph II, the Hapsburg sovereign
of the Holy Roman Empire. His involvement underscored the political and military
implications of the Tsarina's expedition, since Austria was Russia's principal ally
against the Ottomans. The extraordinary mobilization of soldiers and arms that
accompanied the joint parade of 'the two empires' along the Black Sea coast increased
tensions with the Ottoman state. Potemkin carefully orchestrated these tensions at
Catherine's behest. To one of her advisors Catherine confidently proclaimed, "we can
start it ourselves." 108 This provocation, as planned, culminated in the outbreak of war
with the Turks shortly after Catherine's return to Petersburg.
Although Potemkin's detractors later claimed that the crowds were slaves the
houses were made of cardboard, and that Potemkin's minions created entire fa;:ades of
villages along the route, there is no evidence to support these assertions. 109 The term
"Potemkin village" was apparently coined by a German detractor of Potemkin's named
Helbig, who is quoted at the beginning of this section. It is through Helbig's efforts
that the term has come to mean "sham" in Western languages. However, though the
Russian language has no such idiomatic referent, Potemkin is legendary in Russia for
his marvelous demonstrations of pokazukha-or "showing off for effect."
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Russian Pokazukha
Pokazukha, propaganda-what's the difference? It's all bullshit, but
often it's all we Russians have. Potemkin? Sure, I know who he was.
But he's nothing special. All us [former] Soviets do this stuff at one
time or another. It's in our blood-haven't you figured that out by
now?
-Sergei Zolotko 110
Prince Potemkin's villages are legendary-not just because of the efforts of his
enemies, but because he was a master at producing the hallmarks of wealth and power,
even if they were not exactly as he made them appear. Through his well-planned
displays, he succeed in making the Tauride Tour a spectacle the likes of which the
world had never before seen-thereby legitimizing Catherine in Western Europe and
goading her Ottoman enemies.
The endurance of Potemkin's legend tells us something of this culture that is
useful and essential to fully understanding Russian and Soviet history. In most
Western-language dictionaries, the definition of "Potemkin village" includes several
different aspects: fa9ades, 'smoke and mirrors,' and sloganeering, just to name a
few. 111 For most Westerners, these concepts all imply falsity in their definition. In
practice, in Western societies, they are either idealistic constructs or sinister
falsehoods. Whether good or bad, they are representative, not reality. This is not so in
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Russia. As the story of Catherine's Tauride Tour exemplifies, there is something
productive in the Russian application of this practice. In fact, the term "Potemkin
village" does not exist in the Russian dictionary. Instead, the Russians have a very
specific word that incorporates all of the meanings of the Western term, plus a
productive aspect that the Western definition of "Potemkin village" does not include.
The Russian nounpokazukha [rroKa3yxa], directly translated, means "it's all put
on, just for show." 112 In daily Russian usage, it implies much more. It is a slang word,
a common word, a base word. The adjective form is pokaznoi [rroKa3Hoii:], which is
"ostentatious, for show, done for effect." The related verb ispokazivat [rroKa3bIBaTb],
which means literally "to show." At the root of these words is pokaz [rroKa3 ], which
translates as "the demonstration," the process by which "the moon appears from
behind clouds." Pokazukha is that which operates to "reveal" with an ulterior motive,
to make a moon appear at noon. It is the eclipse of the truth with something created.
It is deception as art, illusion as reality. Someone practicingpokazukha is building

more than a fac;ade, he is constructing his own particular edifice of the real.

Pokazukha can best be understood as a set of practices that, through constant
propaganda transmission and reiteration, has become a lasting politico-cultural trend.
Asking a Russian for clarifying connotations of the word pokazukha will get
you a myriad ofresponses. To a child of the Soviet 1980s, it is cleaning only the halls
and rooms of your school that you know the inspector will visit, leaving the rest in
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dishevelment and disrepair. 113 To certain Russian emigres, it is the self-promotion of
the Oligarchs in contemporary Russia that allows murderers to seem like legitimate
businessmen. 114 For Peter the Great, it was fa9ades of the West built in the East. For
the contemporary Russian writer Victor Pelevin it is the creation of reality in the
studios of the society builders, a place where advertising does more than affect
reality-for Pelevin's characters, the pokazukha of advertising is reality .115 These
various connotations have some commonalities. Beyond deception and ostentation is
an implied complicity on the part of both the deceiver and the deceived-a complicity
that lends reality to the illusion being created. The actions that constitute pokazukha
have some reality without the belief of the audience, but audience participation is
necessary when the desired effect is dependent upon the pokazukha being taken for
truth-as in politics. In that situation, when the pokazukha is exposed, all of its power
immediately disappears.
To be sure, fa9ade-building and trends of deceit are concepts not confined to
Russian culture, especially since the intentional export of Soviet ideology and practice.
In Communist countries influenced by Soviet ideology, however, 'showing off and
'putting on' are more than just deceptive fa9ade-building. For the Soviets and their
adherents, illusion is an important part of the process of becoming. As such, it is just
as much productive as it is destructive. Although the manufacture of fa9ades has often
113
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been negative, the core of this practice often contains something unexpectedly
positive. Russia's modern identity has been characterized by the fact that it has tended
to define itself as a country that intends to be something else. However, despite the
dismal historical record and the cynical responses it has provoked, what one finds
ultimately in Russia's prolific construction of simulacra is not a sham culture
suspended over an absence. Instead, through pokazukha, Russians actively cycle,
respond to, and transform into hard cultural currency what they appropriate from
abroad. 116 As this thesis suggests, Castro's pokazukha, in turn, was appropriated from
the Soviets.
Although pokazukha goes hand-in-hand with propaganda, one is not reducible
to the other. At the beginning of the Soviet era, the term 'propaganda' [rrporraraH,r:i:a] in
the Russian language did not bear any negative meaning. It simply meant
"dissemination of ideas." However, as printed propaganda consistently glossed over
the gloomy reality of Soviet life, the Soviet people increasingly assigned a negative set
of connotations to the term. Pokazukha went through a similar progression. By the
end of the Soviet era, both terms referred to the process of revealing something that
was not there. However, pokazukha has some substantiality, while propaganda has
none of its own. Pokazukha builds a fas;ade of what is or should be (and is not) and
propaganda tells its readers about those glorious fas;ades, giving them substantiality in
the minds of the public.
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Prince Potemkin's practices during the Tauride Tour incorporated both of these
trends-making fac;ades and propagandizing them. In twentieth-century verbal usage,
pokazukha and propaganda were essentially opposite sides of a single coin. Prior to
the late Soviet period, when propaganda took on its negative connotations,
''pokazukha" was the term used to describe Potemkin-like fac;ade building if one
wanted to denigrate the process, undermining its reality; propaganda was the term
used if one wanted to glorify the fac;ade and give it substance in the minds of the
public.

Bolshevik Agitprop
Now the new delegates were beginning to arrive. They were royally
welcomed and feted. They were taken to show schools, children's
homes, colonies, and model factories. It was the traditional Potemkin
villages that were shown the visitors. They were graciously received
and 'talked to' by Lenin and Trotsky, treated to theatres, concerts,
ballets, excursions, and military parades. In short, nothing was left
undone to put the delegates into a frame of mind favorable to the great
plan that was to be revealed to them at the Red Trade Union and the
Third International Congresses.
-Emma Goldman, 1920 117
In the twentieth century, both before and after the Revolution of 191 7, Russian
pokazukha and propaganda were codified as part of the new Marxist-Leninist strategy
of world revolution. The leaders of the Russian Revolution utilized concepts from the
traditions of both pokazukha and propaganda, fusing them together to form the
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strategies of Soviet "Agitprop." The term was a shortened form of a phrase pioneered
by Georgi Plekhanov, one of the first leaders of the Russian Communist movement.
In 1883, Plekhanov wrote:
As Heine said, 'New time needs a new garment/For the job it's got to
do' ... The industrial workers, who are more developed and have higher
requirements and a broader outlook than the peasantry, will join our
revolutionary intelligentsia in its struggle against absolutism, and when
they have won political freedom they will organize into a workers'
socialist party whose task will be to begin systematic propaganda of
socialism among the peasantry. We say systematic propaganda because
isolated opportunities of propaganda must not be missed ... [systematic
propaganda] is the diversified work of propaganda and agitation. 118
Thus, in revolutionary Russia, the concepts encompassed by the phrase

agitatsii i propagandy [anna1.uu1 H rrporraraH,llhI], which translates simply as
"agitation and propaganda", became the word "agitprop"-the official, positive word
for pokazukha. Agitprop was systematized by the leaders of the Communist
movement-most importantly by Vladimir Lenin. An examination of Lenin's early
writings on the instrumentalities of politics exposes what the Bolsheviks would later
turn into a powerful branch of the Soviet government. 119 In one of his first major
printed works, "What is to be Done?" (1902), Lenin asserted (although he never used
the negative term in his writings) that to be a revolutionary was to practice pokazukha:
To be fully prepared for his task, the worker-revolutionary must
likewise become a professional revolutionary ... [This] must in Russia
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be done deliberately and systematically by our organizations ... the
working-class masses [must] promote from their ranks not only an
increasing number of talented agitators, but also talented organizers,
propagandists, and 'practical workers' in the best sense of the term. 120
To differentiate agitation from propaganda, Lenin wrote the following:
[We think] (with Plekhanov, and with all the leaders of the
international working class movement) that the propagandist, dealing
with, say, the question of unemployment, must explain the capitalistic
nature of crises, the cause of their inevitability in modem society, the
necessity for the transformation of this society into a socialist society,
etc. In a word, he must present 'many ideas', so many, indeed, that they
will be understood as an integral whole only by a (comparatively) few
persons. The agitator, however, speaking on the same subject, will take
as an illustration a fact that is most glaring and most widely known to
his audience, say, the death of an unemployed worker's family from
starvation, the growing impoverishment, etc., and, utilizing this fact,
known to all, will direct his efforts to presenting a single idea to the
'masses', e.g., the senselessness of the contradiction between the
increase of wealth and the increase of poverty; he will strive to rouse
discontent and indignation among the masses against this crying
injustice, leaving a more complete explanation of this contradiction to
the propagandist. 121
In support of the mission of Communist agitprop in Russia, Lenin concluded
"What is to be Done?" with a strong argument for the establishment of a
Revolutionary propaganda newspaper. He wrote:
This newspaper would become part of an enormous pair of smith's
bellows that would fan every spark of the class struggle and of popular
indignation into a general conflagration. Around what is in itself still a
very innocuous and very small, but regular and common, effort, in the
full sense of the word, a regular army of tried fighters would
systematically gather and receive their training. On the ladders and
scaffolding of this general organizational structure there would soon
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develop and come to the fore Social-Democratic [champions] from
among our revolutionaries and Russian [heroes] from among our
workers, who would take their place at the head of the mobilized army
and rouse the whole people to settle accounts with the shan1e and the
curse of Russia. That is what we should dream of! 122
The Russian Communists established several newspapers in the decades
following, but none survived Tsarist intervention until Leon Trotsky established
Pravda in 1908. Until the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 , the editors and writers of
Pravda did their best to make Lenin's propagandist dream a reality. 123 During Tsarist

censorship, Pravda survived because it was published abroad and smuggled into the
country-a tactic Castro would later adapt and employ when he used U.S. journalists
to overcome Batista's censorship.
Agitprop techniques, based on the early writings of Lenin and modified by
Bolshevik political needs during the Russian civil war, were solidified in the 1920s.
Prior to 1920, agitprop activities included public spectacles, parades, monuments,
kiosks, posters, films, and agit-stations. The agit-stations, located at major railroad
stations, boasted libraries of propaganda material, lecture halls, and theaters. During
the civil war, agitprop was disseminated to rural Russians, provincial cities, and
national republics by agit-trains and agit-ships. These trains and ships functioned like
moving posters with exterior decorations of heroic figures and folk art motifs
accompanied by simple slogans. They brought revolutionary books, pamphlets,
newspapers, posters, newsreels, and short propaganda films, along with skilled
122
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agitators. 124 Agitprop in practice definitely followed the pokazukha tradition of Prince
Potemkin. As one commentator put it:
All of it recalled the Potemkin villages ... This propagandistic campaign,
in all its manifold expressions, was designed to establish a double
fayade, at home and abroad, behind which the horrors and deprivation
of the civil war could remain unnoticed, or at least be diminished.
Abroad, the image of Soviet Russia as a socialist utopia was
disseminated by the Comintem; at home, the concept of a Leninist
salvation was advanced with missionary fervor. 125
At the Second Congress of the Comintem in 1920, Lenin advocated for
worldwide propagandistic utilization of the "consciousness, will, passions and
imagination" of "dozens of millions who have been whipped into action by the fiercest
of class struggle." Linking agitprop to "the main tasks faced by contemporary
communism in Western Europe and America," Lenin asked that "the interests of the
revolution-propagandistic, agitational, organizational" be "gauged realistically,"
reacting to local conditions. Responding to criticism of his desire to export agitprop
worldwide, he said:
Even if the situation is non-revolutionary, the Second International is in
error and carries a heavy responsibility if it is really unwilling to
organize revolutionary propaganda and agitation, since, as has been
proved by the entire history of the Bolshevik Party, revolutionary
propaganda can and should be conducted even in a situation that is not
revolutionary. The difference between the socialists and the
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Communists consists in the former refusing to act in the way we act in
any situation, i.e., conduct revolutionary work. 126
The Bolshevik leadership printed and distributed works on agitprop that circulated the
world over-including Cuba-during the next several decades. It was from these
works and the example of the Russian revolution that Castro learned the agitprop
methods he would later put to use in his own revolution.
In August of 1920, the Bolsheviks created a powerful branch of the Soviet
Communist Party, officially called the Department for Agitation and Propaganda,
which would carry out Bolshevik strategies of agitation and propaganda and
coordinate the propaganda work of all Soviet institutions. The department was
originally divided into five subsections, the two most important being the agitation
subsections, which directed propaganda campaigns and supervised the local press.
The political education subsection developed curriculum for Party schools. The three
remaining subsections published Central Committee works, addressed problems with
the distribution of propaganda in literature, and coordinated work among the parties of
national minorities. The structure of the department reveals that:
By way of contrast with western usage, Soviet writers, nurtured in a
tradition of what one might call political messianism, have tended to
use the term 'propaganda' in a highly positive sense, as more or less
. lent toe d ucat1on.
. 121
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After the civil war, and throughout the Soviet period, Moscow continued to
export propaganda to the countryside via radio, traveling exhibitions, posters,
literature, and film. Like other Central Committee sections, the agitprop department's
organization stabilized by 1948, and remained so until the collapse of the Soviet
Union. However, in a government that became rigid and unresponsive in many ways,
the agitprop department stayed remarkably flexible and responsive to the political
needs of the moment. The propagandists seemed to have internalized Lenin's 1920
admonition "to link the strictest devotion to the ideas of communism with the ability to
effect all the necessary practical compromises, tacks, conciliatory maneuvers, zigzags,
retreats and so on." 128 As a consequence of its flexibility (and therefore its continuing
effectiveness), the Soviet agitprop department passed through several clearly defined
periods of tactical adjustments.
In 1921 , Soviet domestic issues, particularly a severe grain shortage, led the
Kremlin to seek economic and diplomatic support in 'capitalist' countries. At the same
time, however, the agitprop department intensified its activity in those same countries,
sending agitators like Fabio Grobart (the Comintern's agent to Cuba, discussed above),
into countries all over the world. These Comintern agents were invariably supported
by Soviet funds and propaganda. In a bold Potemkin-like stance, Lenin's Commissar
for Foreign Affairs attempted to maintain the fiction that the government of the

128

Lenin, "Left Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder," in Lenin: Collected Works, vol. 31
(Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961), I 16-117.

62
U.S.S.R. could not be held responsible for the machinations of Comintern agitators. 129
This is what George F. Kennan would later call:
that ambiguity and contradictoriness of Soviet policy which has
endured to the present day [ 1960]: the combination of the doctrine of
co-existence-the claim that is, to the right to have normal outward
relations with capitalist countries-with the most determined effort
behind the scenes to destroy the western governments and the social
. . l systems supportmg
. tl1em. 130
an d po l1t1ca
Fidel Castro would later make good use of this same strategy, visiting the United
States on a propaganda tour in 1959 while he simultaneously-and secretlycemented a relationship with its arch-nemesis, the U.S.S.R. (Fidel's "Operation Truth" ,
described below). After Lenin's death, agitprop took on a new dimension abroad, with
the Soviets developing front organizations and cultural conduits like the World Youth
Congress (discussed below), organizations which enlisted the services of wellmeaning supporters for seemingly uncontroversial charitable and politico-cultural
aims. In reality, they were elaborate fac;:ades for the continued work of Soviet
agitprop. 13 1
When Stalin announced the first Five Year Plan in 1928, the agitprop
machinery changed gears to support "socialism in one country", and the goal was to
build a fac;:ade of success and prosperity. Worldwide depression, hidden in the
U.S .S.R. but very much in the open everywhere else, made the illusion of success in
129
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the Soviet Union easier to maintain. Thus, Soviet agitprop made impressive inroads
among western intellectuals in the 1930s. 132
Stalin's actions in the late 1930s and the issues surrounding WWII caused
dizzying shifts and contradictions in Soviet agitprop. During this time, what was
portrayed as the 'stable and powerful' Communist leadership executed most of its
heroes. Nazi Germany was portrayed as a horrible threat, then as an anti-imperialist
intermediary, and finally as 'enemy number one'. Britain and the United States went
from first-enemy status, to first-allies, and finally back to enemy status. Through it
all, however, agitprop was always ready to assist in creating the fa9ades of the new
party line-whatever that happened to be. In fact, not every shift or demand caused
serious issues for the agitprop department--old methods often worked on new
problems. For example, after falling out of use in the 1930s, agit-trains were
reinstituted during World War II to convey propaganda to forces at the front. 133
In the late 1940s and early 1950s, many of the 'underdeveloped' countries of

the world were still held firmly within the sphere of European or North American
economic, political, and ideological influence. The continued Communist demand for
total power, and the complicated and unfamiliar ideology in which it was expressed
(especially in the Stalinist period), compounded the difficulties Soviet agitprop faced
in access to, and impact on, the world audience. "It is also probably true that the
conspiratorial Stalin, given more to the use of physical force than to the arts of
132
133

Ibid ., 11-12.

Stites, Russian Popular Culture, 37-63 .

64
persuasion, was considerably inferior both to Lenin and to Khrushchev as a
propagandist." 134
However, Stalin did develop certain innovative agitprop techniques that laid
the groundwork for the achievements of his successors, including Khrushchev and
Castro. Stalin systematically exploited exchange programs for propaganda purposes,
inviting countless delegations from all over the world-and sending agitprop agents to
the countries agreeing to exchange. For Stalin, such exchanges were "the best, most
forceful and active propaganda for the Soviet system against the capitalist system." 135
Such a program solidified Soviet influence over Raul Castro (discussed below). Stalin
also pioneered the use of interviews with foreign correspondents as an instrument of
Soviet agitprop. By skillful timing and prudence in granting interviews, Stalin often
succeeded in dominating the headlines in Paris, London, New York, and around the
world. 136 It was this propaganda technique, inherited from Stalin, that Fidel Castro
would use in 1959 to overcome Batista's censorship and project his own heroic image
to the world (discussed below).
From Lenin to Khrushchev, the leaders of the Soviet Union and their disciples
abroad utilized concepts from the Russian traditions of both pokazukha and
propaganda, fusing them together to form the official strategies of agitprop. Even if
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Castro did not read Lenin's works (and this would be contrary to what Castro himself
claims and many historians and witnesses corroborate), including "What is to be
Done," prior to 1958, many of the Cuban's agitprop techniques so closely resemble
those of the Soviets that it is difficult to argue that he was not affected by the Soviet
example. Indeed, this thesis argues that he was profoundly affected.
Although deception was commonplace in Cuban politics prior to Fidel, it was
amateurish and unsophisticated, as the examples above illustrate. Cuba did not have
the tradition of pokazukha that Russia possessed. Fidel and his cohorts were the first
to fully utilize organized agitprop on Cuban soil. Robert E. Quirk, expert on Latin
American history, wrote the most in-depth biography of Fidel Castro to date. He is
not alone in his opinion that, "Fidel Castro may have been a quick learner, but he was
never an original, creative thinker." 137 However, Fidel did masterfully use the
techniques of agitprop. Examples of Soviet-style Cuban pokazukha are discussed in
the next chapter.
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Chapter V

POKAZUKHA IN CUBA

Those who thought we were just ordinary guerrillas, those who thought
we knew nothing but the use of firearms, those who thought that after
our military victories they would crush us in the field of information,
and crush us in the field of public opinion, have found that the Cuban
revolution also knows how to fight and win battles in that field.
-Fidel Castro, January 21, 1959 138
Castro's rise to power in Cuba, which he carried out against all odds, has been
a matter of much speculation. However, Fidel Castro brilliantly employed Russianstyle pokazukha-in his own country and abroad-to achieve his goals. His use of
propaganda, especially as magnified by the U.S. media, was undoubtedly one of the
most important components of the extraordinary campaign that propelled Castro from
an obscure existence as a rebel hiding in the mountains to the 'Maximum Leader' of
the Cuban people.

His use of pokazukha allowed him to both manipulate members of

the foreign press and to maintain an anti-Communist fa9ade long enough to stave off
North American interference until he could garner support from the Soviet Union.
When Castro's campaign for power was reduced to its lowest point, in 1958,
his rebellion's success seemed nearly impossible. He was cut off from the Cuban
people by government censorship of the press. The world thought he was dead, his
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rebellion quelled; this was when Castro drew on his propaganda training and sent for a
foreign journalist. Castro and his men then used pokazukha to convince the reporter of
their revolutionary bonajides. After interviewing Castro and appraising the chances
of the rebellion, the reporter wrote a series of articles for the New York Times--one of
the most well-read and respected newspapers in the world-which proved that Castro
was alive, broke the censorship of his adversary, and showed that a rebellion truly did
exist. After his takeover of the Cuban government, Castro then embarked on a tour of
North America that the Cubans mockingly called "Operation Truth." It was similar in
many ways to Catherine's Tauride Tour. The goal of the operation was to conquer
public opinion in the United States until Castro's lieutenants could secure the help of
the Soviet Union.
The reporter who helped propel Castro to power was Herbert L. Matthews, and
his printed interviews with Fidel- that which Matthews called "The Cuban Story"changed history. In the words of Matthews himself,
Journalists rarely make history. This is not our function. We are the
chroniclers of our times; at least we provide the material for history.
It was an accident that my interview with Fidel Castro in the Sierra
Maestra .. . should have proved so important. There was a story to be
got, a censorship to be broken. I got it and did it-and it so happens
that neither Cuba nor the United States is going to be the same again. 139
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This paper does not need to prove that Matthew's story was important to Castro's
rebellion. 140 Instead, it will treat more formidable-and more controversialquestions.
First to be discussed will be the actions and motivations of the principle
characters-Castro and Matthews-which gave rise to the story. Much dispute has
arisen over the circumstances surrounding Matthews' interview. Did Castro intend to
deceive Matthews? Was Matthews deceived? The answer to these questions is
simple: Castro intended to deceive Matthews, and the reporter was deceived because
he wanted to be-he wanted Castro to be a good leader with a powerful army. If he
had reported about a tiny, bedraggled little band headed by a Communist radical, his
story would not have made the headlines and Matthews would not have achieved
international notoriety. As is usually the case,pokazukha and propaganda work best
when they have a willing audience.
Second, we will discover the significance of Castro's manipulation of
Matthews. Although all historians of the Cuban Revolution recognize the prominence
of Matthew's story, they do so because it disproved statements of Castro's death and
broke Batista's censorship. While the article was certainly influential in these ways, it
had other, more substantial effects. Matthew's article did more than break Batista's
censorship; it shattered his credibility. For a short time, Castro, Matthews and the
New York Times waged their own private propaganda battle against Batista. He lost

that battle, and, partially because of that loss, he lost the war. The most important of
140
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all of "The Cuban Story's" effects was that, through Castro's shrewd pokazukha and
Matthew's willing dissemination of it in the form of propaganda, the legend of Castro
was born-a legend that still serves the aging dictator today, almost fifty years later.
Before treating the above points, it is necessary to include some additional background
on Cuba, Fulgencio Batista, Fidel Castro, and the Cuban Revolution.

Fulgencio and Fidel
This time, luckily for Cuba, the Revolution will truly arrive at its goal.
It will not be like '98, when the Americans came in and made
themselves the owners here. It will not be like '33, when the people
began to believe a revolution was in the making and Batista came and
betrayed it, took power, and installed a ferocious dictatorship. It will
not be like '44, when the multitudes ardently believed that at last the
people had taken power, but those who had taken power were the
crooks.
Neither crooks, nor traitors, no interventionists. This time, yes, it is
a revolution!

-Fidel Castro, January 1959 141
Cuba in the 1950's was ready for rebellion. Ruled by the cruel dictator
Fulgencio Batista, many of the people of Cuba wanted change. They had endured
decades of governmental tyranny and corruption, and unrest was coming to a head.
The Cuban republic combined ineffectiveness with corruption. During the first half of
the twentieth century, one leader after another entered the Presidential office with
promises on his lips, only to leave a few years later with money in his pockets. Some
of these men were brutal; some were not. All grew fat on bribes while their nation
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languished. All were supported, in one way or another, by the North Americans. The
last of these politicians was Fulgencio Batista. 142
As has been mentioned, Batista took over the Cuban government, this time as a
dictator, in 1952. Easily overthrowing the old regime, Batista immediately began
working towards a political situation that would give him respectability and stabilize
the political order through a broad consensus. 143 He found this to be an impossible
task; for, although he had no trouble finding people to work directly for his
government, he was disappointed by how few respected citizens were willing to enter
electoral politics under his control-for to do so would render them puppets. He
would later write how what he called the "intolerance of the opposition political
organizations" had been a major factor in his government's ineffectiveness. 144
As a result of the opposition to his brutal and corrupt policies, Batista had few
respectable political leaders working with him during his second reign. Instead, he
ruled by force. Partially as a result of Batista's violent repression of his political
antagonists, partially due to his almost complete lack of effective public relations or
propaganda, he never succeeded in establishing a sense of respectable legality for
himself and his government. 145
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His political opponents, who were tending more towards armed insurrection
than peaceful compromise, plagued Batista. As a thinly veiled propaganda stunt,
Batista held elections on November 1, 1954. Since he ran unopposed, he was
inaugurated as President in 1955. Later that year, in another inept public relations
maneuver, Batista signed a general amnesty for all political prisoners, including Fidel
Castro, who had been imprisoned after the Moncada incident (described below). 146
Batista's regime was decadent, his power unstable. He ruled with the
bureaucracy, the army, and with the support of his own people in office, not through
popular support. His government came apart in the latter part of the fifties. Few
countries were headed by so greedy or cruel a dictator. During his second time as
ruler, Batista's base of popular support was surprisingly small. Cuba boasted, by Latin
American standards, an increasingly sophisticated urban middle class that became
more and more intolerant of corruption as time wore on. That Batista's government
was crooked and of dubious loyalty was known both in Havana and in Washington. 147
One important facet of Batista's government was that he worked with the North
American mob, who themselves had a large stake in Cuban politics. Batista
established lasting relationships with numerous members of organized crime from the
United States, including Frank Costello, Vito Genovese, Santo Trafficante Jr., Moe
Dalitz, and Meyer Lansky. During Batista's reign, Havana became known as "the
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Latin Las Vegas." The casinos, brothels, and clubs that the mafia operated in Havana
were an important source of income both for Cuba and for themselves. Batista was
quick to get in on these profits, setting up a network of secret police, military officers,
and bagmen, who all helped to make transactions of mob money easy and safe.
Batista rewarded many with large bonuses and punished many with torture or death.
His regime "resembled the organization of a large criminal mob more than it did a
..
l government. ,,148
trad 1ttona

Batista himself resembled a mafia boss, for he was a man from the lower
classes who had risen to incredible wealth through brutal manipulation of his society's
weaknesses. Batista survived as long as he retained the support of powerful mobsters
and 'respectable' executives like those who ran the United Fruit Company. Under their
auspices, the U.S. continued unqualified support of Batista's regime until 1957, when
officials in Washington began to push for a more liberal and democratic government
for Havana. A House Foreign Affairs subcommittee finally made a recommendation
to stop military aid to Latin America. "The use by a regime of United States-supplied
armaments in civil strife has garnered us the wrath of people (not only in the country
affected but throughout Latin America) who tend to equate our armaments with the
regime using them." 149 The termination of North American aid, coming as it did in
mid-1957, weakened Batista's defenses just as Castro prepared to attack them. This
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was another propaganda battle that Batista fought and lost before he even engaged his
true enemy-Fidel Castro.
On the morning of March 10, 1952, just after Fulgencio Batista staged his
coup, seizing power and forcing the former President to escape in disguise, Fidel
Castro composed and distributed his first real political treatise, entitled "Revolucion,
No Zarpazo!" [Not Revolution, a Clean Sweep!]. It was a clear challenge to Batista
and ended with these words, taken from the Cuban national anthem, "To live in chains
is to live in shame." It was written in the romantic style of Marti and was an
indication that Castro was "already thinking in a very Cuban tradition that his own
destiny might be to give his life in a heroic youthful struggle." 150
Several passages from this treatise are recognizable or suggestive of MarxistLeninist themes. "Fulgencio Batista!" Castro wrote, "You speak of progress, and yet
you align yourself with powerful Cuban and foreign interests ... You are a faithful dog
of imperialism." Castro went on to parrot the Marxist dictum that when ideas take
possession of the masses, they become a material force: "For those who have blind
faith in the masses, for those who believe in the irreducible force of great ideas, the
indecision of leaders will not be reason for weakness or loss of heart, because the
vacuum will soon be filled by the uncorrupted that arise from the ranks."
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Party. In February of 1953 his brother Raul Castro took part in the Soviet-sponsored
World Youth Congress in Vienna and then visited Romania and Czechoslovakia.
Upon his return in June, Raul joined the Juventud Social is ta, the youth wing of the
Cuban Communist Party. That same month, the Castro brothers began to make plans
for an attack on Batista's government. Since their group needed weapons, they
decided to target the Moncada barracks in the city of Santiago (Oriente Province's
capital), which housed varied armaments.
Even if it ended in failure, Fidel knew the attack would have symbolic and
heroic value (pokazukha value) because of the province's historical importance.
Santiago, called "Cuba" by the people of Oriente, was steeped in the history of the
island-especially its myths and legends. It was one of the most revered cities in the
Americas. Jose Marti and Antonio Maceo had both fought there. Independence from
Spain was consummated in Santiago. "Castro recognized the importance of symbols,
and he was prepared to create more for his revolution ... It was his Santiago, his
history. They would be his myths." 152
Castro gathered his troops the night before the attack and uttered these stirring
words:
Comrades, tomorrow we may win or we may lose, but in the end this
movement will triumph. If we win tomorrow will fulfill what Marti
aspired to. If we don't, the gesture will have to set an example for the
people of Cuba. 153
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The attack on Moncada failed miserably. 154 Castro escaped, but was captured
on August first and placed in a civil prison where he remained until the general
amnesty of 1955. Haydee Santamaria, one of the two women to take part in the
Moncada attack and later an upper-level member of Castro's movement, recorded her
feelings after the incident:
We had been neither dead nor alive. Now we broke free of that thingyou must experience it to know it-that is neither life nor death. And
from that moment the question whether we lived or died no longer
mattered. Fidel was alive. Moncada lived! I was a prisoner, shackled
and manacled, and I felt stronger and freer than those in the robes of
justice who were going to judge me ... As to the transformation that
came over me from the moment I accepted his leadership, it was
because Fidel was Fidel, Fidel, Fidel! 15 5
Santamaria's thoughts and actions were typical of the Fidelistas. Their group
was now called the 26th of July Movement (after the date of the failed Moncada
attempt), and it was gaining force countrywide. Castro was sent to prison on the Isle
of Pines, and although his time in prison was uneventful for him personally, it was not
an unimportant time for his revolution. The most significant event that occurred
during his imprisonment was the publication of the speech Castro gave before the
court that sentenced him to nineteen years because of the Moncada attack. A
masterful piece of propaganda, it began:
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Honorable Judges: Never has a lawyer had to practice his profession
under such difficult conditions; never has such an overwhelming
accumulation of irregularities been committed against the accused. 156
He went on to give his interpretation of the events of Moncada and of the atrocities of
the Batista regime that prompted the attack. The speech ended with these powerful
words,
As for me, I know that jail will be as hard as it has ever been for
anyone, filled with threats, with vileness, as I do not fear the fury of the
miserable tyrant who snuffed out the life of seventy brothers of mine.
Condemn me, it does not matter. History will absolve me! 157
Although Castro was convicted, he was not idle during his imprisonment. He
wrote his speech down using onion and lime juice as invisible ink between the lines of
ordinary letters, which the recipients heated until the lines were visible. His
followers-primarily Haydee Santamaria-had them printed in the form of a
propaganda pamphlet in the Leninist style, and distributed them.
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The ideas put

forth in this pamphlet were much more significant to the July 26th Movement than the
relatively short time that Castro spent in prison. "The ideological basis of the
movement remained the ideas articulated in 'History Will Absolve Me."' 159 Several
leading Cuban Communists were arrested for distributing this pamphlet and charged
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with circulating "malicious propaganda". 160 As a military campaign, Moncada was a
failure; as a propaganda campaign, it was a resounding success. For the first time in
his life, Fidel Castro had expanded his reputation beyond the city of Havana. People
began to recognize his name from one end of the republic to the other. 161
After his release on May 15, 1955, Castro immersed himself in opposition
activities, but found them disorganized and disheartening. He was harried by Batista's
men and feared assassination. On July 7, 1955, he left Cuba for Mexico. He gave
reporters an ominous declaration at the airport:
I am leaving Cuba because all doors of peaceful struggle have been
closed to me .. .I believe the hour has come to take our rights and not to
beg for them, to fight instead of pleading for them ... From trips such as
this, one does not return, or else one returns with the tyranny beheaded
at one's feet. 162
Once in Mexico, Castro met up with his brother Raul and some other
Fidelistas who "were already engaged in preparing to invade Cuba from Mexican
territory." 163 The group continued to practice militarily, doing drills while Fidel, in
good agitprop tradition, "scoured Miami, New York, and Chicago raising money from
other exiled compatriots." 164 After several setbacks caused by the Mexican police,
Castro managed to get a boat and arms for his men. The yacht was named Granma;
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and, though it its manufacturer intended it to comfortably accommodate only ten to
twelve people, he stripped it of comforts and dangerously loaded it with more than
eighty rebels and their ammunition. On November 25, 1956, they set sail for Cuba's
shores, arriving on December second seven miles from their intended landing point.
Che Guevara, a leading figure of the revolution in Cuba and close personal
friend of both Fidel and Raul Castro, was one of the men on Granma. He later wrote
that:
We had reached Cuba after a seven-day voyage across the Gulf of
Mexico and the Caribbean Sea, without food, plagued by seasickness
and aboard a vessel far from seaworthy ... The experience had left a
deep mark upon our troop of rookies who did not know the meaning of
combat. 165
The bedraggled "rookies" then had to begin the long trek to the Sierra Maestra
Mountains. Thanks to the efforts of a spy, Batista's men knew of their location. On
December fifth, Batista's army ambushed Castro's little band in an area called Alegria
de Pio, only twenty-two miles from their landing point. During this altercation,
Batista's army either killed or took prisoner all but seventeen of Castro's men. Of the
handful that escaped, many were wounded. Even worse, they were split into three
groups, each heading in a different direction. Among the wounded was Guevara, who
wrote of the attack:
I cannot remember exactly what happened. I felt the bitterness of
defeat and I was sure I was going to die. We walked until darkness
made it impossible to go on, when we decided to go to sleep, huddled
together in a heap. We were starved and thirsty and the mosquitoes
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increased our misery. This was our baptism of fire on December 5,
1956. It was the beginning of what would later become the Rebel
Army.1 66
From this devastating beginning followed a series of small victories and
narrow escapes. The remaining men were reunited with Castro in the Sierra Maestra
later that month through the help of peasant sympathizers. They spent the holidays in
hiding, moving from house to house gaining strength and nerve, and slowly adding
new recruits. By the middle of January, 1957, the "Rebel Army" had grown to thirtythree members. Fidel decided the time had come for them to see some more action,
and so he led them back down to the coast to attack the small government garrison at
La Plata. The battle was a success, and the rebels gained much-needed ammunition
and weapons. Guevara wrote, "Our victory had an electrifying effect. It was like a
clarion call announcing that the Rebel Army really existed and was ready to fight." 167
At this point, Fidel and his group were little more than bandits, and Guevara's
commentary is an excellent example of pokazukha.
Batista's forces struck back repeatedly. Two weeks after La Plata, the rebels
were hit with a surprise air attack that nearly killed them all. Then, just a week later,
there was another surprise attack that claimed several more rebel lives. Following
these defeats, Castro decided to retreat to the highest reaches of the mountains-the El
Lomon region-to settle and regroup. The movement had once again shrunk in
numbers. In the words of Guevara, "There were then 18 of us. This was the Re166 Ibid., 16.
167 Ibid ., 17.
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unified Revolutionary Army on February 12, 1957." 168 The group settled "in a thicket
of woods near a stream, on a plantation ... The little thicket of woods was the scene
of. .. interesting events. For the first time we were to be interviewed by a reporter, and
a foreign reporter at that. This man was Herbert Matthews." 169
After the Moncada incident, Batista heavily censored the press. Diario de la
Marina, a Cuban newspaper, published the following, "As a consequence of Sunday's

tragic events, the government has begun to apply the law on Public Order which
imposes censorship of the press." 170 The law on Public Order provided for two years
imprisonment for those who disseminated, published, or transmitted rumors that were
seen as degrading to the peace, public order, the stability of the powers of state or the
reputation of the nation or government. Batista's censorship proceeded under these
auspices. This tyrannical censorship drove Castro to use the foreign press. One
contemporary newspaper editorial described the situation:
The government and the armed forces have hung a curtain of fire and
censorship between the zone of operations and the Cuban people. No
journalist has been able to pass through it. .. The Cuban press, which
has so wisely and responsibly confronted these unfortunate
circumstances, does not deserve this. 171
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In early January of 1957, government officials announced that the rebels had
been vanquished and Castro slain. Left unchallenged, this lie could have destroyed the
26th of July Movement. The movement was centered on the person of Fidel-his
death would have been a major blow. However, in a brilliant move, Castro sent for a
foreign journalist, knowing that the truth, printed in a United States newspaper, would
eventually reach the Cuban public. This was an historic decision. Fidel had learned
from Stalin's example that interviews with foreign journalists could be quite powerful.
In "What is to be Done?" Lenin had emphasized how vital the press was to
revolutionary movements. As we have seen, Castro had likely read Lenin's text in
college, and had become a journalist (of sorts) himself.
In the late 1940's he wrote articles under his middle name, Alejandro. At the
University of Havana Law School, he was the co-editor of La Accion, a strongly antiBatista newspaper. He had even contributed articles to Bohemia, the most respected
periodical in Cuba. From the begi1ming, Castro knew how to play the press organ and
play it well. The influence of the media on the perception of public figures has never
been greater than in the case of revolutionary Cuba. If the role of the reporter is 'to get
everybody' as has been advanced by the profession of journalism, then there was a
singular lack of interest in 'getting' Mr. Castro. "In fact, the media have allowed
themselves to be manipulated in Castro's case." 172 Certainly, the journalists involved
in this manipulation were catering to America's fondness for 'w1derdogs'. However, in
at least one case, a journalist allowed himself to be used. Through the efforts of
172
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Herbert Matthews, the pokazukha developed by Castro and his men was amplified,
reaching audiences worldwide and helping to make a rebel into a dictator.

Herbert and Fidel
His brown eyes flash; his intense face is pushed close to the listener,
and the whispering voice, as in a stage play, lends a vivid sense of
drama.
-Herbert Matthews 173
In February 1957, Castro sent one of his most trusted men, Faustino Perez, to
bring back a foreign journalist. Disguised as a farmer, he walked out of the Sierra
Maestra and made his way to Havana, where he went directly to the home of Javier
Pazos, the leader of the revolution in Havana at that time. Castro sent no details on
how to set up an interview, for his position in the Sierra Maestra was a dangerous one,
forcing him to do a lot of moving around. Since Fidel gave no clear instructions,
Pazos went to his own father Felipe, asking him if he knew any foreign
correspondents. There was only one that his father knew personally, Mrs. R. Hart
(Ruby) Phillips of the New York Times. Faustino went to see her and explained his
mission. Ruby immediately recognized that this job had to be done by an outsider, a
person who would come in to get the story and go out to write it. Neither she nor any
of the Times staff in Cuba fit the bill. This is where Herbert Matthews came in.
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Matthews had led a life almost as interesting as that of Castro himself. Born in
New York City on January 10, 1900, he grew up loving what he then considered to be
"the glory" of war. When he was nine years old, his mother gave him a copy of
Richard Harding Davis' Soldiers ofFortune, a book written by "one of the greatest war
correspondents in American journalistic history."
I am not suggesting that my parents had me tagged for a future
newspaperman, or that my mother could have foreseen what my career
would be. The copy of Soldiers of Fortune, which I still possess, is
nevertheless a symbol to me-or if I wanted to believe it, a freakish
sign from Mercury that I was to be under his rule. 175
At age eighteen, Matthews signed up for the U.S. Army and went off to join
the forces battling in World War I, "to seek what is bombastically called glory, to
fulfill all youthful dreams, to emulate in some modest way the heroes of old that I had
been reading about all my life, to win the respect of others, not for any scholarly
achievement, but for physical prowess- to be, in short, everything I had not been." 176
None of these dreams were fated to come true, for Matthews arrived in France
as the peace was being settled, "just too late to see any action."
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in France, Matthews returned home, was discharged from the army, and matriculated
at Columbia University, where he earned a degree in Romance Languages. After his
graduation in 1922, he answered a want ad signed "Publisher", hoping that it was a
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book publisher. Much to his surprise, it was the publisher of the New York Times, and
he found himself a secretary in the business department of the famous newspaper. "I
got kicked into journalism through the back door, or entered it like a child who is
tossed into the water and has no choice but to learn to swim." 178
Matthews spent three "miserable" years in the business and accounting
departments of the Times, and then he switched over to night work so he could return
to Columbia University for a postgraduate course. He then won a fellowship that took
him to Italy in 1925-1926. There he studied Dante, medieval history, and philosophy.
Upon returning to the Times, Matthews was put into the news department as a
secretary. Then, in 1929, he was sent on a five-month junket for newspaper reporters
to Japan, sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 179
After his return from Asia, Matthews began to write as a full-fledged reporter
for the Times. His first assignment was in Paris, covering foreign affairs. He was
there from 1931 to 1935, when he was sent to cover the Italian attack on Abyssinia (in
present-day Ethiopia)-his first assignment as a war correspondent. In Abyssina, he
witnessed his first action and reported on the battle of Amba Aradam.
Matthew's next assignment for the Times was as a war correspondent covering
the Spanish Civil War. He arrived in Madrid in November of 1936 and was 'on the
spot' until the end of the war. He wrote numerous articles at this time, and among his
friends and colleagues were such legendary journalists as Ernest Hemingway. It was
178
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in Spain that Matthews learned firsthand the power a journalist can wield. Along with
Ernest Hemingway and Sefton Delmer of the London Daily Express, he was
instrumental in garnering world support for the anti-nationalist movement there. 180
Matthews was then sent to cover World War II from Italy and then from India.
Upon his return to the states in 1943, he continued to write about Indian and European
affairs for the Times until 1950, when he began to write about Latin America. "From
1950 to 1967 almost every editorial in the New York Times relating to Latin America
was written by me .. .I wrote many news articles, some books, and made innumerable
lectures on the region."
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Matthews covered events in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Cuba, the Dominican
Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela.
Before his visit to Cuba in 19 5 7, Matthews had written countless articles and
editorials, six books, and several scholarly articles. He had already had a remarkable
career. However, his life was slowing and he felt that he needed a "scoop". 182 The
Castro-Matthews connection was a marriage made in a reporter's heaven. The fact is
that Matthews needed Castro as much as the Cuban needed him. The Times
correspondent was nearing the end of his career. According to his colleagues, he
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believed that he never got the credit he deserved. "Here was the chance to get the
scoop of a lifetime." 183
In his book The Cuban Story, Matthews wrote:
I had been getting reports of considerable ferment and discontent, and
was intrigued by the mystery of Fidel Castro, whose name kept
cropping up in persistent reports that he was not dead, as the
government announced and everybody seemed to believe. 184
Whether this is true or not, Phillips decided that Matthews was the man for the
job. On the day of his arrival, February 15, 1957, the reporter met with Felipe Pazos
and his son. During that meeting, when Matthews asked about Castro's death, even
Felipe was inclined to believe the reports, as they had been circulated by respectable
news agencies like the United Press. However, Matthews believed what Perez had
told the younger Pazos, and preparations were made for Matthews to meet with
Castro. He would travel as an American tourist. His wife, Nancie, would go along to
complete this disguise. Faustino Perez and a young woman named Liliam Mesa
would guide the pair. At his hotel, after buying suitable clothes for fishing, Matthews
told the desk that he was going on a fishing trip. All Matthews knew when they set
out was that the interview with Fidel had been fixed for midnight of the next night. 185
Their trip to the Sierra Maestra went smoothly, and they arrived at the first
checkpoint early the next morning. Mrs. Matthews wrote an account of the trip for the
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New York Times house organ, called Times Talk, in March 1957. She finished it with
these words:
I dare not give too many details, but after an agonizing hunt, we located
the preliminary rendezvous. We found ourselves surrounded by the
kind of men and women you might meet at any Cuban tea party.
Incongruously, someone asked me in English if I wanted my dress
pressed. 186
Meanwhile, in the forest above the rendezvous point, Castro and his men were
in a sorry state. Reduced in nwnber to eighteen men, they had few rifles and almost
no ammunition. Their clothes were ragged, their supplies scarce. In the words of Che
Guevara, "When Ciro announced that Matthews had arrived, Fidel told us to look
sharp, like soldiers. I looked at myself, then at the others: shoes falling apart, tied
together with wire; we were covered with filth." 187 Regardless of the reality, Castro
was determined to make his little band seem like an army, and he told his men to make
the jungle clearing look as much like a "busy command post" as possible. 188 Such
fabrication to cover dismal reality was truly in the tradition of Potemkin, Lenin, and
Stalin.
The Matthews stayed overnight at the "preliminary rendezvous"-a small
mountain village named Manzanilla. From there they traveled by jeep, and then by
foot, up into the Sierra Maestras to Castro's secret hideout. Fidel was not at the
clearing when they arrived; Matthews was told that Castro would arrive in two hours,
186
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after an important meeting with his "general staff' . In reality, the guerrilla leader was
just a few hundred yards away, taking a nap.
It must have been a good rest, for it is obvious how affected Matthews was-or

wanted to be- by his first sight of the rebel leader:
Taking him, as one would at first, by his physique and personality, this
was quite a man-a powerful six-footer, olive-skinned, full-faced, with
a straggly beard. He was dressed in a olive-gray fatigue uniform and
carried a rifle with a telescope sight, of which he was very proud .. .It
seems his men had something more than fifty of these and he said the
soldiers feared them. The personality of the man is overpowering. It is
easy to see that his men adored him and also to see why he has caught
the imagination of the youth of Cuba all over the island. Here was an
educated, dedicated, fanatic, a man of ideals, of courage, and of
remarkable qualities of leadership. As the story unfolded of how he had
at first gathered the few remnants of the Eighty-two arow1d him; kept
the government troops at bay while youths came in from other parts of
Oriente as General Batista's counter-terrorism aroused them; got arms
and supplies and then began the series of raids and counter-attacks of
guerrilla warfare, one got a feeling that he is now invincible ... His
brown eyes flash; his intense face is pushed close to the listener, and
the whispering voice, as in a stage play, lends a vivid sense of drama. 189
Castro's act may not have been totally contrived, but it was indeed a "stage
play" which he was putting on, following the practices of agitprop he had learned from
the Bolsheviks. Matthews was a willing audience, and this magnified the effect, as it
invariably does with the practice of pokazukha. The actions that constitute pokazukha
have some reality without the belief of the audience, but audience participation is
necessary when the desired effect is dependent upon the pokazukha being taken for
reality-as in the case of a handful of bedraggled bandits being taken for a vibrant
revolution.
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Che Guevara later wrote, "We put on an act; we fi led off in step with me in the
lead." 190 In 1979, the newspaper Granma (named after the overloaded boat and then
an agitprop organ of the Cuban government under Castro) ran an official account of
the war in the Sierra Maestra. In that account, the authors explained the lengths to
which the rebels went to carry off their act:
Before entering the camp, Fidel had given instructions to his
companions to adopt martial airs .. .for some it took a lot of labor to
reconcile the martial air required by Fidel with the condition of their
clothes and their general appearance ... Manuel Fajardo, for example,
had no back on his shirt, torn to sheds by his knapsack harness. During
the time the journalist remained in the camp, Fajardo was obliged to
walk sideways ...Finally, the journalist believed he had counted some
forty fighters where there were no more than twenty and ... that the
group he had seen was part of a much larger force. 19 1
At one point, a man was brought in, simply to say to Castro, "Commandante,
the liaison from column number two has arrived," to which Fidel replied, "Wait until
I'm finished." The Granma articles clearly describe the rebel's purpose: "to impress
Matthews about the total numbers of the guerrilla army, without openly telling a
lie." 192 The story was printed in the Times on Sunday, February 24, 1957. The frontpage headline read, "Cuban Rebel is visited in Hideout"; the subhead read, "Castro is
Still Alive and Still Fighting in Mountains." The story began with this dramatic
paragraph:
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Fidel Castro, the rebel leader of Cuba's youth, is alive and fighting bard
and successfully in the rugged, almost impenetrable vastness of the
Sierra Maestra, at the southern tip of the island ... [Castro is] the most
dangerous enemy General Batista bas yet faced in a long and
adventurous career as a Cuban leader and dictator. This is the first
sureness that Fidel Castro is still alive ... No one connected with the
outside world, let alone with the press, has seen Senor Castro except
this writer.
Having thus assured his exclusivity, Matthews went on to write:
They have had many fights, and inflicted many losses, Senor Castro
said. Government planes came over and bombed every day; in fact, at
nine sharp a plane did fly over. The troops took up positions; a man in
a white shirt was hastily covered up. But the plane went on to bomb
higher in the mountains ...'We have been fighting for seventy-nine days
now and are stronger than ever,' Senor Castro said, 'The soldiers are
fighting badly; their moral is low and ours could not be higher. We are
killing many.' This account, among other things, will break the tightest
censorship in the history of the Cuban Republic ...Fidel Castro and his
26th of July Movement are the flaming symbol of the opposition to the
regime ...formed of youths of all kinds ... radical, democratic, and
therefore anti-communist ...From the looks of thin~s, General Batista
cannot possibly hope to suppress the Castro revolt. 19
Matthew's article is filled with half-truths and blatant falsities. Before this
article, Castro was not "the rebel leader of Cuba's youth". At the time, he was far from
"the most dangerous enemy General Batista has yet faced" . He and his little group
were not "the flaming symbol of the opposition to the regime," it was not "formed of
youths of all kinds," nor was it "anti-communist". Government planes did not "bomb
every day" . Castro's band was not "stronger than ever," and it was certainly not
"killing many" .
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The first to call Matthew's article into question was Batista himself, but the
Cuban leader went too far. He responded by publicly insisting that his troops had
killed Castro, and that they had squashed the revolution. Batista's credibility dissolved
when the Times then ran a photograph of Matthews and Castro together in the Sierras.
Three columns wide by four columns high, the picture forever dashed Batista's hopes
that the people would believe Castro dead. Batista later recalled his mistake in Cuba
Betrayed, which he wrote from exile in 1962:

A representative of The United Press, Francis L. McCarthy [Batista's
friend] , reported that Castro was dead and buried. There was no official
confirmation of this report, and it was secretly suspected that the rebel
leader had taken refuge in the highest mountainous region of the Sierra
Maestra. Gen. Diaz Tamayo, Chief of the military territory, and Col.
Barrera, Chief of operations, helped reinforce the belief of the General
Staff that the group which had landed Dec. 2 had given up the struggle.
In this climate of doubt, Herbert L. Matthews, reporter for the New
York Times, published an interview with Fidel Castro. To prove his
statements he produced an unclear photograph of Castro. The military
chiefs of the province told the General Staff so emphatically that no
such interview had taken place, that the minister of defense publicly
denied it had occurred. And even I, influenced by the reports of the
General Staff, doubted it. The interview had, in fact, taken place and its
publication was of considerable propaganda value to the rebels. 194
Matthew's story affected more than just Batista's integrity. After Matthew's
articles, other journalists made their way to the mountains. Andrew St. George of
Coronet magazine visited five times. Robert Taber of CBS did a piece on Castro that

was broadcast on television and radio and appeared in the pages of Life magazine. 195
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"Indeed, the Sierra was becoming so crowded that one big newspaper correspondent
on his way up was crestfallen to discover a reporter from Boy's L(fe on his way
down." 196 After Matthews' articles, disillusioned Cubans flocked to the mountains to
meet the extraordinary man they had read about in the Times. In the making of Fidel's
legend, Matthews' stories played a crucial role. There was something exceptionally
romantic about the young leader leaving his advantaged life, going into the mountains
with a few men, and vowing never to return until he could walk in~o Havana with his
revolution.
It was a timeless myth, part-Robin Hood, part-Mao, and given the
excesses of Batista, it found wide acceptance. Fidel Castro might have
been hundreds of miles away in the distant mountains, but with those
articles ... he lived. 197

Matthews later wrote in his book The Cuban Story,
In this interview were all the elements out of which the insurrection
grew to its ultimate triumph ... Add these up and one can argue that The
Times certainly helped to overthrow General Batista .. . [the Cubans]
were and still are very grateful to me and to the New York Times for the
role we played. 198
Castro did not fail to show his gratitude. On Sunday, April 19, 1959, the following
appeared in the New York Times:
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Premier Fidel Castro of Cuba awarded medals tonight to United States
newsmen who interviewed him when he was leading the revolution.
199
They were: Herbert L. Matthews of the New York Times .. .
Matthews again proclaimed his historic role in making Castro a legend in his last
article for the Times:
I will not deny that as I sat with Fidel Castro, his brother Raul, Che
Guevara and others up in the Sierra Maestra on the chilly morning of
Feb. 17, 1957, Clio, the muse of history, touched me with her hand-or
whatever she uses. The resulting publicity in The Times gave Castro
and his guerrilla band a nationwide and even a worldwide fame that,
chronologically, was the start of the most fantastic career of any leader
in the whole course of Latin America's independent history.200
Whether Matthew's hyperbole is true or not, every full-length biography of
Fidel Castro agrees with the reporter on the fact that he and the Times helped to
overthrow Batista. However, none goes so far as to argue that, without Matthew's
articles, Castro would never have risen to take over Cuba. Several have actually
defended Matthews. Tad Szulc wrote:
It was theater, literally guerrilla theater, that Castro put on for
Matthews ... [Matthews] must never be accused of being a dupe or
naive; he was in an environment totally controlled by Fidel, the Cuban
leader was eminently credible, and above all he was very much in
existence when Batista was still claiming him dead. 201
The above facts may or may not be true, but what Mr. Szulc fails to realize is that they
do not constitute a valid defense for Matthews. Whether Castro put on "guerrilla
theater" for Matthews is irrelevant, for even if it was a play, Matthews was a good
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audience, and very willingly 'suspended his disbelief .202 Matthews fiercely defended
his journalism in letters to his peers, editorials for the New York Times, and in all three
of his major works on the subject, The Cuban Story (1961), Fidel Castro (1969), and
Revolution in Cuba (1975). In The Cuban Story, he wrote:

In this interview ... was the true figure of Fidel Castro, before power
taught him intoxicating spiritual corruption, before the ideals of
democracy and freedom presented themselves as impossibilities if he
was to make a drastic social revolution. 203
Matthews again defended himself in Fidel Castro,
I never claimed more for myself in the interview I had with Castro in
the Sierra Maestra than that I recognized his quality and, joining it to
the country-wide antagonism to the Batista regime which existed at the
time, forecast the role that he was to play. I could not realize then how
much danger and hardship he and his followers had yet to survive, or I
might not have been so confident. I did not know how small a force
Fidel had at that time-eighteen men with rifles-but I doubt that this
would have made any difference in the story I wrote for the New York
Times ... That group of eighteen men was enough for the purpose of the
moment in the struggle .. . Anyway, what Fidel did not seem to realize
was the extent to which he had already become a symbol of resistance
for the youth of Cuba, and that he would become the symbol of
revolution after my story was published in the New York Times. 204
Matthew's arguments fall down under scrupulous criticism. The "true figure of
Fidel Castro" was not in any of Matthew's work. "That group of eighteen men" was
not "enough for the purpose" or they would not have been hiding in the highest
reaches of the mountains. Indeed, Matthews has been attacked by many historians and
202
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by his peers in the media. One critic who represents both of these groups is Theodore
Draper, a 1950's journalist and prominent ex-Communist who later became a historian
of the Cuban Revolution. In an exchange of letters with Matthews in March 1962
(which was initiated by a letter to Draper from Matthews in response to an article
Draper had written for the CIA-funded magazine Encounter), Draper brought up some
very good points. He wrote:
I am baffled by the certainty of persons like yourself that they 'know'
Fidel.. .I cannot understand how you can believe that you could look
into his real soul and penetrate his private mind by providing him with
an audience on set occasions .. .I strongly doubt that your articles would
have had such an electrifying effect if you had not personally vouched
for Castro's large and willing force ... It was strange reporting to bear
witness to a large force which merely existed in your imagination.
Draper went on to write:
Having gone this far, I am going to continue, and try to tell you what
has been so disturbing about your role in this whole affair. It has been
a most unusual role for a journalist. How many journalists have been
able to say, as you have said, that your articles 'literally altered the
course of Cuban history?' Therefore, your responsibilities have been
unusually great. You have represented in this case the most influential
newspaper in the United States, perhaps in the world today. Your
words have often been quoted: 'In all my thirty-eight years on the New
York Times, I have never seen a big story so misunderstood, so
misinterpreted and so badly handled as the Cuban Revolution.' I am
inclined to agree with you, but I cannot exempt you from your own
· · ·
205
cnt1c1sm.
Matthews was obviously driven by his own zeal to make Castro and his
movement 'larger than life'. In The Cuban Story, Matthews wrote:

205

Theodore Draper to Herbert L. Matthews, March 5, 1962, transcript in Theodore Draper,
Castro's Revolution: Myths and Realities (New York: Praeger, 1965), 189-191 .

96
I knew I had a sensational scoop. I exulted at the fact that at the age of
fifty-seven I could still show a younger generation of newspapermen
how to get a difficult and dangerous story, and how to write it. 20
Matthews would have, and did, do more for Castro-and his own career-than
simply writing a single article. From 1957 until his retirement several decades later,
Matthews was on the editorial board of the New York Times, and wrote no less than
ten editorials in defense of Castro's conversion of Cuba to Communism. He also
helped Castro in ways that were more material. Mario Llerena, a former member of
Castro's revolution, later wrote:
It was evident that Herbert L. Matthews was most sympathetic toward
the revolutionary cause in Cuba and toward Fidel Castro in particular.
He was also willing to help. It would be a good idea, he suggested, for
me to go on television- my identity should be disguised, naturallyand speak to the American audience as a secret agent of the Castro
underground in Havana. I agreed at once ... Matthews immediately
picked up the phone and called the Columbia Broadcasting System. 207

Robert Taber (who later went to the Sierra Maestra to interview Castro, as mentioned
above) of CBS then tried to get Matthews to go on the show with Llerena, but
Matthews declined, saying that
he could not do it because he was already too publicly involved with
the Castro movement, and a television appearance with me so soon
after the publication of his articles might reflect upon his editorial
position with Times. 208
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As Llerena asserts, these later actions prove that Matthews was not only sympathetic
to Castro's movement, but that---once committed to Castro in his zeal to revitalize his
career-he used every method at his disposal to further it.
"The Cuban Story" serves as an excellent example of how Russian pokazukha
can succeed with the help of a willing audience. Castro and his men deliberately
erected a Potemkin village to deceive Matthews that fateful day in the Sierra Maestra,
in order that he would then be manipulated into writing propaganda on their behalf.
Matthews was there to get a "scoop" and to make the object of that "scoop"-Castro
and his movement-as successful as possible. Both men accomplished their goals.
By writing what amounted to propaganda, Matthews was rewarded by being
immediately promoted to the editorial board of the Times. By employingpokazukha,
Castro was rewarded, as Matthews made him a worldwide hero and helped propel him
into power.
It is easy to answer the question of just how historically significant Matthew's
work was. Without his articles, Castro would have been dead in the minds of the
Cuban people and the world. Without his work, Batista's censorship and integrity
would not have been destroyed as easily or completely. Without Matthews-and his
hidden agendas-Castro would not have become the triumphant hero of the Cuban
Revolution. Instead, he would only have been a Communist radical hiding furtively
from defeat in the highest eyries of the Sierra Maestra. The strength of character,
strength of arms, and anti-Communist feelings that the Castro in Matthew's article
possessed were never commanded by the real Fidel Castro. It was Matthew's fictitious
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hero that won the Revolution; and afterward, the world was left to mourn the fact that
the reality did not live up to their expectations--expectations created by Castro's

pokazukha and by the mind and pen of Herbert Matthews.
In his last book, A World in Revolution, Matthews wrote:
I do not expect to live long enough to see my writings on Cuba
generally accepted .. . One day in October 1963, when my wife and I
were with Fidel Castro and Celia Sanchez in her house in Havana, Fidel
said earnestly to me: 'You will be vindicated some day. People will
see that you told the truth and are telling the truth now about the Cuban
Revolution.' 'I'm afraid I'll be dead by that time,' I answered. 209
Now, long after his death, Matthews has still not been vindicated; he never will
be. The lives of millions and the history of a country were changed forever because of
his words. Matthew's work comprised the most history-changing journalism Cuba had
ever seen. While there are innumerable examples of Fidel's Russian-style pokazukha
and his Stalinist propaganda use of foreignjoumalists, "The Cuban Story" illustrates
the extraordinary power of such tactics if they are skillfully employed before a willing
audience. Matthews and the editorial staff of the New York Times was fully prepared
to accept and develop the image of a Cuban underdog and make the most of his story
in order to sell newspapers.
While Castro deployed the pokazukha tactics of Potemkin, Lenin, and Stalin,
Stalin's successor was simultaneously using and refining those same techniques in the
Soviet Union. Both Fidel and Nikita Khrushchev were practicing these tactics at the
same time; yet since Castro had to hide his true affinities, his agitprop prior to 1959
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was done without the support-indeed without the knowledge-of the top leaders in
the Kremlin. That situation would soon change.

Chapter VI

THE U.S.S.R. AND KHRUSHCHEV

[Cuba has become] a beacon, a hopeful lighthouse for all the
unfortunate, exploited peoples of the world.
-Nikita Khrushchev, 1960 210
Prior to 1959, the Cuban Communists were only on the periphery of Moscow's
vision. The countries of Latin America, including Cuba, were not far enough along
the predetermined path to global socialism for them to be any kind of focus of the
international movement. 2 11 Even so, just as agitprop was modified over the years to fit
the political exigencies of the moment, the influence emanating from the Soviet Union
was not static, and Soviet policy went through several major shifts in its relations with
Latin America from 1917 until 1959. The differences between the policies came in
two major areas: strategic (the main enemy, the character of the revolution) and
tactical (class against class, the 'Bolshevization' of national parties). Although there
were significant differences in policy depending upon the Soviet leaders' needs of the
moment, all policy was directed from Moscow- funneled through the KGB , the
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Department for Agitation and Propaganda, and the Commission on Cultural Affairs in
the Central Committee. 21 2
In 1953, the death of Joseph Stalin created a series of shifts in Moscow, from
which Nikita Khrushchev eventually emerged victorious. Posing as the defender of
Leninist orthodoxy, he launched a revival of party propaganda as a necessary
complement to the ending of Stalinist terror. By 1955, he had established himself as
the top boss of the Soviet Union, partially through his successful use of ebullient
propaganda and his pertinacious use of Potemkin-like foreign policy. The late 1950s
were an optimistic period for both the people of the U.S.S.R. and their leaders: the
Soviet economy was experiencing growth; high-profile projects in the military and
space technology fields were 'proving' the superiority of the socialist state in full view
of the world; and emerging detente between East and West was lessening the
perceived danger from global nuclear war. 213 By 1962, it appeared as if Khrushchev
believed his own propaganda, and his optimistic foreign policy brought the world to
the brink of nuclear war.

Soviets in the American 'Sphere'
The revolution of the proletariat and poor peasants in any country of
Latin America will lead to the immediate armed intervention of the
United States.
'
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From 1917 until 1928, the U.S.S.R. largely ignored Latin America.
Strategically, the Comintern focused on 'imperialist' enemies and the formation of the
international movement, particularly in Europe. The early leaders of the U.S.S.R.
believed, following Marx and Lenin, that revolution would occur in Europe first, then
in Asia, followed by the rest of the globe. Thus, during the first decade of Soviet
leadership, Latin American Communists were expected to support their comrades in
the more industrialized countries. Tactically, they were to distribute propaganda at
home and wait patiently for the revolution to occur in Europe.

2 15

In the mid-1920s, the leaders of world Communism in Moscow slowly began
to realize that global revolution beginning in Europe was not ad portas. This situation
caused a realignment of ideology and policy, such that, in 1928, the Soviets
'discovered' America as a place where revolution might just originate on its own.
However, Latin America was still on the periphery. From 1928 until the outbreak of
WWII, the leaders of the Comintern shifted expectations, and predicted that the
revolution would happen first in Asia, and then spread to the United States.
Strategically, 'Trotskyism' was added to the list of major enemies, followed closely by
fascism . Tactically, Latin American Communists were to 'Bolshevize' (reorganize)
their parties and prepare to support the Revolution in the United States.
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within this context that Fabio Grobart began working among the Communists in Cuba
(discussed above).
With the outbreak of WWII and the invasion of the U.S.S.R., fascism became
strategic enemy number one and supporting the Soviets the highest tactical order of
the day. This situation shifted slightly when the United States became an anti-Fascist
ally, and supporting both the United States and the U.S.S.R. together became the
highest tactical imperative. In Cuba, Communists and non-Communists alike
enthusiastically supported both the United States and the Soviet Union until the end of
the war. 217 In fact, the Cuban republic was the first Latin American government that
officially recognized the U.S.S.R. (which they did under pressure from the United
States).218
The Comintern dissolved at the outset of WWII, and from 1945 until 1959,
Cuba's Communist Party was left to fend largely for itself. Cuba's signing of the 194 7
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, which was in effect a restatement of
the principles of the Monroe Doctrine, confirmed the ideological suspicions of the
leadership in Moscow. Although Stalin and his subordinates dealt pragmatically with
some 'bourgeoisie' nationalists such as Chiang Kai-shek, and broke with some
Communists like Josip Tito, at this time the Soviets believed that the world was
clearly divided into 'Communist' and 'capitalist', and that the Latin American nations,
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including Cuba, were firmly entrenched in the capitalist camp. 21 9 This belief was held
so firmly that the Soviet Union even closed its embassy in Havana in 1958, believing
that it had no practical pmpose. There were no Soviet intelligence officers operating
in Cuba in the late 1950s-when Castro marched into Havana in 1959, the nearest
KGB or GRU (military intelligence) presence was in Mexico City. 220
That is not to say that the leaders of the Soviet Union during the early Cold
War were uninterested in the Third World-it is simply that they ignored Latin
America as irrevocably 'lost'. Until his death in March 1953, Stalin expanded relations
with several nations emerging from the colonial grip. However, Stalin was never able
to develop his foreign policy beyond his unshakable belief in an inevitable war
between the forces of capitalism and the forces of socialism. Thus, Soviet Stalinist
foreign policy was directed, first and foremost, to the strategic defense and economic
support of the U.S.S.R. itself. Jolu1 Lewis Gaddis, a Cold War expert, put it this way:
Stalin's plans for expanding the Soviet Union's influence beyond its
borders contained a major contradiction. On the one hand, he clung to
the notion, growing out of his belief in the instability of capitalism, that
proletarians in other countries would eventually choose the socialist
model : hence, his illusions with respect to Germany and Eastern
Europe at the end of the war as well as his euphoria when the Chinese
unexpectedly did move in that direction. But on the other hand, Stalin's
economic policies caused the Soviet presence in those regions to come
across as exploitive, and this generated resentment an1ong the very
people whose loyalty he had hoped to win .. .The Soviet Union, for this
2 19
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reason, never came close to building relationships based on a sense of
mutual interest. 221
Prior to 1953, Soviet foreign policy was constrained by Stalinist dogma, which
held that there was only one road-a violent one, led by a Bolshevized worker
vanguard-to socialism, and that road was policed by the U.S.S.R. 222 However, once
Khrushchev came to power in 1954-55, dogma gave way to a more pragmatic
approach, and Soviet leaders began to enthusiastically support a number of nonCommunist regimes in the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa.

Khrushchev, Optimistic Propagandist
How can we not rejoice, comrades, at the gigantic achievements of our
industry? ... What other state has ever built on such a scale? There has
never been such a country. Only for our country and its remarkable
people-a people of fighters, a people of pioneers-are such things
possible [Stormy applause].
-Nikita Khrushchev, 1958 223
From 1955 to 1959, many things changed for the Soviet Union. In a climate
where emerging detente was lessening the perceived danger from global nuclear war,
the Soviet command economy seemed to be experiencing growth and Soviet scientists
were 'winning' both the space race and the race for superiority in military
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teclmology. 224 Nikita Khrushchev, now top boss in the Kremlin, imposed new
flexibility in foreign policy and infused it with a new form of agitprop. In fact,

pokazukha became so important to Soviet policy during the Khrushchev years that it is
now impossible to separate many of Klu·ushchev's foreign policy declarations and
tactics from his equally extraordinary agitprop. In Khrushchev's Moscow,
Potemkinism reached a height unparalleled in Russian history.
At the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
(CPSU) in February 1956, Khrushchev secretly denounced Stalin's purges and openly
announced changes in Soviet foreign policy (discussed below). In an important
section of his report to that meeting, entitled "Problems ofldeological Work",
Klu·ushchev emphasized that propaganda must be "practical". 225 In that report, he
conflated propaganda and agitation, making the two into one, and fusing them with
foreign policy in general. According to Western experts on Soviet propaganda,
Kl1rushchev's 1956 policy declarations marked "a further stage in [Soviet
propaganda's] transformation from an instrument of a fanatical but vital political
religion into a gigantic totalitarian public relations program."226
The collapse of the colonial empires "enchanted and mesmerized Khrushchev,
stirring old memories of the revolutionary passions of the [Russian] Civil War and the
224
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Soviet 'Comintern l 920s."' 227 As the leader and primary instigator of the change in
foreign policy, Khrushchev "did not mind abandoning for a while the role of sober and
reasonable world statesman in order to pose more persuasively as a friend of all
revolutionaries and 'liberated peoples' of the world. From being his own foreign
minister, he became a chief Soviet propagandist. ,,22 8 Over the next few years, foreign
policy, the military, the scientific bureaus, and the diplomatic corps were all joined
together with the agitprop department to make up this "gigantic" P.R. campaign under
Khrushchev-and for awhile, the Potemkin-like fa<;ades they built stood up to the
scrutiny of the world.
On October 4, 1957, the Soviets accomplished a major technological and
propaganda feat that changed the world's opinion of Soviet technology overnight. The
first satellite in human history was launched-not by the U.S. or any western cow1try,
but by the Soviet Union. As Sputnik I ("sputnik" means "satellite" in Russian) rose up
to earth orbit, feelings of superiority fell markedly in the West. The West had
underestimated the Soviet Union, confusing substandard Russian cars and other
consumer goods with the state of Soviet science and technology. Prior to Sputnik,
there had been a media flap about possible Soviet 'suitcase bombs'. In response to that
fear, it became a common joke that the Russians could not bring such bombs into the
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United States because they had not been able to perfect the suitcase. After the launch
of Sputnik, the laughter stopped. 229
The Soviet propagandists knew the global importance of their scientists'
achievement, and set the stage well in advance. They deliberately took advantage of
the Western tendency to discount Soviet achievements. At the end of August, less
than two months before the Sputnik launch, the Soviet news agency announced:
"Successful tests of an intercontinental ballistic missile as well as explosions of
nuclear and thermonuclear weapons have taken place in the Soviet Union. "230 At the
time, pundits and scientists in the West "felt that the Russians still were far from
having achieved a useable ICBM"-and they stated so publically and vociferously. 23 1
Soviet agitprop had maneuvered the U.S . into making public statements that would
soon be questioned the world over.
The night of the launch, the Soviets propaganda wizards invited some fifty
scientists from thirteen countries, all members of the International Geophysical Year's
conference on rockets and satellites, for cocktails at the Soviet Embassy in
Washington. The group included a select number of journalists, in order that the
reaction of the international scientific community might be broadcast around the
world. Ne w York Times science reporter Walter Sullivan was called to the phone and

229

Paul Dickson, Sputnik: The Shock of the Century (New York: Berkley Books, 200 I), 109.

230

Tass (Soviet news agency) announcement, quoted by Associated Press, "Soviet Miss ile,"
New York Times, September I, 1957: 99.
23 1

Ibid.

109
told that Moscow had put a satellite into orbit. In the words of one of those gathered
at the embassy:
[Sullivan] hurried back and whispered the news in the ear of U.S.
physicist Lloyd Berkner, who rapped on the hors d'oeuvre table until
the hubbub quieted and dramatically declared to the unknowing and
startled group, including the Russians, 'A satellite is in orbit at an
elevation of 900 km. I wish to congratulate our Soviet colleagues on
their achievement.' Washington changed in those next few hours. The
U.S. , which had assumed scientific pre-eminence, had been beaten in
the opening lap of the space race. Before the night was over the
Russians had fueled themselves with vodka and stood curbside in front
of their embassy, staring into the night sky, singing and cheering. I
didn't go to bed that night, rushing from the Soviet embassy to Capitol
Hill to the White House. Those at the center of the power game knew
their lives had changed. 23 2
At the Naval Research Laboratory-which was in charge of "Project
Vanguard," the U.S. space program-the engineers bathed the roof in searchlights so
they could adjust their radio dishes to pick up the loud and undeniable beep from

Sputnik. The White House affected indifference, and reassured the nation about
American scientific proficiency. Some of the West's top scientists, like M.I.T.'s
Vannevar Bush, "took refuge behind closed doors until they could figure out what to
say." 233 Anxiety spread throughout the West. When the U.S. rushed their satellite to
the launching pad two months later, its rocket lurched, buckled and blew up on the
ground. The American scientific community continued to assert that U.S . technology
was more sophisticated than that of the Soviets. "But by then the game had moved
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beyond pure science. "234 It had moved into the realm of politics and possibility-a
realm perfect for the operation of Potemkin-like pokazukha.
Khrushchev was in Kiev meeting with civilian and military officials when he
received the news about the success of Sputnik. According to his son, as Nikita
reported the achievement to the gathering, his face "shone." The elder Khrushchev
announced:
The Americans have proclaimed to the whole world that they are
preparing to launch a satellite of the earth. Theirs is only the size of an
orange. We, on the other hand, have kept quiet, but now have a
satellite circling the planet. And not a little one, but one that weighs
eighty kilos.235
Khrushchev rarely failed to take proper propaganda advantage of the Sputnik triumph.
After the public humiliation of the Vanguard's launch pad fiasco, Khrushchev claimed
that the U.S.S.R. had "outstripped the leading capitalist country-the United Statesin the field of scientific and technological progress." 236 Following Stalin's example of
holding timely meetings with foreign journalists, Khrushchev granted an interview
with the New York Tim es on October 8, four days after the Sputnik launch:
After having said that the Soviet Union had all the rockets it needed for
its defense, the party secretary added that some Americans had laughed
when he announced that the Soviet Union had the intercontinental
ballistic missile. But now that Moscow has launched the earth satellite,
which requires a powerful rocket to move it into orbit, only the
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uninformed and technically ignorant can say the Russians are not
telling the truth, he said. 237
Agitprop scientists had set up a pokazukha coup; Khrushchev gleefully
capitalized on it out with a timely propaganda interview. Khrushchev pressed this
propaganda advantage at every chance, listing Soviet missile and satellite feats as an
indication of "the high level of science and technology" in Russia. "I think the
Americans too will develop rockets and launch them," he declared, "but the difference
is that they will launch and we have already done that." 238 In April 1958, Khrushchev
felt able to declare that, "It is the United States which is now intent on catching up
with the Soviet Union." 239
With these tactics, Khrushchev and his propaganda machine were indulging in
the most blatant pokazukha-and some in Washington did peer behind their fac;ades.
John Foster Dulles, then Eisenhower's Secretary of State, exposed Soviet posturing
about missiles as "a hoax and a fraud and asked, in effect, what kind of numbskulls the
Soviet leaders thought Americans were. "240 The rocket that carried Sputnik into orbit
was not an operational weapon. Although the U.S.S.R.'s thermonuclear weapons
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worked well enough, their missiles lacked sufficiently precise guidance to put the
weapons where they were aimed. 241

In fact, it was not until the beginning of the next decade that the first accurate
Soviet ICBMs became operational. Sergei Khrushchev later admitted, "We threatened
with missiles we didn't have." He continued, however, to say that the United States
did not discover "the real balance of forces in terms of missiles" until years later. 242
Indeed, many people disagreed with Secretary Dulles, even in the U.S. , and Premier
Khrushchev's claims worked wonders, both in North America and worldwide, on
those that wanted to believe that the Soviets were technologically and militarily
'beating' the United States. Nikita Khrushchev would later admit: "It always sounded
good to say in public speeches that we could hit a fly with our missiles ... I exaggerated
a little." 243 Khrushchev's exaggerations worked. In the words of one contemporary
American pw1dit in 1958:
The Soviet Union is scoring propaganda victory after victory. No
matter how it turns its policies, Washington finds itself reeling and
from reverse to reverse on the propaganda front .. . The cow1terpart to
the image of the Soviet Union growing up in the world appears to be
that of a hesitant legalistic, suspicious, myopic, negativist Uncle Sam
or, perhaps one should say, John Foster Dulles. For it is Mister Dulles'
caricature rather than that of the traditionally benevolent Uncle Sam
that is appearing more and more frequently in the press of Europe and
241
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the uncommitted nations of Asia ... Perhaps Americans should admit
that, although Madison Avenue may be unexcelled in the art of selling
goods, the Russian teclmique of political propaganda is unrivaled. The
Russians have succeeded in presenting their main lines simply, directly,
forcefully. 244
The Sovietpokazukha machine repeated these sorts of tactics-combining
technological advances with Potemkin villages and clear, concise statements of
propaganda-over and over during Khrushchev's reign.
One of the most highly developed tools of Soviet agitprop during the 1950s
and 1960s was the travelling exhibition. Used at world's fairs and in shows that
traveled all over the globe, the Soviets boasted that a tour of their exhibits was, "as
good as a trip to the Soviet Union." After a walk through one of these exhibitions in
New York in 1959, Max Frankel, special correspondent for the New York Times in
Moscow, uncovered these fa9ades for what they were. He wrote, "A visitor can see
far more here in two hours than this correspondent saw in two years in the Soviet
Union, far more especially of the stuff of Soviet wishful dreams. The exhibition
projects a glistening Soviet future, but strains facts of Soviet reality. "245 The Soviet
people were not ignorant of the insubstantial nature of their gleaming pokazukha
fa9ades, their new Potemkin villages. One former Soviet citizen told the following
story:
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I remember something my husband said to me back in the late 1950s,
early 1960s. He was a member of the Communist Party, you know, an
officer in the Soviet Army. He said to me one day after reading some
report or another in the papers that we should take one of Khrushchev's
rockets to visit our world's fair exhibition so that we could see how well
we really lived [laughs]. 246
Even something as complex as a rocket to the moon could be turned into a tool
of Khrushchev's pokazukha. Although Sputnik I dominated center stage at Soviet
exhibitions, the timing of its law1ch had not been set by the demands of agitprop.
Rather, the agitprop surrounding that law1ch was constructed to sync up with the
scientists' practical timetable. Not so with later Soviet space achievements. For
example, on September 12, 1959, just three days prior to Khrushchev's visit to the
United States, his pokazukha machine again capitalized on Soviet technological
advances by launching the world's first rocket to the moon. Making a point to call it a
"guided rocket" in press releases (using the language of missile weaponry), the Soviets
coordinated the mission perfectly with Khrushchev's visit. The rocket reached the
moon the next day at midnight Moscow time (an unfortunate hour for the slumbering
Soviet people), but at precisely 5:00 pm in New York, giving American journalists
plenty of time to write articles about it for every edition of their papers. Those
newspapers then hit newsstands the next day, September 14, the day before
Khrushchev arrived in the U.S.
On September 13 , Max Frankel noted that "The significance of the timing of
the [moon] shot was not lost here. Soviet photographers were at the central telegraph
246
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office to take pictures of foreign correspondents filing the news. "247 The lunar rocket
carried Soviet medallions whose purpose soon became clear. On September 14,
Khrushchev announced to the world that he would give a replica of those medallions
to President Eisenhower upon the Russian Premier's arrival in the U.S. the next day.
Predictably, the newspapers of the world had a field day with this obvious, but

interesting, pokazukha tactic. The New York Times ran the story on the front page for
September 15, the day Khrushchev arrived. 248
As we have seen, under Khrushchev all segments of the Soviet bureaucracy
could be bent to the goals of agitprop-including foreign policy. At the Twentieth
Congress of the CPSU, in February 1956, Khrushchev did more than change Soviet

pokazukha strategy-he made public much of his new thinking in foreign policy,
breaking officially with a great deal of the dogma followed so diligently under Stalin.
Although the world was still divided into communist (socialist) and capitalist
(imperialist) camps, no longer was a new world war "fatalistically inevitable". In the
parts of the world emerging from imperial rule, Khrushchev said, different countries
could take d(fferent roads to socialism-and even peaceful, non-revolutionary paths to
socialism were possible. 249 To Khrushchev, the Third World was an arena of
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competition for influence vis-a-vis the imperialist West, and even bourgeois
nationalist leaders in emerging countries could be allies in this struggle. 25 0
For Khrushchev, the position of the Soviet Union in world affairs had changed
quickly.
When we formed the Warsaw Pact [1955], Western countries had a
great advantage over us in their economies and in their nuclear
arsenals. Because of that we had to mobilize and make better estimates
of our forces in the event that the enemy should attack either the Soviet
Union or om allies. Our military union [the Warsaw Pact] was a
product of the times we lived in. Things are different now. The
military and economic balances have shifted to om favor. That makes
it easier for us to take the offensive in the areas of disarmament and
world cooperation. 25 1
Khrushchev's assessment spelled out a weakening of the imperialist West with the
added benefit of strengthening Soviet security. 252 Even the KGB, the powerful and
generally pessimistic Soviet intelligence organization, really believed that "the world
was going our way. "253
In response to the decline in imperial power and optimism in the Soviet Union,
the Soviets developed a new theory to account for the possibilities of socialist
transition in the emerging nations of Asia and Africa. National democratic states
freshl y removed from imperial rule were neither a part of the capitalist/imperialist, nor
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the communist/socialist, camps. Rather, they were free to choose between the two.
The new Soviet dogma stated that the emerging national democratic states would
select socialism, for the anti-imperialist currents were strong in countries just
emerging from the fog of colonial rule.

254

Khrushchev seems to have believed what

he said in 1956:
The new period in world history which Lenin predicted has arrived, and
the peoples of the East are playing an active part in deciding the
destinies of the whole world, are becoming a new mighty factor in
international relations. 255
As each nation emerged from colonial rule, it was essential that the Soviet Union
"play an active part" to assist in their struggles for "independence." In Khrushchev's
foreign policy, each success of socialism in the Third World would expand Soviet
prestige and power on the global stage, and each nation that chose the capitalist path
would be a major setback.
These assumptions led the KGB, the Soviet leadership in general, and Nikita
Khrushchev in particular to court several countries in Asia, Africa, and the Middle
East. Through clandestine organizational support and open military and economic aid,
the Soviet Union attempted to ensure that the emerging nations would follow their
natural anti-imperialist tendencies right into the arms of the global Communist
revolution. Egypt received the first aid in 1955, followed by Iraq in 1958 and India in
1960. Between 1955 and 1960, Moscow gave military and economic aid to eleven
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Third World countries. In late 1959 and early 1960, just as Castro and his supporters
were consolidating their revolution in Cuba, the Soviet Union began to give aid to
smaller counties like Guinea, Ghana, and Mali. 256
Many of the leaders of emerging nations were happy to accept Soviet aid. As
one historian put it:
In the euphoria of liberation from colonial rule there were many
who ... were seduced by anti-imperialist fantasy economics. Convinced
that heavy industry was the key to rapid economic development, they
welcomed inefficient Soviet steel mills and other heavy plants as
symbols of modernity rather than potential industrial white
elephants. 257
Throughout the Third World, including Cuba, when the Soviets were involved, so was

pokazukha. Fa9ades took the place of substance, and Soviet-built factories , regardless
of usefulness, became the symbols of socialist progress in emerging countries. In turn,
the fiery rhetoric of the new generation of Third World leaders against both their
former colonial rulers and American imperialism inspired Khrushchev to new levels of
public support. During his visit to the United States in 1959, he spoke to the General
Assembly of the United Nations:
The last strongholds of the moribund colonial system are crumbling
away, and crumbling away for good, and this is one of the most
significant factors of our tin1e .. .Future generations will have a high
regard for the heroism of those who are leading the struggle for the
independence of India and Indonesia, the United Arab Republic and
Iraq, Ghana, Guinea and other states, just as the people of the United
States today revere the memory of George Washington and Thomas
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Jefferson, who led the American people in their struggle for
independence.
I deem it necessary to state here from the rostrum of the United
Nations organization that the Soviet Union has the most sincere
sympathy and the most profound understanding for all the peoples who
on different continents are upholding their freedom and national
independence. 258
It was within this context that Khrushchev's Soviet Union began relations with
Castro's Cuba. The U.S.S.R.-Cuba connection was not an isolated association. As the
new Cuban leadership grew increasingly bellicose towards the United States,
nationalized U.S. property, and centralized state control over the Cuban economy and
polity from 1959-1961 , Khrushchev and his advisors naturally saw in the Cuban
Revolution an extraordinary opportunity. A Communist Cuba under the influence of
the Kremlin would expand the Soviet's world propaganda presence as well as their
political influence "right under the nose" of their arch-nemesis-the United States of
America.259
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Chapter VII

UP TO THE BRINK

Not so very long ago, the struggle for national liberation raged
throughout Asia in particular. Then, it spread to Africa ... The national
liberation movement is now becoming more widespread in Latin
America as well. Here is a very recent example: the triumph of the
insurrection of the Cuban people right under the United States' nose!
The heroic and freedom-loving people of this famous sugar-producing
island made those sweet-tooth Yankees swallow a very bitter pill.
-Otto Kuusinen, Politburo Member, February, 1959260
During the first four years of the Cuban Revolution, until after the missile
crisis in October 1962, "the American problem" structured and determined the Soviet
response to Castro's Cuba. The optimistic official thesis of Khrushchev's foreign
policy- that the socialist camp now had sufficient political and military means to stop
the United States from exporting counterrevolution-was not intended for Latin
America and certainly not for Cuba. However, when Castro began to thwart the
interests of the United States, the leaders of the Soviet Union started to believe that
perhaps, just perhaps, the socialist can1p could win a major victory "right under the
United States' nose," making it swallow a "bitter pill" indeed.
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Cautious Collaboration
Cuba forced us to take a fresh look at the whole continent, which until
then had traditionally occupied the last place in the Soviet leadership's
system of priorities.
- Nikolai Leonov, KGB expert on Latin America261
The first contact between the Cuban rebels and Moscow was indirect. In
December 1958 a Costa Rican importing company, functioning as a front, approached
the Czech government to discuss the supply of rifles, mortars and ammmlition for
Fidel's rebel detachments. Prague, firmly in Moscow's 'sphere of influence', requested
guidance from the Kremlin. Moscow's leaders approved "the intention of the Czech
friends to help the liberation movement in Cuba." However, the Russians continued,
"In no document should it be written that the weapons delivery was destined for the
Cubans." Furthermore, no Soviet-made weapons were to be sent, as it was assumed
that if the CIA discovered the shipments, it might be easier for Washington to swallow
the presence of German or Czech weaponry in Cuba. 262
Although they had sanctioned Prague's sale of Czech weapons to the Cuban
rebels, the Soviet leadership in Moscow knew very little about the Cuban leader that
would soon be asking for their support. According to Sergei Khrushchev, Nikita's
son:
The arrival in Havana of the partisan fighter Fidel Castro on January 1,
1959, and Fulgencio Batista's flight, attracted little attention in
Moscow. When Father asked for information about Cuba, it turned out
26 1
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there was none to give him. Neither the Communist Party Central
Committee's International Department, KGB intelligence, nor military
intelligence had any idea who Castro was or what he was fighting
for. 263
This lack of understanding is exaggerated, but the Kremlin did not have many sources
of information inside Cuba. The Cuban Communist Party, the KGB station in Mexico
City, and Czech intelligence all provided much-needed information to the leadership
in Moscow, but there were no Soviet intelligence officers 'on the ground' in Cuba until
October of 1959. 264
In January of that year, Aleksandr Alekseev, a top Russian expert on Latin
America within Soviet intelligence, had asked the KGB to be sent to Cuba as a Soviet
observer and operative. From 1954 to 1958, Alekseev had been covering Latin
America recruiting agents and cultivating pro-Soviet politicians hemisphere-wide
from his base in Buenos Aires. He was recalled to Moscow in 1958 to devise
"propaganda operations" for Latin America for the Commission on Cultural Affairs in
the Central Committee. 265 In January 1959, Alekseev forwarded to the KGB his belief
that Cuba was unusual among the emerging states. For Alekseev, Castro's revolution
did not fit the pattern of the typical Latin American coup----especially since neither the
Cuban military nor representatives of the U.S. seemed to have taken over the new
government. In February, the KGB not only granted Alekseev's request, but expanded
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his "special mission" to include establishing direct contact with the top levels of the
new Cuban leadership. 266 Although the leaders of Cuba did want to establish such
contact, they wanted to keep it secret from the world (especially the United States)
until they were ready. Therefore, they denied a visa for Alekseev until October.

267

In fact, the Cubans made the first clandestine moves toward a direct SovietCuba connection. However, Castro was well aware of the United States' role in Cuban
history. Therefore, he sent his own emissaries to Moscow rather than allowing the
Kremlin to send one of theirs-it was far less likely that the CIA's informers would
notice a Cuban in Moscow than they would a high-ranking Russian intelligence expert
in Havana. Members of the Cuban Communist Party volunteered to forge the link
between Havana and Moscow, and a series of emissaries traveled between the two
capitals. For example, in March 1959, Castro sent a representative of the Cuban
Communist Party to meet with the chief of Staff of the Soviet armed forces to discuss
future relations between the two militaries. 268
Castro, with the help of his brother Raul, then picked Lazaro Pena, a longtime
Cuban Communist Party member and former President of the Cuban Labor Congress,
to be his first major emissary to the Soviet Union. Pena traveled to Moscow in April
1959. Through him, the Castro brothers asked for Soviet assistance in consolidating
their control of the Cuban army and improving their intelligence network. Not even
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this help was to be obvious-the Cubans asked not for Slavic advisors, but rather for
Spanish Communists who had graduated from Soviet military academies. 269 The
Cuban leader's intention in asking for Spaniards was to either make the CIA miss the
assistance altogether, or to confuse the North Americans if they did detect it. 270
Along those same lines, Castro timed his first visit to the United States to
coincide with Pena's visit to the Soviet Union. Here again, the Cuban leader deployed
Russian-style pokazukha. Sarcastically codenamed "Operation Truth," Castro's sixcity whirlwind tour of the U.S. and Canada was intended as exactly the opposite.
Castro had several goals for this "operation." Officially, he was in the U.S. "not to get
a change in the sugar quota or to get a government loan but to win support. .. from
American popular opinion." 27 1 To that end, since his government did not yet have its
own agitprop department, Castro engaged a Manhattan public relations firm to assist
in planning his itinerary and to advise the Cubans "on how to project a favorable
image during their stay in the United States." 272 The firm, Louis-Rowe-FisherLockhart Enterprises, Inc. , boasted the famous heavyweight boxer Joe Lewis as its
Vice President. 273

269
270

Ibid. , I I.
Ibid. , 28.

27 1

Nixon memorandum , quoted in Jeffrey J. Safford, "The Nixon-Castro Meeting of 19 April
1959," Diplomatic History 4 ( 1980): 426-31 .
272
273

Quirk, Fidel Castro, 236.

"Cuba Contract Ended," New York Times, July 8, 1960: 2. When relations between Cuba
and the United States began to sour, Mr. Lewis demanded that the firm drop Cuba as a client, and the
relationship ended.

125
Castro was also in the United States to turn CIA attention from Pena's visit to
Moscow. In addition, Fidel wanted to deflect rumors that he-and his governmentwere Co1m1rnnists. Castro knew that North American acceptance of a Latin American
regime depended upon its being perceived in Washington as non-Communist. To
accomplish that part of his mission, he intentionally brought with him Cuban officials
whose ideas on economics and trade matched those of the Eisenhower administration.
He also publicly denied his own Communist sympathies every time he was asked
during the trip, which was often. Furthermore, he deliberately downplayed the role of
his brother Raul in the new government, as the younger Castro was a known
Communist.
Again, Russian-style pokazukha served Castro well. On the cover of the New

York Times for April 18 (the Saturday after Castro arrived in the U.S.), the following
headline ran in large, bold font: "Castro Declares Regime is Free of Red Influence."
The first paragraph of the article read as follows:
Premier Fidel Castro of Cuba denied today charges of Communist
influences in his regime. In a speech before the American Society of
Newspaper Editors he asserted: 'I have said very clearly that we are not
Communists.' 274
The very same day, the Cuban ambassador held an elaborate reception at which Fidel
shook hands with the Soviet Ambassador and talked to the American Secretary of
Defense. Both were invited to the embassy to witness the main event of the
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reception-in a solemn ceremony, Castro awarded gold medals (mentioned above) to
the North American journalists who had interviewed him in the Sierra Maestra. The
first to receive this accolade was Herbert Matthews.275
Castro's overall objective during "Operation Truth" was to decrease North
American influence over Cuban affairs. He did this by his own public actions in the
United States as well as by his representative's covert actions in Moscow. During the
entire trip, Castro's timing and his manipulation of the foreign press were impeccable.
Castro had learned the lessons of pokazukha well. 276
Although the Soviet leaders were optimistic and energized by the possibility of
a Communist success in the Caribbean, they were as cautious in their support as
Castro was in his request. Cuban requests for assistance in building a military and an
intelligence network met with approval, but preliminary discussions of economic aid
and propaganda assistance were rebuffed. In a geopolitical climate of superpower
competition in the Third World, even Khrushchev was unwilling to go beyond secret
support for a revolutionary that the Soviets knew little about. While the visits of
Cuban Communists to Moscow were encouraging, the Russians still did not have any
intelligence assets on the island. 277 The men in the Kremlin were also aware of the
long shadow of the United States, and were determined not to have a public relations
fiasco taint their new policy of success in the Third World.
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From May to July, 1959, Che Guevara became Cuba's commercial attache,
traveling the world in search of moral and material benefits for Cuba. Although he
deliberately stayed away from socialist countries to avoid raising suspicion in
Washington, he spent time with the local Soviet and Eastern Bloc representatives in
almost every capital on his itinerary. The Kremlin was kept abreast of these meetings.
In general, Che was telling the Soviets that they had a new ally in the Third World,
and that Castro's government fully intended to build socialism in Cuba, in spite of the
influence of the United States. 278 For that, they would need help.
Guevara was clear, however, that the Cuba-Soviet compact had to be
approached carefully. As Che explained to the Soviet Ambassador to Japan in July,
Cuban "rapprochement to socialist countries" had to be "gradual.. .because the
enemies of the revolution will try to use every sign to obstruct domestic affairs on the
pretext of a communist threat in Cuba. "279 In August and then in September, Guevara
negotiated agreements for the U.S.S.R. to buy Cuban sugar at world market pricesfirst 170,000 metric tons, then 333 ,000 tons. 280 In fact, the Soviet Union had
purchased Cuban sugar throughout the 1950s (in 1955, they bought half a million
tons). Some scholars have made the argument that these purchases from Guevara
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were "routine commercial transactions." 281 Such a position is, however, without merit.
This volume of sugar, purchased directly from the new Cuban government, was a sign
of the Soviet leadership's budding confidence in the Cuban revolutionary regime.
Prior to 1959, the Soviets bought Cuban sugar from reliable private exporters.
With Guevara, they were purchasing directly from a revolutionary government not yet
fully in control of its country. Under those circumstances, and in light of the new
foreign policy in Moscow, these purchases point to a desire on the part of the Kremlin
to gamble on the future friendship of the Castro regime by supporting it economically,
despite the risk. Nikolai Leonov, KGB insider and translator for Khrushchev and
Guevara, later wrote that "Nikita Khrushchev did everything possible so that Che
Guevara's mission was successful. "282
Also in September 1959, the Cubans approached Poland with a request similar
to the one that they had made the Czechs the year before-they wished to buy
weapons secretly. Just as the Czechs had, the Poles asked permission from Moscow.
The answer from the Kremlin was delayed by Khrushchev's absence (he was in the
United States at the time), and because it was the considered opinion of the Soviet
intelligence community that "the supply of arms to Cuba will drive the Americans
toward active interference in the internal affairs of Latin America and, in the first
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instance, in the affairs of Cuba. "283 Khrushchev's return to Moscow changed that
decision. Khrushchev was dedicated to his new optimistic policy regarding the Third
World, and the socialist conversion of Cuba "right under the United States' nose" was
too tempting for him to resist. Warsaw Pact weapons, designed by Soviets and
manufactured in Poland, were sent to Cuba without delay-but still secretly. 284
In October, the Soviets were finally able to secure a Cuban visa for the Latin
American expert Aleksandr Alekseev, who was by then assigned to the KGB. Within
three days of his arrival, Alekseev met with Guevara. The next day he had a private
meeting with Fidel himself. During that meeting, Castro assured Alekseev that "All
that needs to be done will be done."285 Knowing firsthand the power of agitprop, he
urged that the traveling Soviet teclmological and propaganda exhibition then in
Mexico be routed next to Cuba, and that Anastas Mikoyan, Deputy Chairman of the
Soviet Cow1cil of Ministers, come with it. The friendly October meeting was the first
of many meetings that Alekseev was to have with the Cuban dictator over the next
several months, and it signaled a change in Castro's willingness to ally himself openly
with the Soviet Union.
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Poster-child of the Revolution
Yes, he is a revolutionary. Completely like us. I felt as though I had
returned to my childhood.
-Anastas Mikoyan, to Khrushchev, February 1960 286
In February 1960, Mikoyan took Castro up on his offer, and traveled to Havana
to assess the situation for himself. In a public speech at the opening of the Soviet
cultural and technological exhibit in Havana, he confidently assured the Cuban people
that the socialist system had proven itself superior to the capitalist system. The
"majestic successes" of the socialist system were made possible by centralized
plaiming and the work of the laborers. Under the wise leadership of the Communist
Party, the Soviet Union was "marching forward with confidence in the friendly family
of the socialist countries"-a fainily that Mikoyan invited the Cuban people to join. 287
After several days of friendly negotiations, Mikoyan met with Fidel to sign a
major trade agreement. The Soviets agreed to buy 425 ,000 metric tons of sugar during
the remainder of 1960, followed by the purchase of a million tons a year for the next
four years. Sugar in the fifth year was to be paid for in cash, the rest in Soviet goods,
including six million barrels of Soviet oil per year. Other products the Soviet were to
send included wheat, iron, steel, aluminum, newsprint, sulfur, caustic soda, fertilizers,
and machinery. The Cubans would also export fruit, juices, fiber and hides to the
286
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U.S .S.R. The Soviets agreed to provide teclmical assistance in the Cuban industrial
sector (building factories and refineries), as well as helping the Cubans to drain some
of their most pestilential swamps. Furthermore, Mikoyan agreed to loan Castro's Cuba
$100 million at the very low yearly interest rate of 2.5 percent for ten years. 288
When the Soviet delegation returned to the U.S.S.R. , they left behind most of
the machinery that had been featured in the exhibition, including a helicopter that was
promptly claimed by Fidel for his own use. They also left behind the agitprop
language of 'international solidarity' and the stamp of approval that the other socialist
countries needed in order to pursue trade. Indeed, the support from Moscow was quite
strong, and even Khrushchev personally "threw around his political weight to ensure
that every ton of Cuban sugar was bought by the USSR and its East European
allies. "289 A delegation from the German Democratic Republic arrived while the
Soviets were still in Havana, and delegations from China and the other Eastern Bloc
countries were not far behind. By the end of the month, Cuba had completed trade
agreements with both the G.D.R. and Poland. 290 The U.S.S.R. had opened a way for
Cuba to survive without the previously essential United States markets and supply.
Mikoyan's visit served also to heighten the positive response of the Soviet
leadership to the revolution in Cuba. Unexpectedly, Mikoyan discovered more in
Cuba than a chance to increase Soviet prestige under the nose of the United States.
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During his visits with Guevara and the Castro brothers, Mikoyan came to realize that
here, in a small island country just off the coast of the U.S. , real socialist revolution
had sprung up without any significant aid from the U.S.S.R.
For Mikoyan, his visit to Cuba had the invigorating affect of "an ideological
Fountain of Youth."

291

A member of the Soviet 'Old Guard', Mikoyan was now an

aging survivor of the Soviet Revolution, the Civil War, two World Wars, and three
regime changes in the Kremlin. By 1960, along with many others in Moscow, he had
become jaded by the lack of the predicted Communist world revolution. As Oleg
Troyanovsky, one of Khrushchev's top foreign policy advisors, later put it:
In the doctrine, Marxist-Leninist doctrine, you were supposed to
believe that Communism would prevail; but this was a little like the
Second Coming of Christ. You were supposed to believe in it, but very
few did [Laughs]. 292
Under these circumstances, Cuba was "a completely w1expected miracle," and
Mikoyan made little secret about how he felt. 293 His enthusiasm was such that, only a
few months later, even Eisenhower noted "I have been told that Mikoyan, on returning
to Moscow from Cuba, was exuberantly rejuvenated, finding that what was going on
in the youthful and disorganized Cuban revolution brought him back to the early days
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of the Russian Revolution. "

Mikoyan later confirmed this in a conversation with

Dean Rusk:
You Americans must realize what Cuba means to us old Bolsheviks.
We have been waiting all our lives for a country to go Communist
without the Red Army. It has happened in Cuba, and it makes us feel
like boys again! 295
Thus, the Soviet-Cuba connection became more than just political or
economic. In Moscow, upon Mikoyan's return, an ideological fervor reentered Soviet
foreign policy. In the words of two Russian Cold War historians, Khrushchev was in
the midst of a "romantic affair with Third World revolutionarism." This was true for
Africa and Asia, but it was especially true for Cuba:
Khrushchev's attachment to Castro's Cuba was the most visible
symptom of his 'leftist disease' in late 1960 and early 1961. .. [he]
allowed himself to get carried away ... Khrushchev and his colleagues
in the Presidiwn .. .saw the young Cubans as heroes who had revived
the promise of the Russian Revolution, and dared do it under the very
nose of the most powerful imperialist country on earth. 296
Mikoyan's enthusiasm was confirmed when Khrushchev embraced Castro in
Harlem, New York, later in the year. At that meeting, "a psychological w1ion was
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built between the two leaders that upset American political circles. "297 Fidel Castro
would later say:
Nikita loved Cuba very much. He especially cherished Cuba. He had a
weakness for Cuba, you might say-emotionally and so on-because
he was a man of political conviction, a man with a political doctrine, a
political theory, and he was consistent with that doctrine. He thought
in terms of capitalism versus socialism. He had very firm convictions.
He thought, perhaps in a kind of mistaken conception, that socialism
would, in peaceful competition, overcome capitalism .. .I never got a
clear answer [from the Soviet leaders] on the role of the strategic
argument in the Soviet deliberations. So I want to make clear that this
was our perception of the motivation.298
Thus did ideological romanticism also play a major part in the actions of the Soviet
leaders. Some scholars of the Cold War have gone so far as to argue that
Khrushchev's emotional commitment caused him to lose perspective completely. 299
Whether that argument is entirely true or not, on June 6, 1960, Khrushchev
publicly placed Cuba under Soviet nuclear protection- making a military and political
commitment that he would find difficult to back down from two years later. He did
this without any direct knowledge of U.S. intentions to intervene. Although in March
1960, Eisenhower had authorized the CIA to begin planning for a possible removal of
Castro, Soviet intelligence appears not to have been aware of this fact. Significantly,
the U.S. intelligence agency had no specific plans by June to which Khrushchev could
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have been reacting. Rather, he appears to have been unilaterally declaring full
solidarity with the Castro regime, reacting to preconceived notions of the U.S. threat
both to Havana and to Moscow-and his own emotionally-driven ideological
commitment to the revolution in Cuba.
At a meeting of Soviet educators, with one of his own childhood teachers
present, Khrushchev announced: "If need be, Soviet artillerymen can support the
Cuban people with their rocket fire, should the aggressive forces in the Pentagon dare
300

to start intervention against Cuba."

With this statement, Khrushchev set the stage

for the ensuing three decades, committing the Soviet Union not just to ideological,
economic, diplomatic, and military support-but also to nuclear support. Once the
Soviet Premier publicly reached this level of commitment, Castro believed he could
operate defiantly, free from repercussions emanating from Washington. He had
secured his superpower ally, and he could now do what he wished in Cuba-as long as
he supported the pokazukha-based foreign policy of the U.S.S .R. The Soviet-Cuba
connection had reached 'the brink' of nuclear war without any significant help from the
United States.

J OO N. Khrushchev, quoted in Fursenko and Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble, 52.

Chapter VIII

PIGS AND HEDGEHOGS

The fate of Cuba and the maintenance of Soviet prestige in that part of
the world preoccupied me.
-Nikita Khrushchev 301
In 1960, with Soviet support assured, Castro no longer needed to hide his
Communist sympathies from Washington. Castro's Cuba fully embraced its job as
poster-child of the anti-imperialist Third World, while simultaneously capitalizing on
both Khrushchev's public commitment and the Russians' desire to retain leadership of
the socialist camp. The United States also began to work against Cuba, but only in
response to specific actions taken by Castro against the private property of U.S.
companies. Although in March of 1960 Eisenhower had authorized the CIA to begin
planning for a possible removal of Castro, the U.S. reaction continued to be slow and
uncertain. The Bay of Pigs invasion, executed as it was in a ridiculously half-hearted
manner, served only to fuel the propagandistic fires burning in the Potemkin villages
of Moscow and Havana.
SimuJtaneously, however, the U.S. was finishing up a concerted-and
successful--effort to investigate behind the Soviet fac;ade of missile superiority. Once
that Potemkin village was pulled down, the primacy of Khrushchev's pokazukha was
301

N. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, trans . and ed. by Strobe Talbott (New York:
Bantham, 1971 ), 546.

136

137
irrevocably lost. In an impulsive bid to retain that position, the Soviet Premier sent
nuclear missiles to Cuba-but it was already too late.

Triumphant Brinkmanship
We were in the antechamber of the holocaust and we were cracking
jokes.

-Fidel Castro 302

In August of 1960, the Cuban Communist Party held its Eighth National
Congress. General Secretary Blas Roca wrote the report to that Congress, in which he
stated Cuba's unequivocal support of, and gratitude to, the Soviet Union. Clearly, the
Cuban leadership had ceased bothering to maintain an anti-Communist fa9ade, and
made some definitely-and defiantly-socialist political decisions. Lengthy quotation
is here worthwhile, as Roca states Castro's position-and the motivations behind itclearly, concisely, and (almost) accurately. The best lies are, of course, those that are
composed mostly of truth.
The solidarity of the socialist countries, offered spontaneously and
generously as a consequence of Marxist-Leninist principles of
proletarian internationalism and aid to countries fighting for liberty and
independence from imperialism, the principles which guide their
policy, has been decisive for the Cuban Revolution.303
Roca's report is similar to Khrushchev's reports to the CPSU. Roca described
how the U.S. "resorted to the criminal maneuver" of cutting off oil shipments to Cuba
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(which it did in response to the nationalization of U.S.-owned refineries), "in the hope
that they could thus bring the revolutionary government to its knees." In that case,
"the Soviet Union sold Cuba all the fuel it needed and guaranteed, to the amazement
and consternation of the imperialists, all the tankers that were needed to transport the
oil." This statement was true to a point, as the U.S.S.R. did supply oil and tankers, and
this did cause consternation in the U.S. However, in 1960, the Soviet Union did not
supply Cuba "all the fuel it needed." Furthermore, the Russians were not particularly
happy about this development. For the first, but definitely not the last time,
Khrushchev discovered himself captive of his own foreign policy pokazukha, stuck
living in a Potemkin village of his own making. In 1970, Khrushchev related how
difficult providing aid to Cuba was for the Soviet Union, even from the beginning.
Life on the island was in danger of corning to a standstill. It was urgent
that we organize an oil delivery to Cuba on a massive scale. But that
was easier said than done. We didn't have enough ocean-going vessels
in our own tanker fleet. Our efforts to provide Cuba with the petroleum
products it needed put a heavy burden on our own shipping system and
forced us to order extra tankers from Italy. 304
"Eisenhower himself," Roca continued in his 1960 report, "took on the dirty
job of eliminating the sugar quota in the market of the United States." Again, this is
true, but was done in response to Cuban confiscation of U.S.-owned holdings on the
island, this time of agribusiness. "Once again," announced Roca, "in the face of this
aggression, the solidarity of the socialist countries was shown in all its scope." 305 The
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Soviet Union and China, Roca wrote, began to buy sugar in quantities that made up for
the loss of the United States and its quotas. In reality, the purchases were not a
reflection of "the solidarity of the socialist countries." Indeed, "It seems to have been
Moscow's need to counter a challenge from Beijing which prompted the next Soviet
commitment to Cuba. 11306 Mao's China had broken with Khrushchev's U.S.S.R. in
1956, and was now in a struggle with Moscow for domination of both the established
socialist states and the emerging countries of the Third World.
Following the early commitments described by Roca, both China and the
Soviet Union sought to outbid each other in support of the Cuban Revolution. In
November, 1960, Che Guevara signed an agreement in the Chinese capital that
committed the Asian Communists to a purchase of an additional one million tons of
sugar in 1961 . The agreement also provided for a Chinese loan of $60 million to
Cuba. "With the rift between Beijing and Moscow deepening, the Soviet leaders,
aware that the Maoist model was not unattractive to the Cubans, made haste to better
the Chinese deal. 11 307 The Soviet rejoinder was a commitment the next month to the
purchase of 2. 7 million metric tons at less than world market price, along with a wide
.
. a1"d an d tee hni ca l assistance
·
vanety
of economic
measures.308
"Thanks to these purchases," continued Roca in June, even before the second
round of support was concluded with either country, "Cuba will not sell less sugar this
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year than last, but more. It will not have an economic crisis, but prosperity. 11309 Thus
did the Cubans reap the economic rewards of Mao and Khrushchev's Potemkin-like
foreign policies-rewards beyond both Cuban and Soviet expectations. Furthermore,
the compensation was not just monetary. Castro would need the latest in weapons
technology if he was to repel attacks from imperialist enemies. To that end, Che
Guevara again visited Moscow. As a result of agreements made there, a group of
Soviet military specialists, headed by A. A. Dement'ev, were sent to Cuba. The
delegation was to come up with a detailed plan to locate conventional missiles on
Cuba. In addition, the group supplied Cuba with a substantial amount of artillery,
including hand-held surface-to-air missiles, and trained Cuban army specialists in
military tactics and strategy. 310
Changing subjects, Roca continued his June report:
In the light of the evidence that that the United States, desperate and
furious, was preparing to launch open military intervention with the
criminal purpose of occupying our country by blood and fire and
defeating by arms a revolution that could not be overthrown even that
way, Prime Minister Khrushchev and leading figures in the U.S.S.R.
issued the well-known sensational warning that if Cuba was attacked in
this way, the Soviet Union would give its full aid, even to the flight of
311
intercontinental missiles to the United States if that were necessary.
In reality, as we have seen, only the month before had the United States begun
to explore the possibility of invading Cuba. pespite Roca's claims, Khrushchev's
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proclamation had little to do with the actions of the United States and everything to do
with his optimistic potemkinism. Even so, since Roca was following the logic of

pokazukha-simply claiming that Khrushchev had stopped the U.S. was just as good
as if it had actually occurred. Continuing to apply that logic, Roca wrote, "This
warning stopped the North American imperialists cold. In the face of its categorical
terms they were forced to ... suspend their plans for direct military intervention in
Cuba." 312
In fact, Khrushchev's blustering had little effect in the United States-but it
had a profound impact back home in the U.S.S.R., where Khrushchev's claims
compelled the Soviet military to attempt to give their leader's fa~ades some semblance
ofreality. Vladimir Rezun (alias Viktor Suvorov), Soviet Army officer and member
of Soviet military intelligence, wrote the following about the Soviet missile program:
"The Strategic Rocket Forces have a much revered father figure. If he did not exist
neither would the SRF. His name is Fidel Castro: you may smile, but the SRF does
not."313
Rezun went on to tell a story of the Soviet commitment to Cuba that
marvelously reveals, from the perspective of a Russian insider, what pokazukha in
action looked like under Khrushchev. With Castro's Cuba, Rezun wrote, "The
Kremlin saw an unexpected chance to loosen the hold of its hated enemy, capitalism,
on the Western hemisphere ... but one which it seemed impossible to exploit because of
312 Jbid.
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lack of strength on the spot." Previously, the Soviet Union had been able to support
allies with conventional weapons.
But how could it help Fidel Castro on the other side of the ocean? At
that time ... strategic aircraft existed but only for parades and
demonstrations of strength.
How could the United States be
dissuaded from stepping in? There was a simple, brilliant solutionbluff.314
Having covered the background, Rezun continued: "It was decided to make use
of a weapon which had not yet come into service-what Goebbels [Nazi Germany's
Propaganda Minister] would have called a 'miracle weapon'." Throughout 1959 there
had been successful Soviet rocket tests. In January 1960, Khrushchev announced the
formation of the Strategic Rocket Forces. He followed this with claims, in true
pokazukha fashion, that nothing would be able to withstand these forces, and that
Soviet missiles could reach any point on the globe. Khrushchev revealed "in
confidence" to journalists that he had been to a factory where he had seen rockets
"tumbling off the conveyor belts, just like sausages." "Incidentally," wrote Rezun in
1982, "then, as now, the supply of meat sausages was presenting the U.S.S.R. with
acute problems. "315
The West, unaccustomed to dealing with such a charlatan, credited his bluff
and was appropriately impressed. Khrushchev began making fierce threats about
"pressing the button" . However, many Soviet leaders and elites were bewildered and
surprised by Khrushchev's behavior and rhetoric. This was particularly true becuase
314 Ibid.
315 Ibid.
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his claims were nothing more than pokazukha. Many in the top echelons of Soviet
society knew that all the operational Soviet rockets were immediately used for
demonstrations in space while the new Strategic Rocket Forces received nothing but
replicas, "which were shown off in parades and in films. Empty dummies, resembling
rockets, were splendidly designated 'dimensional substitutes'."3 16 Meanwhile, a frantic
scramble was in progress to produce real, operational rockets. Working at a fevered
pace, Soviet scientists and engineers were the victims of numerous accidents. In one
such incident on October 24, 1960, an experimental rocket exploded on its launch pad,
killing the Commander-in-Chief of the new Strategic Rocket Forces. Along with his
entire staff and numerous scientists, engineers, and workers, the head of Khrushchev's
'omnipotent' nuclear arsenal was burned alive. 3 17
Thus did Khrushchev's Potemkin-like foreign policy make Fidel Castro the
"revered father figure" of the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces, multiplyingpokazukha
all the way down the chain of command. It was this "miracle weapon" upon which
Blas Roca staked the reputation of the Cuban Revolution when he wrote in his June
1960 report that:

Nationally and internationally, the forces of the Cuban Revolution and
the forces that support it are stronger than the forces of imperialist,
reactionary, and counter-revolutionary enemies. And so once more we
repeat: WE SHALL WIN! 31 8
3 16
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The Almost Invasion
The danger of direct aggression could again gain momentum following
this failure [the Bay of Pigs Affair] . We have said that imperialism will
disappear. We do not wish it to commit suicide; we want it to die a
natural death. If it dies the world will live in peace. But it will die
violently if it begins a world war.

- Fidel Castro, on the Bay of Pigs invasion, April 1961 319
While Castro and Khrushchev were busy capitalizing on their successfully
built Potemkin villages, the Americans were busy with one of the closest Presidential
elections in U.S. history. The Cuban Revolution and Soviet ICBMs became issues in
the race between sitting Vice-President Richard Nixon and Senator John F. Kennedy.
Meanwhile, in Florida, Cuban leaders in exile simply could not conceive of a world in
which the United States would not intervene in a Communist Cuba. Until after the
Bay of Pigs, Cubans who had fled the revolution to take up residence in Miami did not
buy houses or involve themselves in local affairs. They did not get jobs or even read
the Miami Herald-they felt that their sojourn in the U.S. was temporary, and their
lives were consumed with returning to their homeland.
This was due, in no small part, to history and the political currents emanating
from Washington. History told the Cuban exiles (just as it did the Soviets and the

Fidelistas) that the United States would intervene-and both Nixon and Kennedy
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seemed to support that theory. 320 Just as in Guatemala in 1954, exiles would become
the primary element of a U.S. intervention. However, in what was later officially
called "The Bay of Pigs Affair," those exiles were not supported by U.S. military
might, and the invasion ended in a major political and propaganda defeat for the
United States.
By late 1959, the CIA and the Eisenhower administration had decided (as they
had five years earlier with Arbenz in Guatemala) that Fidel Castro was a tool of
Communism and an ally of the Soviet Union. However, no detailed plan of attack was
developed until late in 1960. Throughout that election year, and largely for his own
political reasons, Nixon chafed at the CIA's evident lack of progress on that plan.
John F. Kennedy, his opponent in the Presidential race, was attacking the Eisenhower
administration- and Nixon as its Vice President-for allowing both the alleged
"missile gap" and Communist Cuba to develop. Nixon sent his military aide to push
the American intelligence services into quicker action. "How are 'the boys doing at
the institute?' he asked. 'Are they falling dead over there?' The 'Guatemalan problem'
in 1954 had been finished off in no time."321 A month before the election, it was
evident that there would be no invasion before November to prod the American people
into voting Nixon's way. Thus, "Nixon insisted that the Democratic candidate be kept
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in the dark about the unfolding military operation. Dulles agreed, and when he briefed
Kennedy, he took care to reveal nothing. 11322
For his part, when discussing Cuba during his campaign, Kennedy "proved to
be a hawk of hawks. "323 At the beginning of October, a month before the election, he
devoted an entire speech to the subject:
I want to talk with you tonight about the most glaring failure of
American foreign policy, about a disaster which threatens the security
of the whole Western Hemisphere, about a Communist menace which
has been permitted to arise only ninety miles from the shores of the
United States. I am talking about the once friendly island that our
short-sighted policies in recent years have helped make communism's
first island base, the island of Cuba. 324
It is small wonder that Kennedy, just one month after his inauguration,

authorized CIA Director Allen Dulles and Deputy Director for Plans Richard Bissell
to go ahead with their plan for invasion of the island. Dulles and Bissell came to
Kennedy that February and contended that popular discontent with Castro's regime
could be galvanized into active resistance only by an external shock. They saw the
spring of 1961 as the last opportunity to administer such a shock without actually
committing U.S. ground troops, as Castro's military was receiving more shipments of
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Eastern Bloc weapons on a regular basis, strengthening his regime. Soon, argued
Dulles and Bissell, it would be too late to execute an easy victory on the island. 325
Modeled on the Guatemalan PBSUCCESS operation, the CIA Cuban plan
(which used multiple codenames) called for a CIA-trained force of Cuban exiles who
would seize an isolated area along Cuba's southern coast, allowing emigre political
leaders to return to the island and offer the populace a democratic alternative to
Castro. However, unlike the Guatemalan plan, the Cuban Brigade's air power would
consist of emigre-flown, outmoded B-26 bombers allegedly purchased on the black
market. This would be in stark contrast to the Guatemalan operation, which used
state-of-the-art, CIA-flown bombers supported by fighters.
The original Cuban plan called for a "D-Day airstrike" similar to the airstrikes
on Guatemala City in 1954, but at the last moment, President Kennedy decided not to
allow U.S.-flown airplanes to see action over Cuba, other than a single hour of support
for the B-26s by unmarked fighters deployed from an aircraft carrier. Even this
support went undelivered during the actual invasion, as the CIA and the Pentagon
were unaware of a time zone difference between Nicaragua and Cuba. 326 Kennedy
later told a group of Cuban exile leaders in Florida that "the Soviet government had
threatened to attack West Berlin if the United States continued to launch raids on Cuba
325
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and backed the invasion. "327 Whether this was true or not, Cuban exile leader (and
Bay of Pigs participant) Nestor T. Carbonell later observed: "Tools to do the job were
not lacking; what failed was the will to use them-the will to win." 328 The CIA's
internal probe of the Bay of Pigs Affair concluded that:
The White House and the CIA were like ships passing in the night
during the planning for the Bay of Pigs invasion; they assumed they
spoke the same language with regard to Cuba, but they actually were
imprisoned by mutually exclusive misconceptions about the invasion's
likely outcome. The Kennedy administration believed the assault
brigade would be able to escape destruction by melting into the
countryside to wage guerrilla warfare ... CIA officials, from Dulles on
down to the branch chief who ran the operation, professed this same
belief but tacitly assumed President Kennedy would commit U.S.
troops rather than let the Brigade be overrun. 329
Regardless of the reasons behind the failure, it amounted to a major
propaganda coup for the Fidelistas. In an August 17, 1962 meeting with Che
Guevara, Kennedy aide Richard Goodwin was told, in no uncertain terms, that the
Castro government was quite pleased with the outcome of the 'affair':
[Guevara] then went on to say that he wanted to thank us very much for
the invasion-that it had been a great political victory for themenabled them to consolidate-and transformed them from an aggrieved
. le country to an equal.330
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Behind the Facade
Potemkin villages work only as long as no one peeks behind the fai;ade.
-John Lewis Gaddis, on Khrushchev'sforeignpolicy3 3 1
The Bay of Pigs fiasco came during a time of intense propaganda competition
between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Khrushchev-led pokazukha
campaign seemed to be winning the battle for world opinion, and errors by the United
States played into the hands of both the Cuban and Soviet propagandists. In May,
1960, the Soviets shot down a U-2 spy plane on what might have been one of the last
of such flights, for the U.S. satellite reconnaissance program was about to be
completed. The Soviets captured the pilot, Francis Gary Powers, and turned the
incident into a propaganda nightmare for the United States. At the summit in Paris
two weeks later, "Khrushchev showed up ... only for the purpose of wrecking it. "332
The Soviet leader had decided that the U-2 incident made further cooperation with the
Eisenhower administration close to impossible. Instead, Khrushchev would wait for
Eisenhower's successor. "It was an impulsive decision, but it reflected an awkward
reality: having seen the quality of the photographs from the downed plane,
Khrushchev had to know that his Potemkin strategy was in trouble. "333

Khrushchev'spokazukha was indeed about to be challenged. U.S. intelligence,
under the auspices of the Eisenhower administration and using the U-2 spy plane, had
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secretly uncovered the superficiality of Khrushchev's Potemkin villages. American
intelligence now knew that the Soviets did not have the missiles with which
Khrushchev threatened. Although Khrushchev may have believed Kennedy would be
easier to manipulate than his predecessor, J.F.K. would quickly disabuse him of that
notion. The Americans suffered through several more propaganda embarrassments,
however, before Kennedy finally tore down Khrushchev's fayade.
In April 12, 1961 , Soviet scientists again accomplished the unthinkable-they
put the first man into space. Yuri Gagarin rode the Vostok I into orbit, again fueling
the Soviet pokazukha machine. During his flight, Gagarin (perhaps on orders from the
agitprop department) whistled the tune, "The Motherland Hears" [Po,n;RHa CJihIIIIHT] . 334
The first two lines of the song are: "The Motherland hears, the Motherland
knows/Where her son flies in the sky." 335 The Washington Post headlined
Khrushchev's triumphant dare: "Let the Capitalist Countries Try to Catch Up!" The
Cuban media echoed the Soviet Premier. Revolucion, the Cuban newspaper, ran a full
page of cartoons dedicated to the Soviet success. One cartoon portrayed a naked,
defeated Uncle Sam, hiding in shame and embarrassment behind his tall striped hat.
President Kennedy, in his first public reaction to the flight, praised "the great feat."
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He soon added, however, that he was "tired" of having the United States always come
in second. 336
The fiasco at the Bay of Pigs came directly after Gagarin's victorious space
ride. In June, Khrushchev bullied Kennedy at a summit in Vienna. In August, the
world watched East Germany erect the Berlin Wall, unopposed either from the East or
by the West. Although he was "tired" of second place, Kennedy knew from the U-2
missions and new satellite reconnaissance that Soviet space technology did not equate
to missile superiority. Furthermore, there were no mass-produced Soviet ICBMs.
Kennedy had undoubtedly read the CIA's 1959 National Intelligence Estimate on
Soviet capabilities in guided missiles and space vehicles, in which the myth of the
'missile gap' had been thoroughly debunked. Although Soviet ICBM missile test
flights were continuing, there was no evidence whatever of production or deployment
beyond a single launch pad for prototype rockets. 337
Why, if the President was tired of second place, did he not immediately expose
and discredit the pokazukha of his Russian adversary? The answer lies in Kennedy's
own election 'propaganda'. He had campaigned using the fears of a 'missile gap' as a
political weapon against Nixon and the Eisenhower administration, and to
acknowledge its absence too soon after taking office would have been
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embarrassing. 338 There had been enough embarrassments during his first six months
in office-Kennedy did not want any more. However, when Khrushchev announced
in October 1961 that the Soviet Union would soon test a 100-megaton thermonuclear
weapon-an outright lie-"Kennedy had had enough." 339
The President decided to reveal Khrushchev's Potemkin missiles for what they
were. On October 21 , Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric broke the news
to the world that the United States would no longer accept Soviet pokazukha. In a
front-page story, the New York Times reported Gilpatric's remarks:
The United States is so strong and its power so well deployed that an
aggressor making a sneak nuclear attack would invite selfdestruction ... the Government's confidence in its ability to deter
Communist action or resist Communist blackmail was based on an
appreciation of the military power of each side. Mr. Gilpatric's remarks
had been cleared at the highest level. Although the Russians use rigid
security as a military weapon, he said, 'their Iron Curtain is not so
impenetrable as to force us to accept at face value the Kremlin
boasts.'340
The following February, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara announced
that the U.S. had "a clear military superiority for major nuclear conflict." 341 In March,
just days before the Soviet Army High Command decided it needed to develop an
operation that would send nuclear weapons to Cuba, Kennedy met Soviet pokazukha
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with American reality. No longer tired of being second best in the area of weapons
technology, the President announced that, "Khrushchev must not be certain that, where
its vital interests are threatened, the United States will never strike first." Indeed, he
told one reporter, "In some circumstances, we might have to take the initiative."

342

Once United States intelligence had gotten a bird's eye view of the Potemkin
villages erected in the Soviet Union, they quickly discovered that those villages were
nothing more than faryades. Once exposed, those faryades could no longer serve,
through pokazukha and propaganda, to help Khrushchev win victories on the world
stage. Thus began a new phase of the Cold War-and the beginning of the end for
Premier Khrushchev.

Lobbing Hedgehogs
Why not throw a hedgehog at Uncle Sam's pants?
-Nikita Khrushchev, April 1962343
The effect of Kennedy's exposure of Soviet deception was electric. Since the
Soviet Union had built both its foreign and military policies on the continued success
of its pokazukha, such a reaction is unsurprising. In the words of Khrushchev's
Pulitzer Prize-winning biographer:
The Soviet reaction to this reversal of fortune-angry denials that the
United States had a strategic advantage, plus attacks on Kennedy for
threatening to strike first-was allergic in the extreme. Given
Khrushchev's assumption that even a seeming strategic superiority
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could be decisive, the actual American advantage was doubly
damaging: not only had he lost the kind of strategic leverage he had
been employing for four years, but the Americans had gained it. 344
The implications for Khrushchev himself were manifold. He had personally
insisted on ICBMs as the cornerstone of the Soviet military. He had personally built
the Potemkin villages behind which there were almost no ICBMs (there were exactly
six ICBMs, total, in all of the Soviet Union, at the time of Gilpatric's announcement).

Khrushchev had personally employed a foreign policy of bluff and threat, counting on
apparent Soviet superiority to allow him to negotiate with the U.S. from a position of
perceived strength. Domestically, he had staked his stature in the Presidium on
completing disarmament agreements with the U.S. that were favorable to the U.S.S.R.
These policies were risky for a leader who, unlike Stalin, depended upon the support
of Soviet elites for his continued power. Yet that support was quickly dwindling
away, for "Instead of being a symbol of prosperity and dignified strength, their leader
appeared bellicose and rambling. "345 The first to begin undermining Khrushchev were
from the top ranks of the KGB and GRU. They justified their betrayal on the grounds
that, despite his "peaceful coexistence" rhetoric, Khrushchev's aggressive Potemkinlike foreign policy might trigger a new world war. 346 Now, both the Soviet position at
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the center of the world stage and Khrushchev's position of power in Moscow were
dangerously close to unraveling altogether. 347
Khrushchev did what many Russian leaders, before and since, have done when
crisis hit them-he went on vacation. 348 While on holiday at Pitsunda, a resort city on
the Black Sea, Khrushchev presided over an important meeting of his Defense
Council. Almost all top-ranking members of the Soviet leadership attended, including
many members of the Presidium. Also in attendance were all of the Soviet High
Command and the majority of their leading missile designers, both from the space
program and from the nuclear missile program (many of them worked for both
departments). At the sports hall near the calming waters of the Black Sea, Khrushchev
listened while his subordinates told him how bad the situation was.349
The only piece of good news that they could come up with was that the Soviets
were on par with the United States when it came to short- and intermediate-range
nuclear weapons. This was well known to all the attendees, but was reiterated before
the presenters delivered the bad news, which came in a long series of presentations.
The first presentation detailed Soviet plans to utilize cruise missiles on light vessels
and submarines in order to neutralize the heavy U.S. advantage represented by
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American aircraft carriers. This was followed by a review of the progress in
submarine-launched ballistic missile development, confirming that Soviet capability,
as compared to that of the United States, would be limited for at least another decade.
After announcing some plans for the distant future, Marshal K.S. Moskalenko
briefed the assembled leaders on the status of actual ICBM deployments. A few
Soviet ICBMS were complete and on the ground, but it took several hours to prepare
each one for launch. The rockets could stand armed, fuelled, and readied for launch
for only a few days before their corrosive fuel degraded their tanks and lines. Then
each had to be sent back to the factory for refurbishing. Therefore, Soviet ICBMs
could only be considered a first strike weapon-they could only be effective with
several hours advance notice, and only for a short period. The competing American
ICBM used solid fuel, and could therefore remain 'at the ready' indefinitely.
Development of improved Soviet ICBM designs was dragging on without any
significant results. In the event of war, Moskalenko concluded, "Before we get [our
rockets] ready for launch, there won't be even a wet spot left of any of us. "350
Khrushchev was also dealing with worries caused by his new Third World
poster-child. Although there was no question that Cuba was now fully Communist,
Castro was still uncommitted, one way or the other, to either Soviet or Chinese
leadership. One question, if answered, would seemingly obligate the Cuban leader to
either the Chinese or the Soviet camp: Would he choose to support Khrushchev's
"peaceful coexistence" policy, or would he follow Mao Zedong's lead in supporting

°K.S. Moskalenko, quoted in S. Khrushchev, Creation ofa Superpower, 474.
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violent overthrow of imperialist regimes? Shortly after Khrushchev returned to the
capital from the Crimea, Castro again sent Ramiro Valdes (now Cuban Minister of
Internal Affairs) to Moscow, this time to ask the Soviet Union to organize an
intelligence center in Cuba-including a KGB training camp for agitators and guerilla
revolutionaries. The goal of this center would be to give "active support to
revolutionary movements in Latin America." 351 When the KGB, following orders
from a now deflated Khrushchev, refused the Cuban request, Valdes deliberately
baited the Soviets. "At a time when the Chinese are striving to put a center of Chinese
influence on every continent, the Russians must do this as well. "

352

Khrushchev needed to find a way out of these problems. Sometime in March,
the idea of a missile gambit "began in Khrushchev's mind as a work of inspiration,
even whimsy." 353 Khrushchev did want to protect Cuba from invasion by the United
States, and although the Soviets did not have many ICBMs, their arsenals were full of
short- and intermediate-range nuclear missiles. Placing some of them in Cuba would
serve a double purpose: it would exponentially multiply the number of warheads
capable of reaching American cities, and it would protect and mollify the increasingly
militant-and decreasingly loyal-Cubans. It might yet be possible for Khrushchev to
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regain the upper hand in negotiations with the U.S. while simultaneously protecting
and retaining leadership over his unruly poster-child.354
In a conversation with Rodion Malinovsky, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet
Ground Forces, Khrushchev suggested that Cuba might make a useful base for Soviet
missiles, and asked contemplatively, "Why not throw a hedgehog at Uncle Sam's
pants?" 355 Top Khrushchev advisor Oleg Troyanovsky later related that these Cuban
rockets were intended "to redress the nuclear balance in favor of the Soviet Union."
Troyanovsky also recalled that Yuri Andropov (then in charge of foreign relations
with other socialist countries) told Khrushchev: "Once this is done we'll be able to
target them at the soft underbelly of the United States." 356
Khrushchev would later say that "our missiles would have equalized what the
West likes to call the 'balance of power"'-a balance tipped suddenly towards the
United States due to the collapse of Khrushchev's policy of pokazukha. In reality, the
Cuban deployment was just more of the same-the Soviets would still not come close
to matching the firepower of the United States. Even so, if the Soviet military could
succeed in placing even a few missiles that could reliably hit North American cities,
Khrushchev would have gained back a bit of the negotiating power he had lost.
Although additional aims were to protect Communist Cuba and solidify Castro's
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loyalty to the U.S.S.R. , it was within this larger context that Khrushchev conceived the
missile deployment to Cuba.
To accomplish his goals, Khrushchev needed Castro's permission and support,
which was by no means guaranteed. While the Soviet military commanders worked
on a deployment plan, Khrushchev called Aleksandr Alekseev back to Moscow from
Havana to ask his opinion, in person, about how Castro might be persuaded. Alekseev
predicted that Castro would refuse to cooperate, fearing loss of face ifhe was
perceived to be a lackey of the U.S.S.R. 357 Khrushchev responded by naming
Alekseev his next ambassador to Cuba, and drafting a letter to Castro that included
some extraordinary promises. First, the Soviet Union excused all Cuban debt.
Second, Khrushchev promised to provide Cuba with arms and ammunition, free of
charge, "including missiles and other arms, details about the supply of which will be
discussed by our delegation in Havana."358 Khrushchev, after all, did have a strong
affinity for the Cuban revolutionaries. His support at this juncture was spurred,
therefore, by both diplomatic and ideological considerations--even if it was desperate
and ill-conceived.
The Presidium met at Khrushchev's country home on May 27 to give the
Cuban delegation its instructions. Marshal Sergei Biryuzov, commander of the Soviet
Rocket Forces (he had recently replaced the previous commander, discussed above,
who was burned alive on a launch pad), was to head up the delegation, travelling as an
357
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irrigation expert under the name "Engineer Petrov". He was to tell Fidel that the
missiles were to protect Cuba from the United States and to "buttress the defensive
power" of the worldwide socialist revolution. 359
Contrary to Alekseev's fears, when Biryuzov arrived and made the offer,
Castro accepted quickly and easily. Alekseev was correct-Castro did worry openly
about what this would do to his image. However, Fidel said that Cuba "had no right to
base our decision on narrow self-interest." If the Soviets wanted to "buttress the
defensive power" of the socialist camp by placing nuclear weapons in Cuba, Castro
would let them. 360
Smely, the Cuban leaders were reminded of the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs
Affair, when the actions of the United States had "transformed them from an
aggrieved little country into an equal." The Soviet Union was now doing the same
thing. Thoughts of China probably disappeared from their minds. Here was the
commander of one of the world's two superpower's Strategic Rocket Forces urging the
Cubans to accept free and powerful conventional weapons for their own use, forgiving
them hundreds of millions of dollars of debt, and offering to protect them from their
archenemy by using the most powerful weapons the world had ever seen. Small
wonder that, "For the first and only time in eight years," Alekseev recalled, "I saw the
Cubans writing things down. 11 36 1
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The week before, on May 21, Khrushchev had met with his most trusted
advisors and had secretly decided to install medium- and intermediate-range missiles
in Cuba. The decision was not final, for it would need approval from both the Defense
Council and the Presidium. But prior to those endorsements, the professional military
planners of the Soviet Army High Command were to prepare a preliminary blueprint
for "the creation, transportation, and supply of a military unit similar in its makeup and
mission, if not in size, to Soviet army groups stationed in Europe. This was to be a
new group within the Soviet military, to be named 'The Cuban Group', similar to the
'The German Group.",3 62 This task fell to General Anatoly Gribkov and two of his
coworkers. For the next two days and nights, Gribkov lived in his office, working
furiously and secretly. 363
Although his superiors did not specifically order him to do so, Gribkov (in
good Russian pokazukha tradition) intentionally built as much secrecy and deceptive
illusion into his plan as he could think to include. In a deliberate move to mask its true
destination, Gribkov codenamed the operation "Anadyr" after a river and region in
freezing, unpopulated northeastern Siberia, as far from the tropical Caribbean as the
globe allowed. 364 There were to be seventy to eighty merchant vessels that, after
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refitting, would carry missiles, troops, support staff, and cargo to Cuba. The workers
involved in the project, in all seven Soviet ports used, were to work in fenced
compounds guarded by the KGB. The captains of the vessels were not to be told of
their destination until they opened sealed orders after their ships were well
underway. 365 Gribkov's plan called for these vessels to make a total of 150 trips,
carrying everything the Cuban Group of Soviet Forces would need.
Gribkov's list was five pages long, and included: forces comprising all
branches of the Soviet armed forces, under a single integrated staff of the Cuban
Group headed by a Commander in Chief. The 43rd Missile Division, comprised of
five missile regiments, would be the core of the force. With the missile units would
go 1.5 missiles and 1.5 nuclear warheads per launcher (sixty missiles and sixty
warheads in all), with one field technical base per regiment for equipping the
warheads.
Upon arrival at their designated locations in Cuba, Gribkov gave the personnel
of the missile regiments ten days to equip their positions and be ready to launch. To
help them accomplish this job, he planned to send along twenty-five engineers and
100 construction personnel as well as 100 technological and radio experts. 366
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For air defense, he would send two antiaircraft divisions, including twenty-four
antiaircraft battalions, six technical battalions, one fighter air regiment with the latest
MIG airplanes (three squadrons-forty aircraft), a helicopter regiment (two
squadrons-thirty-three helicopters), and two radar battalions. For defense of coasts
and bases in the sectors of probable enemy attack, Gribkov would send one regiment
of Sopka [little volcano] missile launchers, comprised of three battalions (six
launchers each) with three missiles per launcher.
For defense on the sea, he planned a brigade of missile patrol boats, a
detachment of support ships, a mine-torpedo aviation regiment made up of three
squadrons (thirty-three aircraft) with jet torpedoes and air dropped mines (for
destruction of surface ships), two cruisers, two missile destroyers, two conventional
destroyers, seven missile submarines with three intermediate-range nuclear missiles
each, four torpedo submarines, two submarine tenders, and one refueling tanker.
For protection on the ground, the Group would need four separate motorized
rifle regiments, with a tank battalion in each, at an overall personnel strength of 7,300
foot soldiers. In 'the rear,' Gribkov specified three hospitals of 200 beds each, one
anti-epidemic sanitary detachment, seven warehouses (two for food, one for general
storage, and four for fuel), and even one field bakery factory. 367 Gribkov then
summarized the personnel total: "The overall number of the Cuban Group of Soviet
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Forces [not including naval forces] will be about 44,000 military personnel and 1,300
workers and civilians. "368
On May 24, Malinovsky presented Gribkov's plan to Khrushchev, who
immediately endorsed it. The Premier then sent the Defense Council's secretary, with
a formal version of the plan, to each member of the Defense Council and the
Presidium, individually--even, on orders from Khrushchev, tracking some of the men
down at their country homes. When some Presidium members expressed doubts, the
Premier called them personally. After the call, they signed. When the document had
made the rounds, approval of the plan was 'unanimous'. Three days later, the
delegation led by Biryuzov and Alekseev left for Havana. 369
From June to October, the Cuban Group deployed to the island and set up their
defenses . A policy of pokazukha, originally begun by Gribkov but expanded upon by
others, dictated how they deployment was carried out. None but the highest ranks
knew their destination before they arrived. Many of the troops were issued parkas,
boots, and skis to support the codename of their mission. Other than a few lucky
officers who were able to travel in tourist disguise, the troops and their support
personnel were forced to spend the trip below deck in ships without air conditioning.
Since they were traveling through some of the warmest waters in the world, and since
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they were allowed on deck for only fifteen minutes each night, the twenty-day journey
seemed like hell on earth. 370
The last of the shipments was arriving when the United States intelligence
community (which had largely ignored the thousands of human intelligence reports
coming out of Cuba over the summer about the missiles) finally spotted one of the
rocket installations during an overflight of Cuba by a U-2, on October 14. By October
19, the U-2s had photographed four such installations. On October 22, President
Kennedy delivered a publicly televised address announcing the discovery of the
missiles. Khrushchev's last attempt at parity through pokazukha had failed.
For pokazukha this was-Khrushchev had no intention of using those missiles,
he simply wanted them deployed in Cuba to give him back some of his perceived
power. He later said unequivocally that the missiles were intended only "to threaten
the United States. After installing the missiles we, together with the Castro
government, intended to announce their presence in a loud voice. There was no sense
in keeping the missiles secret, because they were not meant for attack." 371
This time, Kennedy had not waited months to expose the Soviet fayadebuilder. As soon as his bluff was called, Khrushchev took what he could get from the
situation and removed his missiles. What was it that he gained? First, a secret
promise from Kennedy that that the U.S. would remove some aging intermediate-
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range nuclear missiles from Turkey (the U.S. was planning to do that anyway).
Secondly, according to Khrushchev:
[Journalists] used to say that the power of America forced Khrushchev
to back down. The Chinese used the same argument. We have to weigh
the gains against the losses. We removed our missiles in exchange for
the American promise not to invade Cuba. The aim of the Americans
was to destroy Cuba. Our aim was to preserve Cuba. Today Cuba
exists. So who won? 372
However, Khrushchev achieved victory only on his secondary goals, and that
marginal success did nothing for his own career. Khrushchev's last two years in
power were a time of desperation. After the collapse of his Cuban foray, he tried to
address other foreign policy issues, but without the momentum that a Cuban triumph
would have provided. Much of his energy and imagination were spent. In the words
of his biographer, "Khrushchev had learned at last that bluff and bluster didn't pay, but
they had been his main weapons, and without them, he was lost. "373
The true winner of the missile crisis was Fidel Castro. Although Khrushchev
did win a minor battle by extracting Kennedy's pledge in exchange for nothing,
Kennedy had won the war over public opinion. Although Kennedy was victorious in
the propaganda realm, he had abandoned Cuba to a Bolshevik dictator. Only Fidel
won in both the public realm and in the realm of hard-nosed practicality. In 1988, as
the Cold War was thawing shortly before the Iron Curtain came crashing down, Castro
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granted an interview to NBC's Maria Schriver. She asked him about the early 1960s,
and he replied:
[Castro] The United States was not prepared to accept the idea of an
independent country in Latin America, a revolutionary country in Latin
America, and a socialist country in Latin America. They were not
mentally prepared for that. .. China was the Red threat, the Yellow
threat, the threat of all colors .. . The U.S.S.R. was the evil empire and
had no relations. Today U.S. relations with China and U.S. relations
with the U.S.S.R. are excellent. We are left with the honor of being
one of the few adversaries of the United States.
[Shriver] That's an honor?
[Castro] Of course it is an honor. Because for such a small country as
Cuba to have such a gigantic country as the United States live so
obsessed with this small island, a country that no longer considers itself
an adversary of the U.S.S.R. or adversary of China and considers itself
an adversary of Cuba-it is an honor for us. 374

Pokazukha has often worked well as foreign policy-in the short term. For
Catherine and Potemkin, it admirably aided their goals following the Tauride Tour.
For Khrushchev, it allowed him to maintain a fa9ade of Soviet missile superiority,
using that propaganda advantage to expand Soviet influence in the emerging nations.
For Castro, it helped him gain and consolidate power while holding off intervention
from the United States. However, when pokazukha is revealed for what it is, its power
disappears. It is therefore quite dangerous as a long-term basis for policy.
Khrushchev's foreign policy, built almost entirely on fa9ades, failed quickly and
completely when his bluff was called. Despite his blustering, he did not have ICBMs
that could imperil the United States. In spite of his threats, even when he had missiles
in Cuba that could reach most of the important targets in the U.S., he did not use
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them- he had never intended to. Pokazukha, then, worked well for Khrushchev- but
only until it was revealed for what it was.

Chapter IX

CONCLUSIONS

Imagine, if you will, that you find yourself standing in the middle of a small
town in the American West circa 1880. A tumbleweed rolls across the dusty street
lined with horses tied to handrails. Cowboys wearing chaps and spurs stroll with their
gingham-clad ladies. Suddenly, a villain, dressed all in black, comes charging out of a
saloon, firing wildly and yelling at the top of his lungs. You would quickly find the
nearest cover, wouldn't you? Ducking for cover, you have discovered how pokazukha
works, creating a powerful illusion in the minds of its intended audience.
Now imagine that, while you are beating a hasty retreat around the comer of
one of the buildings, you discover that the storefronts that looked so real from the
front are actually two-dimensional fa9ades, held up with wooden supports.
Investigating further, you notice that a large fan is motivating the tumbleweeds and the
dust, and that the horses are actually animatronic. That means, of course, that the
people are all actors, the bullets are all blanks, and you were never in any danger after
all--except in your own mind. Discovering the insubstantiality of the scene, you felt
what occurs when the fa9ades of Potemkin villages are revealed for what they truly
are-the illusion has lost all of its power.
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As we have seen, pokazukha, directly translated, means "it's all put on, just for
show." Pokazukha is that which operates to "reveal" with an ulterior motive. It is the
eclipse of the truth with something created. It is deception as art, illusion as reality.
Someone practicing pokazukha is building more than a fayade, he is constructing his
own particular edifice of the real. For Khrushchev, such constructions allowed him a
brief period of perceived geopolitical preeminence. For Castro, they allowed him to
create his legend, to stave off U.S. intervention and to secure the support of the Soviet
Union.
However, the instigator needs help to produce truly effective pokazukha.
Beyond deception and ostentation is an implied complicity on the part of both the
deceiver and the deceived-a complicity that lends some reality to the illusion being
created. The actions that constitute pokazukha have some reality without the belief of
the audience, but audience participation is necessary when the desired effect is
dependent upon the pokazukha being taken for reality. In the case of Herbert
Matthews and the New York Times, Castro's pokazukha worked because the journalists

wanted the Cuban rebel to be a hero, in order to sell newspapers. In the case of
Kennedy and his delay in exposing Khrushchev's bluff of missile superiority,
Khrushchev's pokazukha continued to work because Kennedy's campaign had insisted
that there was a 'missile gap', just as Khrushchev claimed. However, in situations such
as this, when the pokazukha is exposed all of its power immediately disappears-a
fact which Khrushchev discovered as soon as Kennedy tore down the fayade of Soviet
missile superiority.
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In Communist countries influenced by Soviet ideology, 'showing off and
'putting on' are more than just deceptive fai;ade-building. For the Soviets and their
adherents, illusion is an important part of the process of becoming. If not for the
necessity of supporting Castro with missiles, Khrushchev may not have created the
Strategic Missile Forces and pushed their scientists and engineers to the limits of their
abilities. If not for his claim that his band of bandits was a "rebel army", Castro could
not have maintained the illusion that he was a real threat to Batista's regime. Indeed, if
not for the imperatives engendered by Khrushchev's pokazukha-based foreign policy,
the Soviet Union may not have supported Castro's Cuba at all.
Under the Bolsheviks, Russian pokazukha and propaganda were codified as
part of the new Marxist-Leninist strategy of world revolution. The leaders of the
Russian Revolution utilized concepts from the traditions of both pokazukha and
propaganda, fusing them together to form the strategies of Soviet "agitprop." In the
years that followed, the agitprop department distributed the deceptive practices of the
Soviets worldwide, through printed propaganda and by sending agitators like Fabio
Grobart into countries like Cuba. Fidel Castro would later make good use of standard
Soviet pokazukha strategies. Castro's "Operation Truth", for example, was intended to
persuade the people of the United States that he was their country's friend. In reality,
behind this fai;ade, Castro was simultaneously-and secretly--cementing a
relationship with its arch-nemesis, the U.S .S.R.
Stalin also developed certain innovative agitprop techniques that laid the
groundwork for the achievements of his successors, including Khrushchev and Castro.
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Stalin systematically exploited exchange programs for propaganda purposes, inviting
countless delegations from all over the world-and sending agitprop agents to the
countries agreeing to exchange. As we have seen, just such a program solidified
Soviet influence over Raul Castro. Stalin also pioneered the use of well-timed
interviews with foreign journalists as an instrument of Soviet agitprop. Fidel Castro
used this technique in 1959 to overcome Batista's censorship and project his own
heroic image to the world.
From Lenin to Khrushchev, the leaders of the Soviet Union and their disciples
abroad utilized concepts from the Russian tradition of pokazukha, codifying them in
the official strategies of agitprop. Many of Castro's agitprop techniques so closely
resemble those of the Soviets that it seems clear that he was profoundly affected by the
Soviet example. Fidel and his associates were the first to fully utilize organized
agitprop on Cuban soil. Additionally, as this thesis project has shown, the SovietCuban connection was infused with pokazukha from its very beginnings, and the
building of fa9ades characterized both countries' foreign policy during the Cold War
of the late 1950s and early 1960s.
What motivated the Soviet superpower to support a shaky revolution on the
other side of the world? Khrushchev and those in his Kremlin were absorbed by the
project of expanding Soviet power and prestige through the use of Potemkin-like
posturing. Much of the world was emerging from a colonial yoke, and the Kremlin
believed that the geopolitical position of the Soviet Union was intimately tied to
supporting anti-Western revolutions in the Third World. Khrushchev was dedicated
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to this new expansionist, pokazukha-based foreign policy, and the socialist conversion
of Cuba "right under the United States' nose" was too tempting for him to resist.
Castro's commitment to Communism came as a welcome surprise, and both the
history of United States interference and the emotional and ideological brotherhood
they felt toward Castro's movement caused the Soviet leaders to escalate their support.
What could cause the independent-minded leaders of the Cuban Revolution to
ask for Soviet support? The Castro brothers grew up learning the lessons of Cuban
history. They knew that the United States often intervened when 'American interests'
were threatened. They also grew up watching Stalin and his socialist union thwart the
interests of one imperial power after another. Deeply imbued with revolutionary
fervor and Soviet strategies of pokazukha, they saw an opportunity to use those
strategies-and the socialist superpower that exported them-to escape the historic,
economic, and political hold that the United States had on their country.
Although some scholars have argued that Castro simply exchanged one
dependence for another,375 this rings true only in the economic realm. The Soviets did
not---could not-force Castro to follow their every whim. Once they had committed
to Cuba (both emotionally and geopolitically) as part of their pokazukha-based foreign
policy, the Soviets wanted Castro's revolution to survive and thrive. The importance
of the Cuban Revolution to the reputation of the Soviet Union, both as counter to the
capitalist-imperialist threat and as poster-child of socialist revolution in the Third
World, allowed Castro to forge the Soviet-Cuba connection on equal terms, regardless
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of the economic and geopolitical inequality between the two countries. Of course, the
blunders made by the leaders of both superpowers also helped to artificially elevate
the little Caribbean country.
Beyond their intervention in Guatemala, the actions of the Eisenhower
administration had little to do with the forging of the Soviet-Cuba bond. Much more
important was what the leaders in both socialist countries saw as historically
preordained interference by the United States. Rather than diplomatic actions of the
moment, the geographic and historical shadow of the United States played the primary
North American role. Living in that shadow, Castro felt the need to import Soviet
support. Troubled by that shadow, the Soviets hesitated to export such aid-and then,
once publicly committed, they threw the entire weight of the socialist world behind an
unstable revolution in a diminutive county a globe away from Moscow.
In both Castro's Cuba and Khrushchev's U.S.S.R., appearances were vital. For
both leaders, in different ways, foreign policy successes-particularly vis-a-vis the
United States-were essential in consolidating and holding power domestically. Both
men used pokazukha to accomplish their political ends. By the mid-l 950s, the
leaders of both nations were heavily affected by the Soviet version of fac;ade-building
as well as the agitprop practices of the Russian Revolution. Such strategies worked
extraordinarily well for both leaders until the early 1960s, when the United States
finally developed the technologies necessary to expose Khrushchev's bluff for what it
was-a Potemkin village. Even as his fac;ade of strength was dismantled, however,
Khrushchev was able to use pokazukha, in the form of nuclear missiles he did not
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intend to use, to ensure that Fidel Castro was safe from intervention by the United
States.
Potemkin's legacy is very much alive today. Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev,
Guevara, Castro and the nameless thousands who worked in their agitprop networks
adapted and expanded on the Russian Prince's pokazukha, but it is still recognizable as
Potemkinism. Potemkin's legacy lives in the propaganda pronouncements of rulers
like Hugo Chavez and Hu Jintao. As of this writing, that legacy still lives in the
person of Fidel himself, now a walking version of the Lenin mausoleum-both of
them (Lenin as a corpse and Castro as a zombie) are excellent examples of pokazukha
personified. Potemkin's legacy lives in the military instruction manuals of the world,
where Castro's pokazukha is studied as a model of militant propaganda. 376
Unsurprisingly, it is very much alive in Communist Cuba, which still survives "right
under the United States' nose," reveling in the "honor" of being one of the longestlasting opponents of the world's only remaining superpower.

376

See Major Russell J. Hampsey, U.S. Army, "Voices from the Sierra Maestra: Fidel Castro's
Revolutionary Propaganda," Fort Leavenworth Military Review (November-December 2002), http://
www.latinamericanstudies.org/cuban-rebels/voices.htm
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Y HHBepcu:rezy rrpaBa, BKJIIOqag ace rru:TepaTypHbie rrpaBa u: rrpaaa co6cTBeHHOCTH, Ha
ony6riHKOBaHHe, pacneqaTKY HJIH HHOe HCil0Jlb30BaHHe, a TaK)Ke pa3Me:m:eHRe
3anu:ceil: u:/u:JIH nepenHCaHHbIX C MOHX CJIOB MaTepu:arroB
/
q .
200~ B 3TH ycrrOBHH TaK)Ke BKJIIOqaIDTCH rrpaBa Ha ony6rrHKOBaHHe B neqaTH H B
3JieKTpOHHOH <J:>opMe, pa3Me:m:eHHe B eJieKTpOHHOM q>OpMaTe B ceTH l1HTepHeT/Be6 H
.npyrnx 3JieKTpOHHbIX q>OpMarnx, a TaK)Ke TeXHHtieCKHX <J:>opMaTOB HCIIOJib3yeMbIX B
6y.ny:m:eM . .5I (pacCKa3qHK) a ,naHHOM ,noKyMeHTe ,naID npaaa Ha pacnpOCTpaHeHHe
3anu:ceH H /u:JIH KOIIHH MaTepu:arrOB HHTepBblO B JI10601e ,npyru:e 6u:6JIHOTeKH H
yqe6Ho1e yqepe)K.ZJ:eHHH ,nrrg yqe6Ho-o6pa3oBaTeJibHhIX u;erren.
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Ilo,no6HbIM o6pa30M B paCCMOTpeHHH ycJIOBHH ynoMHHJTbIX BbIIIle, g HHTepBblOep,
MailKJI BecTpeiiT, 3THM ,nOKJMeHTOM 11epe,na10 rronHoMoqu:g H apyqa10 CT.Knay,n
CTeiiT YHHBepcu:Tezy rrpaaa, BKJIIOtIM ace JIHTepaTJPHbie rrpaaa H npaaa
co6CTBeHHOCTH Ha ony6JIHKOBaHHe, pacnetiaTKY HJIH HH0e HCil0Jib30BaHHe, a TaK)Ke
pa3Me:m:eHHe 3aIIHCeii u:/u:rrH nepenu:caHHbIX MaTepu:arroB yrroMHHYTbIX BbIIIIe. 8 3TH
ycJIOBIDI TaK)Ke BKJIIOqalOTCH npaaa Ha ony6JIHKOBaHHe B rreqaTH H B 3JieKTpOHHOH
q>OpMe, pa3Me:m:eHu:e a erreKTpOHHOM <J:>opMaTe a ceTH l1HTepHeT/Be6 H ,npyru:x
3JieKTp0HHbIX <J:>opMaTax, a TaK)Ke TeXHHqeCKHX <J:>opMaTOB HCil0Jib3yeMbIX B

6y.ny:m:eM. B .nonorrHeHHH, g ,naHbIM ,nOKJMeHTOM ,naID pa3pemeHHe Ha coxpaHeHHe
3TOro ycTH0ro HCTopu:qecKoro MaTepu:arra B C00TBeTCTBHH C npHHHTbIMH
npo<J:>ecCHOHaJibHbIMH CTaH,napTaMH 0 coxpaHH0CTH HHq>OpMau;HH H ,naID cornameHHe
rrpe.nocTaBHTb paCCKa3qHKY ,nocTyrr K MaTepHarraM HHTepBblO, eCJIH BOCTpe60BaHO.
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